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Abstract: The regulation of corporate behavior has persisted in spite of peaks of
neo-liberalism in many developed jurisdictions of the world, including the U.K.
This paradox is described as “regulatory capitalism” by a number of scholars.
Of particular note is the proliferation of corporate regulation to govern
“socially responsible” behavior in recent legislative reforms in the EU and
U.K. In seeking to answer the broader question of whether corporate regulation
indeed effectively governs and moderates corporate behavior, this paper focuses
on the nature of corporate regulation. Although different pieces of corporate
regulation purport to achieve different objectives and impose different types of
obligations, this paper offers an institutional account of corporate regulation,
specifically in relation to the U.K.’s regulatory capitalism, as the U.K. is
typically held up as having a liberal market economy (which is broadly similar
to the U.S.). In this article, I argue that the nature and effectiveness of corporate
regulation crucially depends on the nature of regulatory capitalism in the type
of economic order under discussion. Hence the study of the U.K.’s economic
order and its efforts in introducing corporate regulation to change corporate
behavior holds lessons more generally for corporate regulation in economies
that share similar features. The examination in this article provides an
overarching framework for distilling the achievements and limitations of
corporate regulation in such economic contexts.
First, the paper clarifies that regulatory capitalism in the U.K. is characterized
by three key tenets that reflect the spirit of the liberal market economy embraced
here. Over time, gaps have been revealed in the achievements of these tenets of
regulatory capitalism, particularly in relation to social expectations of the
regulation of corporate behavior. These gaps have become the subject of
debates in the realm of “corporate social responsibility” (CSR), where
business, civil society, and the state frame the expectations of corporate
behavior in contested ways: in relation to the scope of responsibility, the
motivations for corporate behavior, the theoretical premises, and business
practices. In the aftermath of the global financial crisis in 2007-2009, we
observe increasing legalization in the EU and U.K. of CSR issues, framed in
Professor of Corporate Law and Financial Regulation, University College London. This
paper is based on my inaugural lecture at UCL, 16 January 2018. The author thanks Steven
Vaughan and Marc Moore for comments on an earlier draft. All errors and omissions are
mine.
*
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“new governance” regulatory techniques. They hold promise for change in
corporate conduct through deeper forms of corporate engagement and
accountability, but they appear at the same time relatively undemanding and
susceptible to cosmetic compliance. By discussing key examples in new
corporate regulation reforms in the EU and U.K., we seek to understand why
recent corporate regulation reforms seem to offer mixed and, in some cases,
relatively limited achievements in governing corporate behavior. We argue that
the institutional account of corporate regulation continues to be able to explain
regulatory weaknesses and limited achievements, in spite of the deployment of
“new governance” regulatory techniques. This is because new governance
regulatory techniques are implemented within the ethos of regulatory capitalism
which limits their potential to introduce paradigm shifts. However, the
limitations of these regulatory reforms highlight more sharply the institutional
shifts that are needed in order to connect the efficacy of corporate regulation
with meeting social expectations.
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INTRODUCTION
The inquiry in this paper is what corporate regulation has achieved
over recent decades and contributes to the discourse on “regulatory
effectiveness.” One could turn to empirical research, and indeed a recent
paper finds that in post-1970 common law countries, corporate regulation is
reactive in nature, and has little role to play in moderating future corporate
behavior.1 Despite the overall pessimistic finding, we observe the
indefatigable advancement of corporate regulation, from product liability2
and environmental degradation, 3 to the recent surge in corporate regulation
that deals with social responsibility such as human rights, corruption, and
stakeholders.4 Can regulatory effectiveness really be dismissed? We
recognize that regulation can be introduced by policy-makers for a variety
of reasons including protectionist purposes,5 but we focus here on the
objective of moderating corporate excesses or changing corporate
behavior.6 Even if we think of regulation as susceptible to bureaucratic
agendas,7 or as being reactive or weak, many commentators8 continue to
affirm its importance in meeting public interest objectives, supplying public
and collective goods, meeting distributive and welfare objectives, and
responding to the needs of society.
The precise weighting of regulatory effectiveness is not what this
paper sets out to do; rather, we argue that an institutional account of
corporate regulation is necessary to illuminate the issue of regulatory
effectiveness in changing corporate behavior.9 As Section I will explain, we
seek to give an account of how corporate regulation works as an institution
1
Luzi Hail et al., Corporate Scandals and Regulation 1-39 (ECGI Working Paper,
2017), http://ecgi.global/sites/default/files/working_papers/documents/hail-tahoun-wangun
pixelated_0.pdf.
2
Strict liability introduced in product liability regulation has advanced consumer
protection to a degree beyond private law rights. See John TD Wood, Consumer Protection:
A Case of Successful Regulation, in REGULATORY THEORY 633-51 (Peter Drahos ed., 2017)
(citations omitted).
3
See overviews in JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PETER DRAHOS, GLOBAL BUSINESS
REGULATION 475-531 (2000); in relation to the U.K., see TONY PROSSER, THE REGULATORY
ENTERPRISE 223-35 (2010).
4
See Section III.
5
Examples include the Bubble Act in the 18th century, which had the effect of
entrenching the power and monopolies of chartered corporations in the U.K.
6
See Christine Parker & Vibeke Lehmann Nielsen, Introduction, in EXPLAINING
COMPLIANCE: BUSINESS RESPONSES TO REGULATION 1-34 (Christine Parker & Vibeke
Lehmann Nielsen eds., 2011).
7
See George Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT.
SCI. 3-21 (1971); but see Steven P. Croley, Theories of Regulation: Incorporating the
Administrative Process, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1-168, (1998).
8
See generally CASS SUNSTEIN, VALUING LIFE: HUMANIZING THE REGULATORY STATE
(2014); JOHN BRAITHWAITE, REGULATORY CAPITALISM 1-31 (2008).
9
Which informs analysis of regulatory effectiveness at more granular levels in relation
to distinct pieces of corporate regulation.
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of our capitalist tradition, in order to appraise its achievements and
limitations. Our institutional account of corporate regulation is able to shed
light on a number of more specific and topical issues, particularly the likely
“effectiveness” of a new trend in corporate regulation targeted at the social
responsibility aspects of corporate behavior,10 and the achievements and
limitations of new regulatory techniques such as new governance 11 that
support such regulation. We seek to understand why regulatory innovations
such as new governance techniques, which have been developed with much
promise in respect of governing corporate behavior, have only been
supported by mixed results.
This article defines the scope of “corporate regulation” as law that
addresses corporate behavior, not limited to the corporate form or
governance. Aguilera et al12 provide a comprehensive mapping of the
drivers for corporate behavioral change at the levels of the individual, the
firm or organization, the national or institutional, and the supranational.13
The range of behavioral drivers include individual ethics, organizational
pressures and culture, bottom-up third party pressures and initiatives,
incentives and pressures entailing from institutions such as law and
regulation, and supranational developments such as international codes and
soft law. Hence, corporate regulation is one but an important driver for
change in corporate conduct and behavior.14 Regulation can, through a
variety of techniques,15 incentivize or force changes to corporate conduct
Discussed in Sections B and C.
Id.
12 Ruth V. Aguilera et al., Putting the S Back in Corporate Social Responsibility: A
Multilevel Theory of Social Change in Organizations, 32 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 836-863
(2007).
13 Id. at 837.
14 For an exploration as to why public policy interfaces with corporate social
responsibility issues, see Jette Knudsen & Dana Brown, Why Governments Intervene:
Exploring Mixed Motives for Public Policies on Corporate Social Responsibility, 30 PUB.
POL’Y & ADMIN. 51-70 (2015); see also Reinhard Steurer, The Role of Governments in
Corporate Social Responsibility: Characterising Public Policies on CSR in Europe, 43
POL’Y SCI. 49-72 (2010). On regulation as a tool of choice for public policy, see Michael
Moran, The Rise of the Regulatory State, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF BUSINESS AND
GOVERNMENT 383 (David Coen et al. eds., 2010); see also Barak Orbach, What is
Regulation?, 30 YALE J. ON REG. 1-10 (2012). For an economic explanation for why
regulation is a tool of choice for implementing policy, see David P. Baron, Regulation and
Legislative Choice, 19 RAND J. ECON. 467-477 (1988). However, regulation is not the only
means in navigating the business-government relationship, as business influences
government too in terms of policy, even as governments make choices to govern businesses
through various means including hybrid means and tools involving public and private sites
of power and capacity. See Gregory Schaffer, Law and Business, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK
OF BUSINESS AND GOVERNMENT, supra, at 63.
15 This could be in relation to business activities, objectives, conduct, standards or
processes. On the different modes of public policy “partnering” with corporate or other
voluntary initiatives in shaping corporate conduct, see overview in Neil Gunningham,
Regulation: From Traditional to Cooperative, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF WHITE
10
11
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and behavior.16 The regulatory context is also important for developing
“soft law”17 and initiatives that complement or co-shape one another for the
purpose of influencing change in corporate behavior.18 Indeed the existence
COLLAR CRIME 503 (Shanna Van Slyke et al. eds., 2016); Laura Albareda et al., Public
Policies on Corporate Social Responsibility: The Role of Governments in Europe, 74 J. BUS.
ETHICS 391-407 (2007).
16 The importance of regulation as effecting public policy is discussed generally in Neil
Gunningham & Robert A. Kagan, Regulation and Business Behavior, 27 L. & POL’Y 213217 (2005); Jenny Fairbrass & Anna Zueva-Owens, Conceptualising Corporate Social
Responsibility: ‘Relational Governance’ Assessed, Augmented, and Adapted, 105 J. BUS.
ETHICS 321-335 (2012). The effectiveness of regulation as articulating norms reflecting
social acceptability, and clarifying corporations’ “social license to operate” is discussed in
Karin Buhmann, Public Regulators and CSR: The ‘Social Licence to Operate’ in Recent
United Nations Instruments on Business and Human Rights and the Juridification of CSR,
136 J. BUS. ETHICS 699-714 (2016); Onyeka Osuji, Fluidity of Regulation-CSR Nexus: The
Multinational Corporate Corruption Example, 103 J. BUS. ETHICS 31-57 (2011); the power
of state enforcement that regulation entails is often a powerful incentive for behavioral
change, see Céline Gainet, Exploring the Impact of Legal Systems and Financial Structure
on Corporate Responsibility, 95 J. BUS. ETHICS 195-222 (2010). Regulation is often a
necessary institutional context for more powerful stakeholder monitoring and civil society
engagement with companies, see Min Dong Paul Lee, Configuration of External Influences:
The Combined Effects of Institutions and Stakeholders on Corporate Social Responsibility
Strategies, 102 J. BUS. ETHICS 281-296 (2011); Jan Lepoutre et al., Dealing with
Uncertainties When Governing CSR Policies, 73 J. BUS. ETHICS 391-408 (2007). Although
regulation is state-centered, McInerney argues that it remains salient and potent in a
globalized world, see Thomas McInerney, Putting Regulation Before Responsibility:
Towards Binding Norms of Corporate Social Responsibility, 40 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 171-200
(2007); commentators also call for more internationally binding laws to curb regulatory
arbitrage, see Ulrich Mueckenberger & Sarah Jastram, Transnational Norm-Building
Networks and the Legitimacy of Corporate Social Responsibility Standards, 97 J. BUS.
ETHICS 223-239 (2010)). See also EXPLAINING COMPLIANCE: BUSINESS RESPONSES TO
REGULATION, supra note 6, at 1-34 (discussions generally on rationales for regulation, modes
of securing compliance, and limitations). For specific examples of regulatory success, see
DAVID SCHORR, THE COLORADO DOCTRINE: WATER RIGHTS, CORPORATIONS, AND JUSTICE ON
THE AMERICAN FRONTIER 65-103 (2012); Caryl Pfeiffer, How the Clean Air Interstate Rule
Will Affect Investment and Management Decisions in the US Electricity Sector, in
STRATEGIES, MARKETS AND GOVERNANCE: EXPLORING COMMERCIAL AND REGULATORY
AGENDAS 151–65 (Ralf Boscheck ed., 2008); Ralf Boscheck, Strategy, Markets and
Governance, in STRATEGIES, MARKETS AND GOVERNANCE: EXPLORING COMMERCIAL AND
REGULATORY AGENDAS, supra, at 3-32 (discusses the legalization of the Kimberley process
for certifying that diamonds sourced by MNCs are free from being tainted with exploitation
of civil conflict); Ralf Boscheck, On Governing Natural Resources, in STRATEGIES,
MARKETS AND GOVERNANCE: EXPLORING COMMERCIAL AND REGULATORY AGENDAS, supra,
at 208–24.
17 Soft law usually refers to instruments that fall short of the qualities of hard law, this
definition will be clarified in the discussion of the relationship between regulation and soft
law later in the article.
18 The complexity of the matrix of various governance initiatives is discussed in Bryan
Horrigan, 21st Century Corporate Social Responsibility Trends – An Emerging Comparative
Body of Law and Regulation on Corporate Responsibility, Governance, and Sustainability, 4
MCQUARIE J. BUS. L. 85-122 (2007); Reinhard Steurer, Disentangling Governance: A
Synoptic View of Regulation by Government, Business, and Civil Society, 46 POL. SCI. 387-
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of regulation is often crucial to the success or otherwise of voluntary, thirdparty or civil society-led initiatives that seek to influence changes in
corporate conduct.19 Hence, by focusing on giving an institutional account
of corporate regulation, this article does not marginalize the importance of
other types of initiatives. Quite the contrary, it argues that a clear and rich
understanding of the institution of corporate regulation is essential to the
larger picture of developing and evaluating endeavors by governments, civil
society, and business to change corporate behavior.20
Section I first explores the development of corporate regulation in the
U.K. as an institution of regulatory capitalism. Corporate regulation
supports and is integral to the ethos of the capitalist tradition embraced in
many jurisdictions in the world.21 We discuss the key tenets and
achievements of regulatory capitalism but also highlight its limitations as
crucially defined by our capitalist economic model.
Section II discusses how regulatory limitations have been increasingly
exposed and challenged in the social sphere. Socially-organized calls for
CSR have become clearer and louder, entailing developments in the
voluntary and largely transnational space, in the form of new governance
and “soft law.” The global financial crisis from 2007 to 2009 brought about
a culmination in ideological crises of faith in modern capitalism. We
observe in its wake the surfacing of social discontent amidst disruptions to
political power. In response, policy-makers globally have introduced an
unprecedented surge in the legalization of CSR. Section III analyses this
phenomenon and the package of regulatory reforms introduced in the U.K.
and EU to shed light on whether such legalization, which incorporates new
governance regulatory techniques, indicates paradigm shifts in corporate
regulation. We find mixed results and conclude that there is no crucial
paradigm shift. However, we explain our findings in Section IV and argue
that the mixed achievements in recent corporate regulation reforms are
410 (2013).
19 Jodi L. Short & Michael W. Toffel, Making Self-Regulation More Than Merely
Symbolic: The Critical Role of the Legal Environment, 55 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 361-397 (2010);
for how the legal environment supports non-state actors in governance, see John L.
Campbell, Why Would Corporations Behave in Socially Responsible Ways? An Institutional
Theory of Corporate Social Responsibility, 32 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 946-967 (2007); Ronald
Jeurissen, Institutional Conditions of Corporate Citizenship, 53 J. BUS. ETHICS 87-96 (2004);
and for a specific study of the “responsible care” program’s effectiveness against the
regulatory context, see Stephen Finger & Shanti Gamper-Rabindran, Does Industry SelfRegulation Reduce Accidents? Responsible Care in the Chemical Sector, 43 J. REG. ECON. 130 (2013) (argues for the necessity of the regulatory context for the success of voluntary
compliance programs).
20
See also Jodi Short, Self-Regulation in the Regulatory Void: “Blue Moon” or “Bad
Moon”?, 649 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL’Y & SOC. SCI. 22-34 (2013) (argues that the lack of
corporate regulation is often a regulatory void and is not substituted by effective means of
soft law or self-regulation).
21 David Levi-Faur, The Global Diffusion of Regulatory Capitalism, 598 ANNALS AM.
ACAD. POL’Y & SOC. SCI. 12-32 (2005).
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affected by old patterns of regulatory weaknesses. These are inherent in the
institutional account of corporate regulation. Nevertheless, this institutional
account pinpoints the precise limitations of recent corporate regulation
reforms and the path to institutional change.
I. CORPORATE REGULATION IN THE U.K. AS A PHENOMENON OF
REGULATORY CAPITALISM
A. The Capitalist Order of the Liberal Market Economy and the Nature of
Regulatory Capitalism
The capitalist economic model in the U.K. is described as an “Angloliberal” economy22 or as termed by the varieties of capitalism literature, a
“liberal market economy.”23 The U.S. also subscribes to a “liberal market
economic order.”24 Fundamentally, a capitalist economic order upholds the
freedom of exchange expressed in market relations, seen as the essential
counterpart to political freedom in democratic states.25 Markets are
regarded as places where individuals seeking to maximize their welfare can
make efficient choices based on their individualistic perceptions of
opportunity cost.26 The promotion of free markets can be seen as
establishing the necessary conditions for realizing economic freedoms and
individual success.27 The hallmark of the British model is the acceptance of
the supremacy of the market in coordinating economic relations whether
they are investment, production, distribution or consumption — a
phenomenon some call “market fundamentalism.” 28 Such market
COLIN HAY & ANTHONY PAYNE, CIVIC CAPITALISM AT 4 (2015).
Peter A. Hall & David Soskice, An Introduction to Varieties of Capitalism, in
VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM: THE INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE
1-70 (Peter A Hall & David Soskice eds., 2001). Although this characterization is derived
from the perspective of how firms structure their relationships in order to organize economic
activity from production to distribution to consumption, and the institutions that support and
advance such structuring, the ramifications of the British capitalist order for the nature of
corporations and corporate regulation (including corporate law and governance) are
especially on point for this article.
24 Id. at 1-34
25 Martin Wolf, The Morality of the Market, 138 FOREIGN POL’Y 46-50 (2003).
26 PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, MICROECONOMICS 3-24 (19th ed.
2009) (discussing the basic economic concept of opportunity cost that underlies “microeconomic” behavior, and frames a choice in relation to what else is traded off or foregone,
i.e., that a choice is made because it is preferred to alternatives). For the basic economic
concept of opportunity cost that underlies “micro-economic” behavior, see SAMUELSON &
NORDHAUS, supra, at 3-17.
27
One can reconcile Hayek’s libertarian support of the free market with Amartya Sen’s
argument that political and economic liberties are key institutions, though not exclusively,
for the development of real economic well-being for every individual; see FRIEDRICH
HAYEK, ROAD TO SERFDOM 63-90 (1944); AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 13-85
(1999).
28 This similar model is also a hallmark of the US economy; see JOSEPH STIGLITZ,
22
23
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fundamentalism rose to its political peak in the 1980s under the Thatcher
governments in the U.K. and the Reagan administration in the U.S.29
Although markets are not regarded as perfect and the development of law
and regulation has played a part in addressing market distortions and
failures,30 the Anglo-American model of capitalism today has continued to
reflect many features of market fundamentalism.31
The importance of marketization of economic relations has profoundly
affected the organization of economic activity in corporations. The
corporate sector in Britain was dominated by monopolies established under
Royal Charter until the 19th century,32 and family-owned and closely knit
companies until the end of the First World War.33 The organization of
economic activity within a corporate structure was not only an economic
phenomenon34 but had social and political implications.35 The corporation
ushered in an economic society in terms of structuring economic relations36
and bringing about social changes such as social mobility.37 From the end
of the Second World War, the marketization of the corporation developed
incrementally with the rise in the market for corporate control and

FREEFALL: AMERICA, FREE MARKETS, AND THE SINKING OF THE WORLD ECONOMY 1-57
(2010); see also LEE BOLDEMAN, THE CULT OF THE MARKET: ECONOMIC FUNDAMENTALISM
AND ITS DISCONTENTS 1-34 (2007) (discussing how this similar model is also a hallmark of
the U.S. economy).
29 See SALLY WHEELER, CORPORATIONS AND THE THIRD WAY 14, 44 (2002) (describing
the “New Right”).
30 See JOHN MCDERMOTT, CORPORATE SOCIETY 1-2 (1991) (indicating that even where
free markets find political support, markets areas where law and regulation are absent does
not reflect reality).
31 See HAY & PAYNE, supra note 22; see also ADAIR TURNER, JUST CAPITAL: THE
LIBERAL ECONOMY 364-79 (2001). Although Sally Wheeler argues that the election of the
New Labour government in 1997 marked a turning point for Britain’s economic model
towards centrist politics and a middle way, termed “The Third Way” in conceiving of a more
stakeholder-conscious and ethical economic model, hence shaping the social position of the
corporation, such change has arguably not taken place under the stewardship of the Labour
government 1997-2010 which has since given way to a predominantly Conservative
government that supports the liberal market economic model; see WHEELER, supra note 29,
at 29-33
32 The East India and South Sea Companies were protected by the Bubble Act, which
prevented similar enterprises from being incorporated. Only after the repeal of the Bubble
Act in 1825 did Britain emerge from its “corporate lag.” See BRIAN R. CHEFFINS,
CORPORATE OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL: BRITISH BUSINESSES TRANSFORMED 175-220 (2010).
33 Id. at 252-381.
34 See Ronald Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386-405 (1937).
35
Discussed in relation to how the Cadburys merged economic enterprise with social
provision for their employees; see WHEELER, supra note 29, at 33.
36 The corporation is analyzed as a social institution structuring economic relations; see
MCDERMOTT, supra note 30, at 1-2.
37 See, e.g., SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET & REINHARD BENDIX, SOCIAL MOBILITY IN
INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY 5-27 (1991).
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ownership of shares.38 The promotion of market fundamentalism peaked
with the dismantling of Keynesian economic management policies in the
1980s, as the British state relinquished direct economic agency, privatized
nationalized industries,39 and pursued a policy of enhancing corporate
competitiveness. This era marked a decisive shift in the characterization of
British corporations as market-based actors, and has had a lasting effect
upon corporate behavior. Corporations as market-based actors pursue
individualistic and “rational” micro-economic behavior, profoundly
changing the way economic relationships are structured within and beyond
the corporation,40 as well as how they perceive their roles in society.41
Public policy promoted the structuring of economic relations through the
market, and market supremacy crucially trumped organized relations
between firms and labor, marking the start of the decline of the institution
of collective bargaining.42 Under the economic policies introduced by the
Thatcher government in the U.K., government involvement in economic
38 CHEFFINS, supra note 32, at 252-381 (discussing how mergers and acquisitions
activity rose to disrupt close family ownership of companies, and then the growth of the
stock market and the willingness on the part of corporations to make public offers, matched
by the growth in appetite in the investing community, particularly institutions, resulted in
greater dispersion of ownership in British publicly listed companies).
39 Stephen Young, The Nature of Privatisation in Britain, 1979–85, 9 W. EUR. POL. 235252 (1986); see Richard Seymour, A Short History of Privatisation in the UK: 1979-2012,
GUARDIAN (Mar. 29, 2012), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/mar/29/
short-history-of-privatisation.
40 As market-based actors, corporations may choose to frame their relationships in
singularly economic terms. Inherent in attaining efficiency is the freedom to exit a
transactional relationship, prizing choice and efficiency over social values such as
commitment. See ALBERT O. HIRSCHMANN, EXIT, VOICE AND LOYALTY 1-20 (1970)
(provides an analytical paradigm for relational ordering). Exit through the market may
provide individual relief from discontent but contributes nothing to improvement of the
situation whether in firms, organizations, politics or business. Voice is a more painstaking
route as effort is made to influence change. Exit, for its short-termist efficiency advantages,
is questioned as to its effectiveness in contributing to longer-term political, social or
economic ordering.
41 This is marked by the gradual shift away from socially conscious or “values ethics”based roles; see WHEELER, supra note 29, at 1-58 (argues for a return to a “third way” in the
characterization of corporate purpose and governance in between the “New Right” policies
of the 1980s and 1990s and the discredited socialist policies after the fall of communism in
the early 1990s. Such a third way was offered at a time coinciding with the election of a
Labour government in the U.K. in 1997 which represented an era of centrist politics).
Bratton also argues that corporations moved away from a social welfare role at the same
time in the U.S., as Reagan’s government ushered in market fundamentalist policies to
change an economic landscape marked by disenchantment with the centralized hands of state
economic management and the managerial class in corporations. See William W. Bratton,
The Separation of Corporate Law from Social Welfare, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 767-790
(2017).
42 Richard F. Disney et al., British Unions in Decline: An Examination of the 1980s Fall
in Trade Union Recognition 403-419 (NBER Working Paper No. w4733, 2000),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=250345.
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activity declined, and the private sector clearly came to the forefront in
relation to “rowing” the economy, which refers to the provision of goods
and services and the carrying out of technological innovation. Although
commentators doubt that the government ever had a very strong hand in
economic and industrial policies before,43 as compared to the growth of the
welfare state during that time,44 the 1980s clearly marked the start of a new
form of economic capitalism in Britain.
Paradoxically, it is observed that the state grew concomitantly in terms
of its regulatory remit and apparatus.45 It is a myth that systemic
deregulation had taken place. Instead, this is an age of regulatory
capitalism, a phenomenon observed not only in the U.K. but globally. 46
Regulatory capitalism may be seen as the balance to market
fundamentalism. The role of the state in economic policy is clarified as that
of “steering” while the private sector is responsible for rowing. 47 The
objectives of regulation are to steer away from the problems that unbridled
markets give rise to, such as market failures48 to provide collective goods.49
Such moderation nevertheless supports markets so that they can work
optimally. The nature of regulation has gradually become infused with
economic analysis and market-based concepts.50
Referring to post-war Britain, see PETER A. HALL, GOVERNING THE ECONOMY 23136(1986); R. C. O. Matthews, Why Has Britain Had Full Employment Since the War?, 78
ECON. J. 555-569 (1968) (arguing that Britain’s fiscal policy did not contribute a significant
part to post-war full employment and economic boom, as private sector investment was the
most significant factor). This was also not due to particularly robust industrial policy
adopted by Britain, as such weaknesses were later discussed in S. N. Broadberry & N. F. R.
Crafts, British Economic Policy and Industrial Performance in the Early Post-War Period,
38 HIST. BUS. 65, 65 (1996) (argues that post-war economic boom was also not due to
particularly robust industrial policy adopted by Britain.
44 MICHAEL HILL, THE WELFARE STATE IN BRITAIN: A POLITICAL HISTORY SINCE 1945,
chapters 2 and 3 (1993).
45 Michael Moran, The Rise of the Regulatory State in Britain, 54 PARLIAMENTARY AFF.
19-34 (2001).
46 BRAITHWAITE, supra note 8, at 1-31 (2008).
47 “Rowing” depicts the work of actual service provision and technological innovation
that is carried out by the private sector as commercial and business activity, while “steering”
refers to setting policy in order to influence, govern, or incentivize behavior or output in
relation to rowing. See Levi-Faur, supra note 21, at 15; BRAITHWAITE, supra note 46.
48 I.e., where markets do not produce optimal outcomes due to structural problems such
as information asymmetry, oligopolistic structures, etc.; MARTIN CAVE & ROBERT BALDWIN,
UNDERSTANDING REGULATION 9-17 (1999); BRONWEN MORGAN & KAREN YEUNG, AN
INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND REGULATION 18-25, 47-53 (2007).
49 Also includes prevention of social harm, where such prevention is more efficient than
ex post litigation, see Edward L. Glaeser & Andrei Schleifer, The Rise of the Regulatory
State, 41 J. ECON. LITERATURE 401-425 (2003); Steven Shavell, Liability for Harm Versus
Regulation of Safety, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 357-397 (1983).
50 The “Law and Economics” school of thought has American origins. See Robert van
Horn & Philip Mirowski, The Rise of the Chicago School of Economics and the Birth of
Neoliberalism, in THE ROAD FROM MONT PÉLERIN 139-78 (2015). A key British commentator
43
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The economically-driven model of regulation can be seen, for
example, in the regulation of utilities51 which focuses on anti-competitive
behavior, and in financial regulation which imposes mandatory disclosure52
to overcome information asymmetries in the markets for securities and
financial products.53 The growth of many regulatory agencies54 is premised
upon the need to correct failures in markets to support optimal market
outcomes. Indeed, in 2004, the U.K. government accepted a set of
principles recommended in the Hampton Report,55 including refraining
from regulatory intervention in favor of “economic progress” unless
necessary and ensuring the efficiency of regulatory administration and
action. This has given rise to governmental commitment to “better” and
more efficient evaluation of regulatory policy and design as a whole,56
elucidates how economic analysis and market-based concepts have become integral to
regulatory thinking. See ROBIN PAUL MALLOY, LAW IN A MARKET CONTEXT 1-25 (2004)
(elucidates how market concepts feature in legal reasoning in the U.K. context). However,
the U.K. and EU employ economic concepts to legal and regulatory policy but are often
cognizant too of the limitations of these concepts. See ARISTIDES N. HATZIS & NICHOLAS
MERCURO, LAW AND ECONOMICS 1-31, 89-120, 203-44 (2015); KATJA LAGENBUCHER,
ECONOMIC TRANSPLANTS: ON LAWMAKING FOR CORPORATIONS AND CAPITAL MARKETS 1140; 64-70 (2017) (an analysis is made of regulatory problems framed in economic terms,
solutions sourced in economic models and the imperfections these entail for regulation and
judicial decision-making).
51 John Vickers & George Yarrow, Regulation of Privatised Firms in Britain, 32 EUR.
ECON. REV. 465 (1988); PROSSER, supra note 3, at 176-200; Mark Thatcher, Institutions,
Regulation, and Change: New Regulatory Agencies in the British Privatised Utilities, 21 W.
EUR. POL. 120 (1998).
52 More to be discussed in relation to securities regulation shortly.
53 FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., ECONOMICS FOR EFFECTIVE REGULATION: OCCASIONAL PAPER
13, 3-41 (2016), https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/occasional-papers/occassional-paper13.pdf (the most recent affirmation of an economically-driven approach to financial
regulation). See also earlier pronouncements on an economically-driven, risk-based
approach when the regulator’s predecessor, the Financial Services Authority, was
established. JULIA BLACK, THE DEVELOPMENT OF RISK-BASED REGULATION IN FINANCIAL
SERVICES: CANADA, THE UK AND AUSTRALIA: A RESEARCH REPORT 1-54 (2004),
http://www.lse.ac.uk/law/people/academic-staff/julia-black/Documents/black19.pdf; JOHN
ARMOUR ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF FINANCIAL REGULATION 3-21 (2016).
54 The growth of regulatory agencies has come to be a key observation at a global level
for many jurisdictions in the age of regulatory capitalism. See, Levi-Faur, supra note 21, at
16-19. Giandomenico Majone, The Rise of the Regulatory State in Europe, 17 W. EUR. POL.
77-101 (1994) (discussing a similar underpinning for European agencies).
55 PHILIP HAMPTON, HM TREASURY, REDUCING ADMINISTRATIVE BURDENS: EFFECTIVE
INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT: THE HAMPTON REVIEW – FINAL REPORT 7-8 (2005),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/nol/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/bud05hampton_150305_640.pdf.
56 The Better Regulation Task Force was introduced in 2006, then re-styled as the Better
Regulation Commission in 2008-2009 as an independent advisory body to the government
promoting rational and efficient design in regulation]. The work of the Better Regulation
Commission continues in the Regulatory Policy Committee, which is an advisory and nondepartmental government body sponsored by the Department of Business, Industrial
Strategy, and Energy. The Committee continues to support the government in cost-benefit
analysis and rationalizing regulatory policy and design today. See The Better Regulation
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which has continued through changes in government.
Although the purposes of regulation are varied, regulatory thinking has
predominantly been shaped by economic notions.57 Policy-making and
regulatory technique are infused with “market-based” wisdom, as regulators
consider the balance of risk and harm to determine the extent of
intervention,58 the need for regulatory resources to be allocated according to
risk-based regulation,59 and the use of cost-benefit analyses60 (however
imperfectly)61 to account for regulatory initiatives.
Regulation has also been introduced to govern industries where
business activity has resulted in social harms and scandals,62 producing
regulatory regimes that target a mixture of economic and social demands. 63
In sum, regulatory capitalism is heavily infused with the economic
intellectual tradition, as economic behavior and its control become
Commission, Dep’t for Bus. Innovation & Skills (archived Mar. 4, 2010), https://webarchive.
nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.berr.gov.uk/whatwedo/bre/reviewing-regulation/
commission/page44086.html.
57 See, e.g., FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., supra note 53, at 3-41; see also LAGENBUCHER, supra
note 50, 11-40, 64-70.
58 Jonathan B. Wiener, Whose Precaution After All? A Comment on the Comparison and
Evolution of Risk Regulatory Systems, 13 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 207-262 (2003);
CHRISTOPHER HOOD ET AL., THE GOVERNMENT OF RISK: UNDERSTANDING RISK REGULATION
REGIMES , chapters 1 and 2 (2004); SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, RISK
REGULATION AT RISK 1-30 (2003) (provides a critical approach to the “economic” thinking
behind regulatory policy).
59 BLACK, supra note 53, at 1-54.
60 This is a key remit of the Regulatory Policy Committee. See also Julie Froud &
Anthony Ogus, Rational Social Regulation and Compliance Cost Assessment, 74 PUB.
ADMIN. 221, 221-37 (1996); Cass R. Sunstein, The Cost-Benefit State 1-43 (Coase-Sandor
Institute for Law & Economics, Working Paper No. 39, 1996) (American perspective); and
for improvements to such a methodology in order to embrace more holistic and qualitative
judgments, see Cass R. Sunstein, The Limits of Quantification, 102 CAL. L. REV. 1369-1421
(2014); Robert H. Frank & Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Relative Position, 68
U. CHI. L. REV. 323-374 (2001); Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Essay: Moral
Commitments in Cost-Benefit Analysis, 103 VA. L. REV. 1809-1860 (2017) (supports the
underlying rationality in cost-benefit analyses but not a narrow and metricized approach).
61 Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Unquantified Benefits and the Problem of
Regulation Under Uncertainty, 102 CORNELL L.R. 87-137 (2016).
62 BRAITHWAITE, supra note 8, at 32-63. Scandals may involve social harms such as
BSE (bovine spongiform encephalopathy, or otherwise known as ‘mad cow’s disease) which
culminated in greater food regulation in the U.K., or financial crises, such as those of in the
1970s, that led to the introduction of bank capital adequacy standards which cascaded from
the international (Basel Committee of Banking Supervision) to the national. The drivers of
regulatory capitalism will be in greater detail discussed shortly in greater detail.
63 This has been observed by Prosser in relation to the U.K., as well as Braithwaite and
Drahos in relation to global business regulation, as both books observe substantial
developments in social policy such as in relation to public and employment health and
safety, product, and food and drug regulation, as well as environmental regulation in relation
to anti-pollution of air and water. See PROSSER, supra note 3, at 223; BRAITHWAITE &
DRAHOS, supra note 3, at 475.
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increasingly framed as incentive-based.
Although this is not the only paradigm in which regulation is designed
and implemented, regulatory capitalism in the U.K. can, on the whole, be
regarded as neo-liberal in nature, 64 expressed through policy-making and
regulatory initiatives that largely go towards making the marketized
economic order work better. Regulatory capitalism calibrates state-business
relationships in such a way as to move away from simplistic notions of
antagonism or paternalistic oversight, but as a necessary market
companion,65 promoting the fulfilment of economic rowing by business.
This position has persisted in the U.K. since the 1980s.66
B. The Three Tenets of Corporate Regulation
We argue that corporate regulation in the U.K.’s liberal market
economy is underpinned by the ethos in regulatory capitalism, giving rise to
three regulatory tenets that reflect this ethos. First, the law for the
organization and structuring in corporations, i.e. company law, respects
corporations as private economic organizations free to determine their own
purposes, and does not intervene into their objectives. 67 Company law
preserves or facilitates the economic freedoms of freely associating agents
in the model of a corporation as a “contractarian organization” which
manages its internal efficiencies and is private in nature.68 The role of
64 See Peter Drahos, Regulatory Capitalism, Globalization and the End of History, 1
INTELL. PROP. L. & POL’Y J. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 1, 1-23 (2014) (a characterization that several
commentators agree with).
65 BRAITHWAITE, supra note 8, at 197.
66 The New Labour government continued to support “better regulation” so that
regulation is effective but also proportionate, cognizant of business criticisms of costly
burdens and red tape; see PROSSER, supra note 3, at 201.
67 For example, corporate purpose is up to the management and shareholders to decide;
the doctrine of ultra vires in company law was decisively abandoned in the reforms made to
the Companies Act 2006. This doctrine used to uphold the existence of objects clauses in
company constitutions that limited the sphere of corporate activity and could render void
third-party contracts entered into pursuant to purposes outside of the objects clauses; see
Ashbury Ry Carriage and Iron Co v. Riche [1879] LR 7 (HL) 653 (U.K.). The doctrine may
be viewed as an obsolete aspect of the “social contract” companies have with society in
return for the privilege of incorporation (as a state-granted “franchise” or “concession”).
Companies now have unlimited objects by default, (see section 21, UK Companies Act
2006), and are thus free to pursue their private economic freedoms, while being accountable
primarily to shareholders as to the results of those economic pursuits. Also, much of
company law, in terms of internal governance, is enabling in nature, such as the possibility
of opting out of the enabling default “constitution” set out in the Model Articles Regulations,
and the Foss v Harbottle doctrine that looks to shareholders to ratify internal breaches or
errors before resorting to derivative actions, now (see s239, UK Companies Act 2006).
68 Boiling down to a “nexus of contracts” organized within the internal marketized
model of the firm. See Coase, supra note 34, at 386–405; the theory establishes the
“quintessentially private and self-ordered nature of a company’s management affairs,” which
should be mainly free from state intervention. See, Marc Moore, Private Ordering and
Public Policy: The Paradoxical Foundations of Contractarianism, 34 OXFORD J. LEGAL

97

Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business

39:85 (2019)

mandatory law is to provide an efficient framework to meet the needs of
order, balance, and accountability in the private “administrative” franchise
that is the company.69 Company law70 essentially constitutes a private
framework of governance centered upon management control71 subject to
shareholder primacy.72 This is consonant with the notions of theoretical
efficiency supported by commentators73 in the economics of organization.
The legal preference for shareholder centricity is also a legacy issue in the
U.K., as businesses transformed into corporations from the late 19th century,
bringing partnership concepts into company law.74 Company law has been
shaped largely by internal efficiency and governance needs,75 bearing little
STUD. 693, 697 (2014). This concept means that company law reflects parties’ default
hypothetical bargains. See, William A. Klein, The Modern Business Organization:
Bargaining Under Constraints, 91 YALE L.J. 1521-1564 (1982); Manuel A. Utset, Towards
a Bargaining Theory of the Firm, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 540-611 (1995); FRANK H.
EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 1
(1991).
69 See MARC MOORE, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE SHADOW OF THE STATE at chapter
2 (2013) (discusses the theoretical lens of institutional analysis in relation to private
“administrative” power).
70 Such as minority shareholder protection in recourse to the derivative claim (s260-263,
UK Companies Act 2006); or unfair prejudice petition (s994-996, UK Companies Act 2006),
and the codified directors’ duties, (s170-177, UK Companies Act 2006).
71 The Companies (Model Articles) Regulations 2008, SI 2008/3229, Schedule 3.
72 ANDREW KEAY, SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY IN CORPORATE LAW: CAN IT SURVIVE?
SHOULD IT SURVIVE? 1-51 (2009). At the global level, shareholder primacy is argued to be a
model of the corporate economy that has brought about the end of history as being an
ideological and practical winner; see Henry Hansmann & Reiner Kraakman, The End of
History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439-468 (2000); see also Leo Strine Jr., Our
Continuing Struggle with the Idea that For-Profit Corporations Seek Profit, 47 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 135-172 (2012).
73 Investors are characterized as supplying capital in an incomplete contract, not
knowing how the corporation would fare, hence they are regarded as “residual claimants” to
corporate property if the company indeed goes insolvent, and can then exercise rights of
quasi-property, attached to their shares, in the company. See Armen A. Alchian & Harold
Demsetz, Production, Information Costs and Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV.
777-795 (1972). See also Oliver E. Williamson, Corporate Governance, 93 YALE L.J. 11971230 (1984). Agency economists also see shareholder primacy as the cure to the agency
problem of separation of ownership from control. See, EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note
68, at 1-3 Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305-360 (1976).
74 Paddy Ireland, Limited Liability, Shareholder Rights and the Problem of Corporate
Irresponsibility, 34 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 837-856 (2010). In fact, dispersed ownership only
started taking off from the post-War period, hence company law served the needs of closelyheld companies where managers were often also shareholders or closely related to other
shareholders; CHEFFINS, supra note 32, at 221-251
75 A model argued to be globally superior. See, Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 72,
at 439 (argues that the shareholder-centric model of corporate governance is regarded as the
“end of history for corporate law” as such a model, focused singularly on private
economically-driven interests, seemed best-placed to drive economic purpose, productivity,
and organization in companies). The private law notions of property and contract underlie
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relation to social policy.76 As the New Labour government put it in relation
to reforming company law after it came into power, company law reforms
carried out in 2006 were about modernizing the company as a business
vehicle that promotes enterprise and the right conditions for investment and
employment.77 Company law supports private organizations and economic
endeavors in order to play its part in growing the economy because the
company, in the U.K.’s liberal market economy model, is a free agent in the
market and not a socially-coordinated instrument or public policy.78
Second, a major source of corporate regulation is securities regulation
for publicly listed corporations. Such regulation is focused on corporations’
responsibilities to the markets that provide them with capital and facilitates
market-based discipline carried out by investors. Securities regulation was
pioneered in the U.S. as a socio-economic reform,79 but has since become
many of the rights and obligations among constituents in company law. See, John Armour &
Michael J. Whincop, The Proprietary Foundations of Corporate Law, 27 OXFORD J. LEGAL
STUD. 429-465 (2007).
76 See Benedict Sheehy, Private and Public Corporate Regulatory Systems: Does CSR
Provide a Systemic Alternative to Public Law?, 17 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 1-54 (2016) (a
critical account of the dis-embedded corporation). See also Lyman Johnson, Corporate Law
and the History of Corporate Social Responsibility, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE
HISTORY OF COMPANY AND CORPORATE LAW 570 (Harwell Wells ed., 2017). For an analysis
of the general lack of a wider socially-facing dimension in corporate law, see Jingchen Zhao,
Promoting More Socially Responsible Corporations Through a Corporate Law Regulatory
Framework, 37 LEGAL STUD. 103-136 (2017). For an examination of the peripheral nature of
company law in relation to social policy issues such as climate change in a special volume of
the International Comparative Corporate Law Journal, see Celia R. Taylor, United States
Company Law as It Impacts Corporate Environmental Behavior, with Emphasis on Climate
Change, 11 INT’L. & COMP. CORP. L.J. 7-10 (2015) (U.S. position); Surya Deva, Sustainable
Business and Australian Corporate Law: An Exploration, 11 INT’L. & COMP. CORP. L.J. 5962 (2015) (Australian position). However, the New Labour government did introduce the
Corporate Homicide Act 2007 and Bribery Act 2010 which delved into internal governance
and behavior within corporations to address social ills, rare phenomena which indicated the
early changes to regulatory capitalism, and will be discussed below.
77 DEP’T TRADE & INDUS., COMPANY LAW REFORM 8–15 (2005), http://webarchive.
nationalarchives.gov.uk/20060214052726/http://www.dti.gov.uk/cld/WhitePaper.htm.
78 Such as in the coordinated market economy which is represented by the German
model, a highlight of such model being the adoption of co-determination into corporate
governance. See Sigurt Vitols, Varieties of Corporate Governance: Comparing Germany
and the UK, in VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM: THE INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF
COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE, supra note 23, at 337-60.
79 Securities regulation was introduced after the Great Depression and represented part
of the socio-economic New Deal reforms. JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL
STREET: A HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND MODERN
CORPORATE FINANCE 73-100 (1st ed. 1982). For a discussion about the distributive tenor of
the New Deal reforms as a distribution of informational power to the market so that
informational power is not concentrated in the hands of small coteries of securities brokers,
see Emilios Avgouleas, Market Accountability and Pre- and Post-Trade Transparency: The
Case for the Reform of the EU Regulatory Framework: Parts 1 & 2, 19 COMPANY LAW.,
162-170, 202-210 (1998). Securities regulation required mandatory disclosure to be made by
issuers of corporate securities, so that “truth” in securities can be brought to light in the
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characterized as chiefly economic in nature since the 1980s, as theoretical
commentaries on securities regulation revolve around the efficiency of
securities markets for securing investor protection.80 Regulation is primarily
framed to support the optimal working of markets and such a basis has also
driven the development of EU securities regulation,81 culminating in major
harmonization reforms in the early millennium. 82 These have been
transposed in the U.K. The EU saw legal integration in securities regulation
as an instrument for capital markets integration,83 a perspective that
continues today.84
market and misspelling can be stamped out. For social policy overtones, see Milton H.
Cohen, Truth in Securities Revisited, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1340-1408 (1966). Securities
regulation is policed and enforced by a new Securities and Exchange Commission,
representing a new constitutional bargain between state, markets, business and citizenry.
Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421-510 (1987).
80 Referring to information asymmetry between investors and companies issuing
securities. See John C. Coffee Jr., Market Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory
Disclosure System, 70 VA. L. REV. 717-753 (1984). Efficient prices in securities markets
(including secondary securities markets) reflect corporate performance so that investors can
optimally determine the allocation of capital. Hence, it is also necessary to require securities
issuers to keep feeding secondary markets with information so that issuers’ secondary
trading prices reflect all information at any given point in time, thereby enabling investors to
make efficient buy, sell, or hold decisions. This is the efficient capital markets hypothesis
posited by Eugene Fama, though empirically supported only in its semi-strong form. See
Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J.
FIN. 383-417 (1970); Merritt B. Fox et al., Law, Share Price Accuracy, and Economic
Performance: The New Evidence, 102 MICH. L. REV. 331-353, 355-386 (2003). On
theoretical support for the Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis, see Marcel Kahan,
Securities Laws and the Social Costs of “Inaccurate” Stock Prices, 41 DUKE L.J. 977-1044
(1992); Merritt B. Fox, Rethinking Disclosure Liability in the Modern Era, 75 WASH. U.
L.Q. 903-918 (1997), all of whom support mandatory continuous disclosure as a key to
maintain stock price accuracy according to the semi-strong form of the efficient capital
markets hypothesis.
81 IRIS H-Y CHIU, REGULATORY CONVERGENCE IN EU SECURITIES REGULATION 1-46
(2008).
82 After the publication of [Final Report of the Committee of Wise Men on the
Regulation of European Securities Markets (15 Feb 2001), available at
http://www.spk.gov.tr/Sayfa/Dosya/114, such as the Directive 2003/71/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 4 November 2003 on the prospectus to be published when
securities are offered to the public or admitted to trading and amending Directive
2001/34/EC (Prospectus Directive 2003); Directive 2004/109/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 15 December 2004 on the harmonization of transparency
requirements related to information about issuers whose securities are admitted to trading on
a regulated market and amending Directive 2001/34/EC OJ 2004 L390/38 (Transparency
Directive 2004).
83 Christian Joerges, The Law in the Process of Constitutionalising Europe 3-34 (EUI,
Working Paper 2002/4, 2002), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=307720;
EILIS FERRAN, BUILDING AN EU SECURITIES MARKET 8-57 (2004).
84 EURO. COMM’N, COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN
PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE
COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS ACTION PLAN ON BUILDING A CAPITAL MARKETS UNION at
paragraphs 1-7 (2015), https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/growth-and-
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Securities regulation is purposed towards supporting market-based
discipline for publicly listed corporations by their investors, an important
tenet in a well-functioning capital market. Investors could exercise their
market-based discipline by voting with their feet and supporting a market
for corporate control, as a means to change corporate management.85 They
could also choose to be activist and build up stakes in a company in order to
exercise voice,86 a phenomenon termed as the market for corporate
influence.87 The marketization of investment relations between the
company and shareholders has become the chief (and private) means for
structuring the internal governance relations within the company. Thus,
when corporate scandals erupted in the early 1990s in relation to internal
fraud and misrepresentations of financial reporting on securities markets,88
the key cure for such ills was seen to be investor discipline and scrutiny. 89
The U.K. charted a regime of business-led soft law for the corporate
governance of listed companies.90 Best practices in corporate governance
are now enshrined within a code91 that applies on a comply-or-explain basis
to publicly traded companies.92 The corporate governance of these
companies is framed as a matter for shareholders to scrutinize and comment
investment/capital-markets-union/capital-markets-union-action-plan_en (lays the foundation
for a number of legislative initiatives, including the Prospectus Regulation 2017).
85 James D. Parrino & Robert S. Harris, Takeovers, Management Replacement, and
Post-Acquisition Operating Performance: Some Evidence from the 1980s, in CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE AT THE CROSSROADS 385 (Donald Chew & Stuart Gillan eds., 2005); Michael
C. Jensen & Richard S. Ruback, The Market for Corporate Control: The Scientific Evidence,
11 J. FIN. ECON. 5-50 (1983); Gregg A. Jarrell et al., The Market for Corporate Control: The
Empirical Evidence Since 1980, 2 J. ECON. PERSP. 49-68 (1988). Much of the literature dates
back to the 1980s where takeover activity in the U.S. was roaring.
86 See IRIS H-Y. CHIU, THE FOUNDATIONS AND ANATOMY OF SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM at
chapters 2-5 (2008) (discusses different types of activism).
87 John Armour & Brian R. Cheffins, The Rise and Fall (?) of Shareholder Activism by
Hedge Funds, 14 J. ALTERNATIVE INV. 17-27 (2012) (on hedge funds in the market for
corporate influence); see Paul Rose, Shareholder Proposals in the Market for Corporate
Influence, 66 FLA L. REV. 2179-2228 (2014) (on shareholder proposals generally as
constituting a market for corporate influence).
88 For discussions about the scandal of the fall of the Polly Peck Group and BCCI in the
early 1990s, see CHIU, supra note 86, at 16-70.
89 ADRIAN CADBURY, THE FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 14-16
(1992).
90 FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL, THE UK CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE 4-15 (2018),
https://www.frc.org.uk/getattachment/88bd8c45-50ea-4841-95b0-d2f4f48069a2/2018-UKCorporate-Governance-Code-FINAL.pdf.
91 Id. at 4-15.
92 Alan Dignam, Capturing Corporate Governance: The End of the UK Self-Regulating
System, 4 INT’L. J. DISCLOSURE & GOVERNANCE 24-41 (2007). On the efficacy of comply-orexplain, see Sridhar Arcot et al., Corporate Governance in the UK: Is the Comply or Explain
Approach Working?, 30 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 193-201 (2010); Iain MacNeil & Xiao Li,
Comply or Explain: Market Discipline and Non-Compliance with the Combined Code, 14
CORP. GOVERNANCE 486-496 (2006).
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on,93 neutralizing the social ramifications of the scandals in question. This
tradition has continued despite the findings of the Myners Report in 2001
relating to the relative passivity of institutional investors,94 and the findings
of the Walker Report in 200995 discussing institutional investor apathy in
relation to the global financial crisis from 2007 to 2009. Business and
markets continue to support shareholder centricity in market discipline,96 a
position that policy-makers have been willing to endorse.97 Investor
primacy has brought about a marketized model profoundly shaping the
objectives98 and the nature of the corporation.99
Nevertheless, “business regulation” has been developed to affect
economic and social policy that impacts business or commercial
activities.100 These are often externally101 addressed to corporations and
other economic actors but do not intervene in the private spheres of
corporate objectives or governance. The need for business regulation has
grown in the era of market fundamentalism. This is because corporations’
economic behavior creates externalities, and markets fail to discipline or
contain such behavior. For example, market failures such as misselling have
led to a burst in global consumer protection regulation.102 Product safety
See CADBURY, supra note 89, at 48-52(provided the foundation for the first Cadbury
Code of Corporate Governance).
94 PAUL MYNERS, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTMENT IN THE UK: A REVIEW at paragraphs 5.245.63 (2001), http://uksif.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/MYNERS-P.-2001.-InstitutionalInvestment-in-the-United-Kingdom-A-Review.pdf.
95 DAVID WALKER, A REVIEW OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN UK BANKS AND OTHER
FINANCIAL INDUSTRY ENTITIES: FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS AT PARAGRAPH 5.10 (2009),
https://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http:/www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/walker_
review_261109.pdf.
96 Seen in the bottom-up Institutional Shareholders Committee’s first Stewardship
Principles that evolved to be adopted as the U.K. Stewardship Code by the Financial
Reporting Council.
97 U.K. Stewardship Code sets out optimal principles for shareholder scrutiny and
engagement with companies, see also Iris H-Y Chiu, Turning Institutional Investors into
‘Stewards’: Exploring the Meaning and Objectives in ‘Stewardship’, 66 CURRENT LEGAL
PROBS. 443-481 (2013); Arad Reisberg, The UK Stewardship Code: On the Road to
Nowhere?, 15 J. CORP. L. STUD. 217-253 (2015).
98 Shareholder primacy model, supra note 75.
99 See Karen Ho, Corporate Nostalgia? Managerial Capitalism from a Contemporary
Perspective, in CORPORATIONS AND CITIZENSHIP 267-88 (Greg Urban ed., 2014) (critical
account of the company becoming framed chiefly in terms of a tradeable stock with its
commodity price in an investor’s portfolio).
100 Characterized as such in the examination of regulation that has addressed corporate
and business behavior at a global level, see BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, supra note 3, at 88471 discussing specific areas of business regulation that are developed outside of corporate
law.
101 Lyman Johnson, Law and the History of Corporate Responsibility: Corporate
Governance, 10 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 974-990 (2013).
102 Wood, supra note 2, at 633-651; Rena Steinzor, The Truth About Regulation in
America, 5 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 323-346 (2011).
93
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has been refined by private law in liability103 as well as by regulatory
standards and enforcement,104 extending to crucial areas, such as food105
and drugs,106 especially in the wake of scandals, such as the BSE scandal107
and the thalidomide scandal.108 Consumer protection reforms have been
extended to even fundamentalist market including finance.109 Although
social protection against poor commercial practices underlies these
regulatory reforms, it is arguable that such business regulation ultimately
supports market capitalism as consumer confidence is maintained.110
103 For a discussion on the interface of tort liability and regulation, see Maria Lee, Safety,
Regulation and Tort: Fault in Context, 74 MOD. L. REV. 555-580 (2011).
104
The Consumer Protection Act 1987 provides strict liability for certain unsafe and
defective products, while the Trade Descriptions Act 1968 regulates misleading
representations and mis-selling as a result. There remain criticisms of these regimes, but
advances have been achieved in regulation beyond what private law affords in relation to
consumer protection. See Wood, supra note 2, at 633-651. Product standards have also been
subject to international trade-led development (e.g. the CE (Conformité Européene)
mark in Europe) as well as regulatory prescriptions where relevant; see BRAITHWAITE &
DRAHOS, supra note 3, at 475-531.
105 The Food Standards Agency was established under the Blair government in order to
address the previous problem of ministerial capture by business. The Food Standards
Agency has developed a consumer-facing profile, but it is equally oriented towards
protection as well as promoting consumer choice. It coordinates the implementation of
standards from the EU Food Agency as well. See PROSSER, supra note 3, at 44-65. For a
comparison between the American prescriptive regulatory standards in food compared to a
less robust European approach relying on third-party standards, see Wyn Grant,
Environmental and Food Safety Policy, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF BUSINESS AND
GOVERNMENT, supra note 14, at 663-83.
106
Largely centralized under the European Medicines Agency which vets and approves
medicines, representing a highly regulated form of product regulation in the interests of
safety, and a similar approach is taken in the U.S. too; see BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, supra
note 3, at 360-396.
107 Kamal Ahmed et al., Madness, GUARDIAN (Oct. 28, 2000), https://www.theguardian.
com/uk/2000/oct/29/bse.focus1.
108 Bara Fintel et al., The Thalidomide Tragedy: Lessons for Drug Safety and Regulation,
HELIX (Jul. 28, 2009), https://helix.northwestern.edu/article/thalidomide-tragedy-lessonsdrug-safety-and-regulation.
109 The financial market has become a platform for private consumer decisions in
managing their own financial needs – an age of financialization, according to many. See
FINANCIALIZATION AT WORK: KEY TESTS AND COMMENTARY at ch13 (Ismail Erturk et al.
eds., 2008). This market is often criticized due to the inability of consumers to understand
credence goods and their future performance. See Paul Langley, The Uncertain Subjects of
Anglo-American Financialization, 65 CULTURAL CRITIQUE 67-91 (2007); Ismail Erturk et al.,
The Democratization of Finance? Promises, Outcomes and Conditions, 14 REV. INT’L POL.
ECON. 553-575 (2007); Toni Williams, Empowerment of Whom and for What? Financial
Literacy Education and the New Regulation of Consumer Financial Services, 29 L. & POL’Y
226-256 (2007). Increasing consumer protection is being seen in financial regulation reforms
especially after the global financial crisis 2007-2009, which will be discussed below as a key
driver for regulatory capitalism entering into the cusp of change. See, MADS ANDENAS & IRIS
H-Y CHIU, THE FOUNDATIONS AND FUTURE OF FINANCIAL REGULATION at chapter 8 (2014).
110 Shavell, supra note 49.
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Further, as the de-socialization of labor-firm relations has taken place
in the 1980s under the conservative governments,111 regulatory policy has
become more important in providing the necessary balances to the
inequalities in employment relationships which are not corrected by labor
markets. The growth of employee protection legislation in antidiscrimination rights, health and safety rights, minimum wage rights, and
other contractual rights112 may to an extent overcome some of the inequality
of bargaining power between labor and companies, as collective bargaining
has fallen from vogue.113
Drahos and Braithwaite114 also observed the rise in environmental
protection legislation particularly in respect to clean air and water, as
regulatory capitalism addressed the externalities caused by business
activity.115 These reforms are arguably a mixture of social and economic
policy,116 as corporations are forced to prevent, or pay for social cost and
111 Unlike the co-determination system in Germany which embeds industrial relations
within the firm, see Stephen C. Smith, On the Economic Rationale for Codetermination
Law, 16 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 261-281 (1991) There is little socialization of economic
relations within the British corporate paradigm. In the key labor-firm relationship, a history
of patchwork regulatory intervention moderated this relationship, albeit while steeped in
master-servant traditions. See Simon F. Deakin, Legal Origin, Juridical Form and
Industrialization in Historical Perspective: The Case of the Employment Contract and the
Joint-Stock Company, 7 SOCIO-ECON. REV. 35-65 (2009). The post-war Labour government
capitalized on the strength of the state in governing an economy under rebuilding and paved
the way for institutionalized collective bargaining to take place, via the reformed Trade
Disputes and Trade Unions Act 1946. The era of the power of the unions possibly came
closest to socially reframing labor-firm relations, but the achievements of these decades
were truncated by conservative government policies in the 1980s. The Thatcherite
perspective was that corporations needed to be saved from being taken hostage by labor
relations that jeopardized firms’ productivity. The 1980s conservative government policies
have recalibrated industrial relations since, preserving the marketized model of the
corporation from further paradigmatic disturbances.
112 See, e.g., SIMON FEG ET AL., LABOUR LAW 267-268; 304-414; 601-769; 771-984 (6th
ed. 2012).
113 Disney et al., supra note 42, at 403-419.
114 BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, supra note 3, at 256-295.
115 Boscheck, supra note 16, at 151-190; SCHORR, supra note 16, at 65-103.
116 The mixed social-economic nature of environmental regulation can be attributed to a
mixture of public interest and economic efficiency thinking in regulatory ethos and design,
such as the balance between the precautionary principle and cost-benefit analyses in policy
generation, the expansive regulatory space for corporations where third party standards,
audits and civil society activism co-exist with corporate endeavors and regulatory
enforcement, and innovative regulatory measures. For some examples of discussion, see Neil
Gunningham, Environment Law, Regulation and Governance: Shifting Architectures, 21 J.
ENVTL. L.J. 179-212 (2009); Neil Gunningham, The New Collaborative Environmental
Governance: The Localization of Regulation, 36 J.L. & SOC’Y 145-166 (2009); Neil
Gunningham & Darren Sinclair, Smart Regulation, in REGULATORY THEORY, supra note 2,
at 133; ASEEM PRAKASH & MATTHEW POTOSKI, THE VOLUNTARY ENVIRONMENTALISTS:
GREEN CLUBS, ISO 14001, AND VOLUNTARY ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS 81-188 (2006)
(on how the voluntary adoption of ISO14000 has helped improve environmental
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internalize the social price of their activities, such as carrying out risk
management. The dominance of economic thinking in environmental policy
can nevertheless be seen in many initiatives, including the carbon emissions
trading regulation which adopts a marketized approach to regulate
corporate carbon footprint.117
Although business regulation intervenes where markets do not work
optimally, regulatory policy is highly shaped and influenced by business. In
this political economy, corporations act as businesses, collectively, through
trade associations118 and international networks,119 generating both
epistemic authority and lobbying pressure in relation to regulatory policy.120
Dignam describes corporate law and securities regulation as particularly
shaped by a “negotiated” regulatory framework between business and
government.121 The institutional context for corporate regulation is thus
very much shaped by the peer level,122 power and status123 of business and
states vis a vis each other.
The private and shareholder-focused nature of company law, investorfocused securities regulation, and the expression of much of social policy
through external regulation have become relatively “stable” tenets of
corporate regulation. These hallmarks support (a) the neoliberal economic
agenda, as states and business maintain a companion relationship of
steering and rowing, and (b) the liberal market economy where economic
relations are incentive-based and marketized.
management in corporates).
117 Discussed critically in Sol Piccioto, Paradoxes of Regulating Corporate Capitalism:
Property Rights and Hyper-Regulation, 1 OÑATI SOCIO-LEGAL SERIES 1-15 (2011); see also
Jonas J. Monast et al., On Morals, Markets, and Climate Change: Exploring Pope Francis’
Challenge, 80 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 135-162 (2017).
118 Sectoral industries organize much lobbying as a form of collective corporate power,
see discussion in Peter Gourevitch, Politics and Corporate Governance: What Explains
Policy Outcomes?, in CORPORATIONS AND CITIZENSHIP, supra note 99, at 183; Gregory
Shaffer, Law and Business, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF BUSINESS AND GOVERNMENT,
supra note 14, at 63; Katherine E. Smith et al., Corporate Coalitions and Policy Making in
the European Union: How and Why British American Tobacco Promoted ‘‘Better
Regulation”, 40 J. HEALTH, POL’Y, & L. 325-372 (2015).
119 Pamela Camerra-Rowe & Michelle Egan, International Regulators and Network
Governance, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF BUSINESS AND GOVERNMENT, supra note 14, at
404.
120 Gourevitch, supra note 118, at 183.
121 Dignam, supra note 92, at 24-41.
122 CORPORATIONS AND CITIZENSHIP, supra note 99 (a volume curated to present the vast
social and political power of corporates derived from their economic power).
123 This is the natural trajectory of successful corporations as engines of production and
wealth creation, as Lazonick critically dismisses economists’ dream of ideal firm sizes as
small in a world of perfect competition, see William Lazonick, The Corporation in
Economics, in THE CORPORATION 64 (Grietje Baars & André Spicer eds., 2017). According
to Lazonick’s argument, it is a positive and not a negative or transitional phenomenon to
behold the growth of significant corporations in scale and power.
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C. Deficiencies and Lacunae
In an economic model of market fundamentalism,124 prices in relevant
supply and demand side markets drive corporations’ incentive-based
behavior. Corporations have become insularly focused on profitmaximization reflected in high securities markets prices, characterized as
“individualistic” pursuits.125 The incentives for corporate behavior tend to
cause tensions between the needs of “collective” good or the social
dimension.126 The tradition of regulatory capitalism has, to an extent,
addressed corporate conduct that causes direct social harms and market
failures, but it tends to uphold a broad scope of economic freedom. Hence,
regulatory capitalism is unlikely to address areas where conflicts arise
between social expectations and corporations’ economic freedoms.
Corporations have marginalized the social and ethical dimensions of
corporate behavior that are not reflected in “market value.” Boldeman
describes corporate behavior that has become “dehumanizing” and
“intolerant” of moral or social dimensions.127 Old-fashioned and holistic
notions such as the moderation of “self-interest” by “moral sentiments” of
self-restraint,128 or the perspective that a corporation creating economic
wealth should do so as being entrusted by society129 have become squeezed
out by market fundamentalism. Corporate exploits could often be at the
expense of collective good or the social dimension, producing “a-social”
behavior.130 Further, Hendry gives an account of how market
fundamentalism has made market values central to business operations, and
corporations pursuing their business case are merely adhering to the
morality of self-interest in markets.131 This conception of morality may be
124 There is an interesting empirical finding of the alignment broadly between national
culture, such as market fundamentalism, and organizational culture, such as the
marketization approaches taken in corporations, see GEERT HOFSTEDE ET AL., CULTURES AND
ORGANISATIONS 320-28 (2010).
125 Ho, supra note 99; WHEELER, supra note 29, at chapter 1 (arguing that such
“individualistic” narrative has dominated corporate behavior in the post-2000s. The book
critically explores alternative forces to change corporate behavior, such as an awareness of
‘collective good’, the rise of stakeholder capitalism and ethicality to shape corporate
objectives and behavior.
126 WHEELER, supra note 29, at chapter 1.
127 BOLDEMAN, supra note 28, at 280.
128 Reconciling Adam Smith’s grand treatises, The Wealth of Nations and The Theory of
Moral Sentiments, see SPENCER J. PACK, CAPITALISM AS A MORAL SYSTEM: ADAM SMITH’S
CRITIQUE OF THE FREE MARKET ECONOMY chapter 1 (2010).
129 ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY 352 (1991).
130
Indeed, Bakan’s critical account paints corporate behavior as pathologically
sociopathic, see JOEL BAKAN, THE CORPORATION: THE PATHOLOGICAL PURSUIT OF PROFIT
AND POWER at chapter 3 (2003).
131 JOHN HENDRY, BETWEEN ETHICS AND ENTERPRISE: BUSINESS AND MANAGEMENT IN A
BIMORAL SOCIETY chapters 1-2 (2004), and Milton Friedman’s famous pronouncement that
“the social responsibility of business is to increase its profits” is very much reflective of that
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contested vis-a-vis our human or social conception of morality,132 giving
rise to a “bimoral” space for negotiation by companies. The bifurcation of
“business morality” from human or social conceptions,133 or indeed the
marginalization of the latter134 can serve utilitarian purposes, but create a
perverse organizational belief system which would be regarded as morally
dysfunctional.135
The private nature of corporate objectives is not necessarily
compatible with ethical or social dimensions. The disengagement of
corporations from society is criticized by many as, at the very least, the
privilege of incorporation reflects a certain social contract on the basis of
state enfranchisement or ‘chartering’ of private activity. 136 In the absence of
regulatory moderation, corporations can adopt a social and bimoral
behavior where there is a business case. This tendency is further
exacerbated by global trends.
The rise in neo-liberalism and globalization has been taken advantage
of by corporations, bringing profound changes to the economic structures of
many jurisdictions. International trade and globalization have changed
corporate configurations and many take advantage of multi-jurisdictional
footprints and loose networks in contracts and organization.137 Corporate
behavior has become less easy for national policy-makers to regulate,138
leaning. See Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its
Profits, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE (Sept. 13, 1970), http://www.umich.edu/~thecore/doc/
Friedman.pdf. See also Jiwei Ci, Justice, Freedom, and the Moral Bounds of Capitalism, 25
SOC. THEORY & PRAC. 409-438 (1999).
132 See Susanna Kim Ripken, Multiple Personalities Incorporated: Accepting the MultiDimensional Personhood of the Modern Corporation 3-103 (Chapman University Law
Research Paper No. 08-296, 2008), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1184322; John Ikerd,
Sustainable Capitalism: A Matter of Ethics and Morality, 3 PROBS. SUSTAINABLE DEV. 13-22
(2008) (lamenting the inability of economic-driven thinking to incorporate non-monetary or
economic values in terms of moral and ethical paradigms).
133 But see, Wim Dubbink & Jeffrey Smith, A Political Account of Corporate Moral
Responsibility, 14 ETHICAL THEORY & MORAL PRAC. 223-246 (2009).
134 Jeroen Veldman & Hugh Willmott, The Corporation in Management Studies, in THE
CORPORATION, supra note 123, at 197-212.
135 See, e.g., BAKAN, supra note 130, at chapter 3.
136 David Ciepley, Beyond Public and Private: Toward a Political Theory of the
Corporation, 107 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 139-158 (2013).
137 See Päivi Oinas, The Many Boundaries of the Firm, UNDERSTANDING THE FIRM:
SPATIAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL DIMENSIONS 35-60 (Michael Taylor & Päivi Oinas eds.,
2006). See also SOL PICCIOTTO, REGULATING GLOBAL CORPORATE CAPITALISM 155-206
(2011).
138 See, e.g., William Magnuson, Unilateral Corporate Regulation, 17 CHI. J. INT’L L.
521-572 (2016); Peter J. Spiro, Constraining Global Corporate Power: A Short
Introduction, 46 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1101-1118 (2013); Kenneth M. Amaeshi et al.,
Corporate Social Responsibility in Supply Chains of Global Brands: A Boundaryless
Responsibility? Clarifications, Exceptions and Implications, 81 J. BUS. ETHICS 223-255
(2008); Jette Steen Knudsen, The Growth of Private Regulation of Labor Standards in
Global Supply Chains: Mission Impossible for Western Small- and Medium-Sized Firms?,
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while the same policy-makers design regulatory regimes to compete in
global regulatory competition139 even if strong and extra-territorial
legislation can be affected.140 There is a lack of international law to govern
multinational corporate behavior,141 and regulatory arbitrage142 by
corporations has flourished in the slow progress towards international
harmonization.143
Regulatory obligations may be regarded as boundaries for arbitrage,
and litigation expenses or regulatory fines as a price for doing business. For
example, a profit-chasing culture in many financial firms generated
117 J. BUS. ETHICS 387-395 (2013); Tim Büthe, Private Regulation in the Global Economy:
A (P)Review, 12 BUS. & POL. 1-38 (2010).
139 I.e., being in the market for rules of incorporation and doing business, see Colin
Crouch, The Global Firm: The Problem of the Giant Firm in Democratic Capitalism, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF BUSINESS AND GOVERNMENT, supra note 14, at 148. There is a lack
of empirical evidence on whether and to what extent “exit” by corporations cause regulatory
competition anxieties for states, as states may respond to a perceived threat whether real or
otherwise, see Henry Tjiong, Breaking the Spell of Regulatory Competition: Reframing the
Problem of Regulatory Exit, 66 RABEL J. COMP. & INT’L PRIV. L. 66, 75-76 (2002).
140 Such as the pre-1980s initiatives in the US, including e.g., the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act 1977 and Alien Tort Claims Act dating to the 18th century, and modern
exterritorial environment and other legislation. The effectiveness is discussed in Susan C.
Kaczmarek & Abraham L. Newman, The Long Arm of the Law: Extraterritoriality and the
National Implementation of Foreign Bribery Legislation, 65 INT’L ORG. 745-770 (2011).
Magnuson discusses the oft-ignored effectiveness of such unilateral regulation as
representing political will and power to control corporate conduct, based on “effects”
doctrines and extra-territoriality, see Magnuson, supra note 138, at 521-572.
141 Susan C. Kaczmarek & Abraham L. Newman, The Long Arm of the Law:
Extraterritoriality and the National Implementation of Foreign Bribery Legislation, 65 INT’L
ORG. 745-770 (2011).
142 Regulatory arbitrage often allows corporations to move their externalities to
jurisdictions with lowest standards or least susceptible to regulatory or civil enforcement.
See on environmental pollution, Harland Prechel & Lu Zheng, Corporate Characteristics,
Political Embeddedness and Environmental Pollution by Large U.S. Corporations, 90 SOC.
FORCES 947-970 (2012); and on civil liability, see generally, Robin F. Hansen, Multinational
Enterprise Pursuit of Minimized Liability: Law, International Business Theory and the
Prestige Oil Spill, 26 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 410-451 (2008). This is in a large part made
possible by the lack of an enterprise liability doctrine in the U.K., which strictly treats each
company in a corporate group as its own legal person and it is rare for the corporate
personality of a subsidiary to be treated as the parent’s or for the corporate group to be
treated as having a shared personality. See Adams v Cape Industries Plc [1990] 2 WLR 657;
Prest v Petrodel Resources Ltd [2013] UKSC 34. Further, innovative structuration such as
outsourcing and networks have changed multinational operations, allowing them to maintain
a powerful global footprint while minimizing obligations to stakeholders, see Glenn Morgan,
The Multinational as a Corporate Form: A Critical Contribution from Organization Studies,
THE CORPORATION, supra note 123, at 248-56.
143 Lawrence Tshuma, Hierarchies and Government Versus Networks and Governance:
Competing Regulatory Paradigms in Global Economic Regulation, 9 SOC. & LEGAL STUD.
115, 142 (2000); Camerra-Rowe & Egan, supra note 119, at 404; Tim Büthe & Walter
Mattli, International Standards and Standard Setting Bodies, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
BUSINESS AND GOVERNMENT, supra note 14, at 440-71.
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perverse incentives towards excessive risk-taking,144 culminating in the
global financial crisis 2007-2009, and was also prevalent in the scandal of
fictitious bank accounts in Wells Fargo.145 Many also regard the BP
Deepwater Horizon oil spill disaster in 2010 as reflecting failures in
organizational culture which prized cost-reduction over human safety.146
In an “a-socialized” paradigm, companies can pursue myopic and
economically driven relations with their constituents as long as financial
efficiency is achieved. If employee-firm relations are insularly treated as
economic and marketized, issues such as wage advancement and justice
would be contractual bargaining147 and not framed as issues of “social
relations.” Further, stakeholders have found it challenging to advance their
participation or voice in the corporate law framework underpinned by
shareholder primacy. For example, one of the hallmarks of the liberal
market economy in the U.K. is an open market for corporate control. The
company is free to sell out to takeover offerors that meet with shareholder
approval. Even if stakeholders, such as employees and suppliers, are most
affected by such decisions, they have no place for strategic participation in
such decisions.148 The dominantly marketized framing for corporate
conduct and decisions crowds out perspectives from a social point of view.
In accordance with the trends of different labor markets, U.K. companies

Michael A. Santoro & Ronald J. Strauss, WALL STREET VALUES: BUSINESS ETHICS
chapters 1-2 (2012); Donald C. Langevoort, Chasing the
Greased Pig Down Wall Street: A Gatekeeper’s Guide to the Psychology, Culture and Ethics
of Financial Risk Taking, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1209-1246 (2011); also official reports that
lament poor culture at banks in the form of House of Lords and House of Commons, see
Graeme Baber, Changing Banking for Good: No More Recklessness Misconduct, 34 COMP.
L. 340-347 (2013); ANTHONY SALZ, THE SALZ REVIEW at paragraphs 8.13-30 (2013) (on
Barclay’s aggressive trading culture). An overview is provided in IRIS H-Y CHIU,
REGULATING FROM THE INSIDE: THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR INTERNAL CONTROL IN BANKS
AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS at chapter 5 (2015).
145 Kevin McCoy, Wells Fargo Fined $185M for Fake Accounts; 5,300 Were Fired,
USA TODAY (Sept. 8, 2016), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2016/09/08/wellsfargo-fined-185m-over-unauthorized-accounts/90003212/ (on a scandal dating back over 10
years where employees were perversely incentivized to churn out fake bank accounts in
order to claim performance-based remuneration).
146 CTR. FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM, THE BP CATASTROPHE: WHEN HOBBLED LAW AND
HOLLOW REGULATION LEAVE AMERICANS UNPROTECTED 1-24 (2011).
147 Inequalities of power can affect contractual bargaining, and can result in “vicious
spirals” in terms of the position of the disadvantaged party, see Michael Galanis, Vicious
Spirals in Corporate Governance: Mandatory Rules for Systemic (Re)Balancing?, 31
OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 327-363 (2011).
148 For example, the board neutrality rule upheld in the U.K. that prevents directors from
defending the bid and to recommend to shareholders only for their exclusive decision what is
in the best interests of the company, Hogg v. Cramphorn Ltd [1967] Ch 254, and more
recently the Kraft takeover of Cadbury Plc in the U.K., see discussion in Georgina Tsagas, A
Long-Term Vision for UK Firms? Revisiting the Target Director’s Advisory Role Since the
Takeover of Cadbury’s PLC, 14 J. CORP. L. STUD. 241-275 (2014).
144
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are free to maintain low wages for medium to low level employees149 while
giving in to inflated executive compensation.150 A marketized framing of
such disparities in reward would not allow U.S. to compare apples to
oranges in terms of the different wage markets. However, a social framing
of the disparities in reward would raise the query why the corporate-profit
pie, which is the product of all workers, should be distributed
disproportionately to favor executives and management.
A marketized framing for corporate conduct and decisions can also
tolerate certain amoral behavior if private contracts have been entered
freely in the market. Sharp commercial practices that do not fall within
consumer regulation may be pursued, such as mis selling to commercial
albeit less sophisticated parties,151 or putting suppliers on insecure terms.152
The case of Newton-Sealey v. ArmorGroup Services Ltd & Ors153 illustrates
how corporations can legally structure employment relations in such a way
as to minimize risks for them while being disengaged from the needs of
personal and social justice. In the case, a retired army officer in the U.K.
was recruited to provide risky security services in a post-conflict zone in
Iraq. The contract was framed to be between the ArmorGroup’s Jersey
company and the individual because the Jersey company could exclude
liability for negligence in causing personal injury or death. Although the
U.K. provides consumer protection law outlawing such exclusion clauses,
the individual was subject to less protection under Jersey law, the choice of
law made possible for the corporation due to its multi-jurisdictional
footprint. The individual who was ultimately injured while on duty could
not obtain any compensation from the Jersey or the U.K. parent company.
The legitimacy, albeit sharpness of the commercial practice of limiting
business risks for the parent company, was upheld because the parent
company was free to organize its economic relations and business risks
149 Wage stagnation is discussed in INST. FOR PUB. POLICY RESEARCH, COMM’N ON ECON.
JUSTICE, TIME FOR CHANGE: A NEW VISION FOR THE BRITISH ECONOMY 13-19 (2017),
https://www.ippr.org/files/2017-09/cej-interim-report.pdf.
150 Reported as early as 2000, see Martin J. Conyon & Joachim Schwalbach, Executive
Compensation: Evidence from the UK and Germany, 33 LONG RANGE PLANNING 504-526
(2000). For modern evidence, see Guido Ferrarini et al., Executive Remuneration in Crisis:
A Critical Assessment of Reforms in Europe, 15 J. CORP. L. STUD. 73-118 (2010).
151 Such as the selling of interest rate swaps to small businesses by banks, a commercial
practice that is heavily criticized but which small businesses nevertheless cannot get redress
in court under regulatory or private law, see Crestsign Ltd v. National Westminster Bank Plc,
The Royal Bank of Scotland Plc [2014] EWHC 3043 (Ch); Bailey & Anor v. Barclays Bank
Plc [2014] EWHC 2882 (QB).
152 Christel Lane & Reinhard Bachmann, The Social Constitution of Trust: Supplier
Relations in Britain and Germany, 17 ORG. STUD. 365-395 (1996); and the American take
on the relations between firms and suppliers in a liberal market economy as compared to a
stakeholder economy is studied in Susan Helper, Comparative Supplier Relations in the US
and Japanese Auto Industries: An Exit/Voice Approach, 19 BUS. & ECON. HIST. 153-162,
(1990).
153 Newton-Sealey v. Armor Group Cos. [2008] EWHC 233 (QB).
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within the available company law framework. The limitation of corporate
liability by strategic structuring within corporate groups is often not
successfully challenged by tort victims because the U.K. lacks a doctrine of
enterprise liability. Although courts have been able to uphold a parent
company’s duty of care to subsidiary employees directly affected by their
policies, when applied to subsidiaries, such a duty of care does not easily
arise, and there is no general doctrine of enterprise liability.154
Further, by maintaining the insular, private, and business-focused
nature of corporate law, the company can remain impervious to
distributional issues while governments face limitations in their options for
affecting distributional justice. The liberal market economy is a capitalist
order apt to produce distributive inequalities.155 Although such inequalities
reflect differences in reward for different forms of enterprise or economic
behavior,156 it is another matter to find tolerable the “politically and socially
offensive”157 levels of inequality that have come about in neo-liberal,
financialized economies such as the U.S. and U.K.158 where the
distributional differences between “winners” and “losers”159 can be
phenomenal.160 For example, companies have financially jeopardized
pension schemes to the disadvantage of employees while giving in to
market pressures and paying out dividends to shareholders while pension
pots are still in deficit. 161 These loci of distributional injustices are now
Chandler v Cape plc [2012] EWCA Civ 525; Ogale Community & Ors v Royal
Dutch Shell Plc & Anor [2018] EWCA Civ 191.
155 ROGER BOOTLE, THE TROUBLE WITH MARKETS: SAVING CAPITALISM FROM ITSELF 6692 (Nicholas Brealey Publishing 2012).
156
Such as argued in ISRAEL M. KIRZNER, DISCOVERY, CAPITALISM AND DISTRIBUTIVE
JUSTICE 95-169 (Peter J. Boettke & Frédéric Sautet eds., 2016).
157 HAY & P AYNE, supra note 22, at 42.
158 BOOTLE, supra note 155, at 66-92; Geoff Mulgan, The Essence of Capitalism, in THE
LOCUST AND THE BEE: PREDATORS AND CREATORS IN CAPITALISM’S FUTURE 28-51 (2013);
Greta Krippner, Accumulation and the Profits of Finance, in FINANCIALIZATION AT WORK,
supra note 109, at 191–208.
159 The competitive and non-collaborative ethos in market capitalism is heavily criticized
in R. Edward Freeman et al., Stakeholder Capitalism, 74 J. BUS. ETHICS 303-314 (2007)
(arguing for a more co-operative, long-termism, and gain-sharing form of capitalism).
160 Prompting economists such as Amartya Sen to articulate the need for economic
justice to be prized above the relentless logic of liberal market freedoms. See, Amartya Sen,
Markets and Freedoms: Achievements and Limitations of the Market Mechanism in
Promoting Individual Freedoms, 45 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 519-541, (1993); Zafar Iqbal et
al., The Current Crisis of Capitalism, 9 POL’Y PERSP. 65-86 (2012).
161 The shift from defined benefit occupational pensions to defined contribution which
exposes employees to the risks of financial investment over the long-term. See, PENSIONS
POLICY INST., THE CHANGING LANDSCAPE OF PENSION SCHEMES IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR IN
THE UK 17 (2012); John Broadbent et al., The Shift from Defined Benefit to Defined
Contribution Pension Plans – Implications for Asset Allocation and Risk Management, BIS,
Dec. 2006, at 11-21 (providing aggregate observations on Australia, Canada and U.S. and
the British Home Stores collapse which exposes the possibility of companies paying
inordinate dividends at the expense of huge pension deficits). See also HOUSE OF COMMONS
154
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attracting policy attention, as Section II discusses.162 Market primacy
cannot address such inequalities as market prices are often flawed and do
not reflect perfectly social cost.163 In relation to the Newton-Sealey case
above, the wages paid to the employee arguably do not fully internalize the
risks to the individual and his family.
It is arguable that the very social good of having corporate forms
organize productive economic activity is itself becoming questionable as
corporate and market behavior threaten to erode this. This problem is
explored in Kay’s 2012 review164 undertaken for the British government
with regard to how long-termism, i.e. the social good of corporate wealth
creation for the long-term (for all economic constituents such as savers,
employees, etc.) is being undermined by stock market short-termism.165 As
investors “discipline” corporations by exit or voice depending on quarterly
corporate performance, corporate strategies become attuned to the shortterm and are excessively financially driven, undermining visions and
strategic investment for the long term. 166
The three tenets of corporate regulation are limited in addressing the
social disapproval of corporate behavior, as the limits of regulation are most
sharply felt where social objectives are in conflict with market-based
incentives. By leaving markets to achieve their allocative purposes,
governments have a limited arsenal in addressing social inequalities or
bimoral (but legal) behavior perpetuated by the corporate sector. Bruner167
argues that the essentially private, shareholder-centric model of company
law is socially accepted in the U.K. as social concerns need not be mediated
through corporate law. He points to the existence of the welfare state and
WORK & PENSIONS & BUS., INNOVATION & SKILLS COMMS., BHS: FIRST REPORT OF THE
WORK AND PENSION COMMITTEE AND FOURTH REPORT OF THE BUSINESS, INNOVATION AND
SKILLS COMMITTEE OF SESSION 2016-17, 2016, HC 54, at 13 (UK).
162 DEP’T FOR BUS., ENERGY & INDUS. STRATEGY, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REFORM:
THE GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO THE GREEN PAPER CONSULTATION, 2007, at 8-52 (looking at
pay gaps within corporations). Pensions protection is also being consulted upon, so that
pension trustees may be more empowered to give voice to the protection of pension schemes
where companies contemplate strategic changes. See DEP’T FOR WORK & PENSIONS,
GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO THE CONSULTATION ON PROTECTING DEFINED BENEFIT PENSION
SCHEMES – A STRONGER PENSIONS REGULATOR, 2018, at 19-28.
163 JOHN PLENDER, CAPITALISM: MONEY, MORALS AND MARKETS 277-309 (2015).
164 JOHN KAY, THE KAY REVIEW OF UK EQUITY MARKETS AND LONG-TERM DECISION
MAKING: FINAL REPORT at paragraph 2.16 (2012).
165 THE ASPEN INST., OVERCOMING SHORT-TERMISM: A CALL FOR A MORE RESPONSIBLE
APPROACH TO INVESTMENT AND BUSINESS MANAGEMENT at 2 (2009).
166 Caitlin Helms et al., Corporate Short-Termism: Causes and Remedies, 23 INT’L
COMPANY & COM. L. REV. 45-54 (2012); Emeka Duruigbo, Tackling Shareholder ShortTermism and Managerial Myopia, 100 KY. L.J. 531-584 (2011). This short-termism, whose
flip side is dynamism and innovation is also noted in Vitols,
supra note 78, at 337-60.
167 Christopher M. Bruner, Power and Purpose in the ‘Anglo-American’ Corporation, 50
VA. J. INT’L L. 579-622 (2010).
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social policy regulations in the U.K. as providing adequately for social
concerns, therefore leaving free corporate law and governance to serve the
needs of the private economic enterprise of the company. The government’s
ability to use fiscal and welfare state measures168 has become increasingly
limited in the face of the austerity measures imposed after the global
financial crisis.169 The lacunae and deficiencies of corporate regulation are
being exposed for not significantly moderating a-social and bimoral
behavior on the part of corporations. 170
Section II turns to the drivers that challenge the stability of regulatory
capitalism.
II. REGULATORY CAPITALISM CHALLENGED
In this Section, we argue that two major drivers exert pressure towards
shifts in the tenets of regulatory capitalism. First, the rise of a diffuse space
for voices (whether of a public/regulatory or social/business nature) that
articulate perspectives on CSR, influencing policy and law for corporations.
Second, the onset of the global financial crisis 2007-2009 has introduced
political disruptions that have had aftershock effects upon corporate
regulation and reform.
A. The Rise of Transnational Private Governance, Multi-Stakeholder
Initiatives, and New Governance
Civil society forces, such as the rise of non-governmental
organizations (NGOs),171 have assumed an increasingly important voice in
pushing for changes in corporate behavior, articulating the need for
corporations to assume responsibility commensurate with their social power
and footprint172 and the need for corporations to act as “social citizens”
168 Such as the working tax credit which has been introduced under the New Labour
government and generally positively evaluated. See Mike Brewer et al., Did Working
Families’ Tax Credit Work? Analysing the Impact of In-Work Support on Labour Supply and
Programme Participation, INLAND REVENUE, Dec. 2003, at 1.
169 As national debt was raised to bail-out U.K. banks, the budget deficit became hugely
challenging and austerity was introduced. See Ashley Seager & Julia Kollewe, Bank BailOut ‘Could Send National Debt Soaring By £1.5 Trillion’, GUARDIAN (Feb. 19, 2009),
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2009/feb/19/national-debt-lloyds-hbos.
170 Grietje Baars, “Reform or Revolution”? Polanyian Versus Marxian Perspectives on
the Regulation of the Economic, 62 N. IR. LEGAL Q. 415-431 (2011).
171 Jonathan P. Doh & Terrence R. Guay, Globalization and Corporate Social
Responsibility: How Non-Governmental Organizations Influence Labor and Environmental
Codes of Conduct, 44 MGMT. INT’L REV. 7-29, (2004); Robert J. Bies et al., Introduction to
Special Topic Forum: Corporations as Social Change Agents: Individual, Interpersonal,
Institutional, and Environmental Dynamics, 32 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 788 -793 (2007);
Dorothea Baur & Guido Palazzo, The Moral Legitimacy of NGOs as Partners of
Corporations, 21 BUS. ETHICS Q. 579-604 (2011).
172 Peter Newell, Citizenship, Accountability and Community: The Limits of the CSR
Agenda, 81 INT’L AFF. 541-557 (2005); Rogers Tabe Egbe Orock, Less-Told Stories About
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beyond legal compliance.173 These voices are especially critical of
multinational corporations’ exploitation of regulatory arbitrage, benefiting
from lightly-regulated jurisdictions, corrupt governments, etc. Even as they
introduce investment and economic opportunities, they also exploit
resources and externalize social harm.174 Civil society voices have arisen in
gaps in the transnational sphere where there is a lack of global corporate
regulation either at an international level or in terms of strong (and often)
extra-territorial regulation by nation states.175
In this transnational space, a variety of actors offer voice, both critical
and constructive, as well as pro-active initiatives to influence corporate
behavior. The space was first dominated by states, international
organizations, networks of regulators and industry associations,176 but is
increasingly populated by third-party standard-setting bodies, civil society
organizations, non-governmental organizations, collectively forming a
polycentric space177 for influence and interactions. Technological
Corporate Globalization: Transnational Corporations and CSR as the Politics of
(Ir)Responsibility in Africa, 37 DIALECTICAL ANTHROPOLOGY 27-50 (2013); David Vogel,
Taming Globalization? Civil Regulation and Corporate Capitalism, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF BUSINESS AND GOVERNMENT, supra note 14, at 472-94.
173 ANDREW CRANE ET AL., CORPORATIONS AND CITIZENSHIP: BUSINESS, RESPONSIBILITY
AND SOCIETY 1-14 (2008); Jeremy Moon et al., Corporations and Citizenship in New
Institutions of Global Governance, in THE RESPONSIBLE CORPORATION IN A GLOBAL
ECONOMY 203-24 (Colin Crouch & Camilla Maclean eds., 2011); Peter Edward & Hugh
Willmott, Corporate Citizenship: Rise or Demise of a Myth?, 33 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 771,
771-73 (2008).
174 JANET DINE, Transnationals Out of Control, in THE GOVERNANCE OF CORPORATE
GROUPS 151-75 (2000).
175 Tshuma, supra note 143, at 115, 142.
176 See PICCIOTTO, supra note 137, at 9-16, 50-60, 61-107.
177 See Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance
in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342-470 (2004); Louise G. Trubek, New
Governance and Soft Law in Health Care Reform, 3 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 139, 170 (2006).
Catǻ Backer refers to the rise of bottom-up voices in the governance space as movement of
“social aggregation” or “social constitutionalism,” establishing socially-led organizations as
having a participative voice and rights in transnational governance. See Larry Catá Backer,
Transnational Corporations Outward Expression of Inward Self-Constitution: The
Enforcement of Human Rights by Apple, Inc., 20 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 805-879
(2013). A range of polycentric actors and their influences: third-party initiatives that may
influence corporate behavioral change include lender governance such as under the Equator
Principles athttps://equator-principles.com. But see critique in Douglas Sarro, Do Lenders
Make Effective Regulators? An Assessment of the Equator Principles on Project Finance, 13
GERMAN L.J. 1525-1558, (2012) (relating to lack of monitoring and governance, therefore
making lender governance a procedural and superficial phenomenon that lenders can brand
themselves by); see also Niamh O’Sullivan & Brendan O’Dwyer, Stakeholder Perspectives
on a Financial Sector Legitimation Process: The Case of NGOs and the Equator Principles,
22 ACCT., AUDITING & ACCOUNTABILITY J. 553-87 (2009); Patrick Haack et al., Exploring
the Constitutive Conditions for a Self-Energizing Effect of CSR Standards: The Case of the
‘Equator Principles’ 4-33 (University of Zurich Institute of Organization and Administrative
Science IOU Working Paper No. 115, 2010), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
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modernization has played no small part in facilitating the social
organization and cooperation for common causes nationally and
internationally, due to the fall in the cost of communications. In this space,
various initiatives of a voluntary nature have been developed to secure
corporate commitment to certain standards or conduct. These initiatives
include agenda-setting for policy change; standard-setting for products,
services or conduct; labeling of organizations or their output; certification
of organizations or their output; auditor organizations; procedural
governance; and dialogic mechanisms.178 As many of the initiatives differ
abstract_id=1706267. Many programs of third party certification and monitoring such as
SA8000, the Ethical Trading Initiative, the Marine and Forest Stewardship Councils
initiatives, the ISO14000 for environmental management, etc., have attained credibility due
to independent monitoring. See Karen Bradshaw Schulz, New Governance and Industry
Culture, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2515-2549 (2013); Kees Bastmeijer & Jonathan
Verschuuren, NGO-Business Collaborations and the Law: Sustainability, Limitations of the
Law, and the Changing Relationship Between Companies and NGOs, in CORPORATE SOCIAL
RESPONSIBILITY, ACCOUNTABILITY AND GOVERNANCE: GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES 314-29 (Istemi
Demirag ed., 2005); Dara O’Rourke, Outsourcing Regulation: Analyzing Nongovernmental
Systems of Labor Standards and Monitoring, 31 POL’Y STUD. J. 1-29 (2003); David A.
Wirth, The International Organization for Standardization: Private Voluntary Standards as
Swords and Shields, 36 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 79-102 (2009); PRAKASH & POTOSKI,
supra note 116, at 81-188. There is also a critique of inspectors’ lack of business experience
and susceptibility to be fooled by superficial compliance. See Petra Christmann & Glen
Taylor, Firm Self-Regulation Through International Certifiable Standards: Determinants of
Symbolic Versus Substantive Implementation, 37 J. INT’L BUS. STUD. 863-878 (2006). Other
voluntary initiatives include industry voluntary standards, which may be credible as being
bottom-up and overcome the collective action problem, and that facilitate learning and
internalization. See Chang-Hsien Tsai & Yen-Nung Wu, What Conflict Minerals Rules Tell
Us About the Legal Transplantation of Corporate Social Responsibility Standards Without
the State: From the United Nations to the United States to Taiwan, 38 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS.
233-284 (2018) (on the significant acceptance of the Electronic Industry Citizenship
Coalition (EICC) industry standards for monitoring conflict minerals sourcing); Bindu Arya
& Jane E. Salk, Cross-Sector Alliance Learning and Effectiveness of Voluntary Codes of
Corporate Social Responsibility, 16 BUS. ETHICS Q. 211-234 (2006). Civil society pressure
and engagement is also important on an ad hoc basis. See Doreen McBarnet, Corporate
Social Responsibility Beyond Law, Through Law, for Law: The New Corporate
Accountability 1-63 (University of Edinburgh School of Law Working Paper No. 2009/03,
2009), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1369305; Vogel, supra note
172, at 472-94. See David Nerserssian, Business Lawyers as Worldwide Moral Gatekeepers?
Legal Ethics and Human Rights in Global Corporate Practice, 28 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
1135-1187 (2015) (on external legal counsel who could also act as gatekeepers to change
corporate behavior in view of increasing legal risk in relation to the matters of CSR). But the
ambivalence of the moral compass of legal advisors is comprehensively canvassed in
RICHARD MOORHEAD ET AL., MAPPING THE MORAL COMPASS: THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN
IN-HOUSE LAWYERS’ ROLE, PROFESSIONAL ORIENTATIONS, TEAM CULTURES,
ORGANISATIONAL PRESSURES, ETHICAL INFRASTRUCTURE AND ETHICAL INCLINATION 4-122
(2016) at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2784758; David Kershaw &
Richard Moorhead, Consequential Responsibility for Client Wrongs: Lehman Brothers and
the Regulation of the Legal Profession, 76 MOD. L. REV. 26-61 (2013).
178 A typology of these “private governance” initiatives is explored in Tracey M.
Roberts, Innovations in Governance: A Functional Typology of Private Governance
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from traditional regulatory law in terms of the nature of “obligation”
imposed, the “precision” of such obligation or the “enforcement” of such
obligation,179 they are characterized as “soft law.” A soft law typically
mimics but does not fully attain the traditional characteristics of state-based
regulation.180 Many commentators have increasingly called upon the
recognition of this body of soft law as “transnational private regulation,” 181
consolidating its “lawness” as a pluralist development in law,182 so that its
causes may be advanced and not obstructed by traditional frames for law
and legality.183
The polycentric governance space and diverse soft law instruments for
securing change in corporate behavior constitute a “transnational” new
Institutions, 22 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 67-144 (2011). See also Fabrizio Cafaggi &
Andrea Renda, Public and Private Regulation: Mapping the Labyrinth, 1 DQ 16-29 (2012);
Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Strengthening International Regulation Through
Transmittal New Governance: Overcoming the Orchestration Deficit, 42 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 501-578 (2009).
179 Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International
Governance, 54 INT’L ORG. 421-456 (2000) (in which is offered the paradigm spectrum for
characterizing hard or soft law based on the qualities of precision, binding-ness and
enforcement). Even if standards may be specific, the lack of enforcement authority or an
adjudicatory forum would still likely render such standards as soft law.
180 Alexia Brunet Marks, The Right to Regulate, 38 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 1-69 (2016); Harri
Kalim & Tim Staal, “Softness” in International Instruments: The Case of Transnational
Corporations, 41 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 257-334 (2014).
181 Fabrizio Cafaggi, New Foundations of Transnational Private Regulation, 38 J.L. &
SOC’Y 20-49 (2011); Colin Scott et al., The Conceptual and Constitutional Challenge of
Transnational Private Regulation, 38 J. L. & SOC’Y 1-19 (2011).
182 This is advanced by a number of commentators who advocate a broad definition of
law that is not traditionally constrained and more porous to other disciplines such as
sociology, political science, or anthropology in achieving the securing of commitment to
behavioral change. The de-legalized framing of such initiatives would further reinforce their
lack of effectiveness, and acknowledgement of their function, effect and near-law profile is
more constructive towards governance ends. See Larry Catá Backer, Governance
Polycentrism – Hierarchy and Order Without Government in Business and Human Rights
Regulation 1-27 (Coalition for Peace and Ethics Working Paper No. 1/1, 2014),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2373734; see also Larry Catá Backer,
Theorizing Regulatory Governance Within its Ecology: The Structure of Management in an
Age of Globalization, 24 J. CONTEMP. POL. 607-630 (2018); Larry Catá Backer, A Lex
Mercatoria for Corporate Social Responsibility Codes Without the State? A Critique of
Legalization Within the State Under the Premises of Globalization, 24 IND. J. GLOB. LEGAL
STUD. 115-145 (2017); Larry Catá Backer, Global Panopticism: States, Corporations, and
the Governance Effects of Monitoring Regimes, 15 IND. J. GLOB. LEGAL STUD. 101-148
(2008); Neil Walker & Gráinne de Búrca, Reconceiving Law and New Governance 2-17
(EUI Working Paper Law No. 2007/10, 2007), http://ssrn.com/abstract=987180; Peer
Zumbansen, Transnational Legal Pluralism, 1 TRANSNAT’L LEGAL THEORY 141-189 (2010);
Peer Zumbansen, Lochner Disembedded: The Anxieties of Law in a Global Context, 20 IND.
J. GLOB. LEGAL STUD. 29-69 (2013) (citations omitted).
183 Zumbansen, supra note 182, at 141-189; Christine Parker, The Pluralization of
Regulation, 9 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 349-369 (2008).
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governance,184 which is characterized by diversity, inclusiveness,
participation, interrelationships,185 and the socialization of the corporation
within this fabric.186 Commentators view the development of this space as
crucially enrolling the “social” dimension into governance of corporate
behavior, so that such governance is not narrowly dominated by
government and business.187 In this manner, firm insularity can be opened
up, and corporate accountability may be multi-channeled and widely
scoped,188 instead of narrowly focusing on markets and investors. There is
increasingly recognition of the potency of such bottom-up pressures.189
Abbott & Snidal, supra note 178, at 501-578.
Neil Gunningham, Regulatory Reform and Reflexive Regulation: Beyond Command
and Control, in REFLEXIVE GOVERNANCE FOR GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS, 85-104 (Eric
Brousseau et al. eds., 2012); and generally new governance techniques, see Karin
Buhmann, Reflexive Regulation of CSR to Promote Sustainability: Understanding EU
Public-Private Regulation on CSR through the Case of Human Rights, 8 INT’L & COMP.
CORP. L. J. 38-76 (2011); Stavros Gadinis, Three Pathways to Global Standards: Private,
Regulator, and Ministry Networks, 109 AM. J. INT’L L. 1-57 (2015); Ronen Shamir, Socially
Responsible Private Regulation: World-Culture or World-Capitalism?, 45 L. & SOC’Y REV.
313-336 (2011).
186 Heiko Spitzeck, Organizational Moral Learning: What, If Anything, Do Corporations
Learn from NGO Critique?, 88 J. BUS. ETHICS 157-173 (2009) (on how organizations are
compelled to adopt learning in social and not merely individualistically-driven dimensions).
187 Bettina Lange & Fiona Haines, Introduction, in REGULATORY TRANSFORMATIONS:
RETHINKING ECONOMY-SOCIETY INTERACTIONS 1-30 (Bettina Lange et al. eds., 2015);
Alexander Ebner, The Regulation of Markets: Polanyian Perspectives, in REGULATORY
TRANSFORMATIONS: RETHINKING ECONOMY-SOCIETY INTERACTIONS, supra, at 31-53. At a
broader level, the socialization of the governance sphere is consistent with the holistic nature
of markets that Polanyi championed- socially embedded markets instead of markets driven
on narrow economic logics devoid of a full sense of humanity in participation.
188 Andreas Rasche et al., Complete and Partial Organizing for Corporate Social
Responsibility, 115 J. BUS. ETHICS 651-663 (2013) discusses the changing landscape of
“organizing” governance, and Mueckenberger & Jastram, supra note 16, at 223-239
(discusses the transnational governance space of networks and coalitions). It is noted that the
rise of third party monitors, auditors, etc. from civil society quarters such as NGOs have
become a real force in the governance space. See Bastmeijer & Verschuuren, supra note
177, at 314-29; Henrik Lindholm et al., Do Code of Conduct Audits Improve Chemical
Safety in Garment Factories? Lessons on Corporate Social Responsibility in the Supply
Chain from Fair Wear Foundation, 22 INT’L J. OCCUPATIONAL & ENVTL. HEALTH 283-291
(2016); Gay W. Seidman, Regulation at Work: Globalization, Labor Rights, and
Development, 79 SOC. RES. 1023-1044 (2012).
189 Empirical research does document the importance of organized civil society demand,
characterized as an institutional factor that drives companies to respond to CSR demands.
See Laura P. Hartman et al., The Communication of Corporate Social Responsibility: United
States and European Union Multinational Corporations, 74 J. BUS. ETHICS 373-389 (2007);
David Antony Detomasi, The Political Roots of Corporate Social Responsibility, 82 J. BUS.
ETHICS 807-819 (2008); Ulf Henning Richter, Drivers of Change: A Multiple-Case Study on
the Process of Institutionalization of Corporate Responsibility Among Three Multinational
Companies, 102 J. BUS. ETHICS 261-279 (2011). Even in relation to traditional welfare states
that may be on the cusp of change, civil society voices for CSR are getting corporate
attention. See Hans De Geer et al., Reconciling CSR with the Role of the Corporation in
Welfare States: The Problematic Swedish Example, 89 J. BUS. ETHICS 269-283 (2009).
184
185
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Civil society groups have successfully become part of many multistakeholder initiatives that shape corporate behavior,190 albeit in an
essentially contested space for governance. These initiatives are important
as they bring social dimensions to bear more forcefully than where soft law
initiatives are shaped by corporations and industry alone.191
Such institutional movements have been keenly noted by business.
Concomitantly, businesses have also participated in the conceptualization
of CSR in order to frame it towards their interest.192 This conceptual and
intellectual stalemate193 is reflected in a “governance” or political
stalemate,194 as neither social forces nor businesses have fully captured the
However, the weakness of civil society in the governance space is discussed in Jon Burchell
& Joanne Cook, Sleeping with the Enemy? Strategic Transformations in Business—NGO
Relationships Through Stakeholder Dialogue, 113 J. BUS. ETHICS 505-518 (2013); Fairbrass
& Zueva-Owens, supra note 16, at 321-335; and more precisely in Doh & Guay, supra note
171, at 7-29. NGOs are not consistently involved in dialogue and change processes and the
risks of their marginalization remain strong. Further where civil society actors interact with
business, the risk of capture could also make them less effective in championing corporate
behavioral change. See Peter Utting, Corporate Responsibility and the Movement of
Business, 15 DEV. PRAC. 375-388 (2005).
190 An overview of such well-developed multi-stakeholder initiatives can be found in
Nancy Vallejo & Pierre Hauselmann, Governance and Multi-Stakeholder Processes, INT’L
INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV., May 2004, at 3-26. An example that can be looked at is the
Kimberley process for certifying conflict-free diamonds. See Franziska Bieri & John Boli,
Trading Diamonds Responsibly: Institutional Explanations for Corporate Social
Responsibility, 26 SOC. F. 501-526 (2011). The Forest Stewardship and Marine Stewardship
Councils are also regarded as successful multi-stakeholder initiatives, see Bastmeijer &
Verschuuren, supra note 177, at 314-29. The Ethical Trading Initiative has had mixed
success although it is proliferated across jurisdictions achieving a form of international
governance. See Alex Hughes et al., Organisational Geographies of Corporate
Responsibility: A UK-US Comparison of Retailers’ Ethical Trading Initiatives, 7 J. ECON.
GEOGRAPHY 491-513 (2007).
191 For example, the business-led BSCI [Business Social Compliance Initiative] for
auditing apparel factories have not detected issues that ultimately led to the Rana Plaza
collapse in Bangladesh. Civil society groups call for more multi-stakeholder initiatives to
monitor and hold multinationals to account. See Dan Viederman, Supply Chains and Forced
Labour After Rana Plaza, GUARDIAN (Apr. 24, 2014), https://www.theguardian.com/globaldevelopment-professionals-network/2013/may/30/rana-plaza-bangladesh-forced-laboursupply-chains; BSCI 10th Anniversary Shame Over Rana Plaza, CLEAN CLOTHES CAMPAIGN
(June 25, 2013), https://cleanclothes.org/news/2013/06/25/bsci-10th-anniversary-shameover-rana-plaza.
192 Krista Bondy et al., An Institution of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) in MultiNational Corporations (MNCs): Form and Implications, 111 J. BUS. ETHICS 281-299 (2012).
193 Shallini S. Taneja et al., Researches in Corporate Social Responsibility: A Review of
Shifting Focus, Paradigms, and Methodologies, 101 J. BUS. ETHICS 343-364 (2011).
194 Luc Fransen, Multi-Stakeholder Governance and Voluntary Programme Interactions:
Legitimation Politics
In the Institutional Design of Corporate Social Responsibility, 10 SOCIO-ECON. REV. 163192 (2012) (discussing how businesses have developed “challenger” business associationsled approaches to rival multi-stakeholder governance initiatives).
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definition of CSR.195 Businesses have sought to characterize CSR as being
consistent with the business case, whether financially-defined196 or wider.197
Businesses have also framed CSR as a new management and self-regulatory
tool198 that is purportedly more effective199 or efficient200 than government
Taneja et al., supra note 193, at 343-364.
These relate to conventional financial performance, see Manuel Castelo Branco &
Lúcia Lima Rodrigues, Corporate Social Responsibility and Resource-Based Perspectives,
69 J. BUS. ETHICS 111-132 (2006); Hoje Jo & Maretno A. Harjoto, The Causal Effect of
Corporate Governance on Corporate Social Responsibility, 106 J. BUS. ETHICS 53-72
(2012); or more widely to managing risks that may affect such performance such as
reputational risks, see Lisa Whitehouse, Corporate Social Responsibility: Views from the
Frontline, 63 J. BUS. ETHICS 279-296, (2006). But the evidence supporting the link between
financial performance and corporate social performance is inconclusive. See Laura Poddi &
Sergio Vergalli, Does Corporate Social Responsibility Affect the Performance of Firms? 138 (FEEM Working Paper No. 52.2009, 2009), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1444333; Philip L.
Baird et al., Corporate Social and Financial Performance Re-Examined: Industry Effects in
a Linear Mixed Model Analysis, 109 J. BUS. ETHICS 367-388 (2012) (citations omitted); and
Henry L. Petersen & Harrie Vredenburg, Morals or Economics? Institutional Investor
Preferences for Corporate Social Responsibility, 90 J. BUS. ETHICS 1-14, (2009). See Maria
Ceu Cortez et al., The Performance of European Socially Responsible Funds, 87 J. BUS.
ETHICS 573-588 (2009) (arguing that European socially screened funds based on stock
selection do not perform worse than conventional benchmarks, hence justifying investing in
socially responsible funds). However, some studies suggest ambiguous findings where the
correlation is indeterminate. See, e.g., Michael L. Barnett & Robert M. Salomon, Beyond
Dichotomy: The Curvilinear Relationship Between Social Responsibility and Financial
Performance, 27 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 1101-1122 (2006). Other studies find a negative
correlation. See, e.g., Stephen Brammer et al., Corporate Social Performance and Stock
Returns: UK Evidence from Disaggregate Measures, 35 FIN. MGMT. 97-116 (2006);
Leonardo Bechetti & Rocco Ciciretti, Corporate Social Responsibility and Stock Market
Performance, Applied Financial Economics, 2009, vol. 19, issue 16, 1283-1293.
197 Or from a resource-based perspective such as gaining social capital. See Dilek
Cetindamar & Kristoffer Husoy, Corporate Social Responsibility Practices and
Environmentally Responsible Behavior: The Case of the United Nations Global Compact, 76
J. BUS. ETHICS 163-176 (2007). This would include gaining consumer loyalty or employee
loyalty and productivity. See Ron Bird et al., What Corporate Social Responsibility
Activities Are Valued by the Market?, 76 J. BUS. ETHICS 189-206 (2007); DAVID VOGEL, THE
MARKET FOR VIRTUE: THE POTENTIAL AND LIMITS OF CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 115, 46-74 (2005).
198 Kunal Basu & Guido Palazzo, Corporate Social Responsibility: A Process Model of
Sensemaking, 33 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 122-136 (2008) (discussing how overall “sensemaking” in CSR has turned primarily into management “sense-making”); Marta de la Cuesta
González & Carmen Valor Martinez, Fostering Corporate Social Responsibility Through
Public Initiative: From the EU to the Spanish Case, 55 J. BUS. ETHICS 275-293 (2004)
(discussing how CSR is merely managerial and procedural in Spanish companies); and
similar findings for Serbian companies, see Ivana S. Mijatovic & Dusan Stokic, The
Influence of Internal and External Codes on CSR Practice: The Case of Companies
Operating in Serbia, 94 J. BUS. ETHICS 533-552 (2010).
199 Tim Baines, Integration of Corporate Social Responsibility Through International
Voluntary Initiatives, 16 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 223-248 (2009).
200 Atle Blomgren, Is the CSR Craze Good for Society? The Welfare Economic Approach
to Corporate Social Responsibility, 69 REV. SOC. ECON. 495-515 (2011).
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regulation, due to the transnational nature of these issues and the disparities
in regulatory capacity between states at different points of political and
economic development.201
In this ideological contest over CSR, we see the intractability of the
debates between delineated responsibility and maximal responsibility for
corporations,202 and between regulation and self-regulation,203 both of
which seem to have become a fixture in the political economy of CSR.
Commentators remain in an equilibrium of disagreement on the
characterization of corporate citizenship,204 corporate purpose,205 and the
means to change corporate behavior.206 Such intractability can be illustrated
Markus Kitzmueller & Jay Shimshack, Economic Perspectives on Corporate Social
Responsibility, 50 J. ECON. LITERATURE 51-84 (2012).
202 For commentators supporting a narrow conception of corporate responsibility such as
economic responsibility or narrow ranges of stakeholders, see, George G. Brenkert, Private
Corporations and Public Welfare, 6 PUB. AFF. Q. 155-168 (1992); Timothy M. Devinney, Is
the Socially Responsible Corporation a Myth? The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly of
Corporate Social Responsibility, 23 ACAD. MGMT. PERSPECTIVES 44-54 (2009); and those
supporting refrain from imposing on corporations’ responsibilities that should be
administered by states, see Klaus M. Leisinger, The Corporate Social Responsibility of the
Pharmaceutical Industry: Idealism without Illusion and Realism without Resignation, 15
BUS. ETHICS Q. 577-594 (2005); Michael Blowfield & Jedrzej George Frynas, Setting New
Agendas: Critical Perspectives on Corporate Social Responsibility in the Developing World,
81 INT’L AFF. 499-513 (2005) (special issue on critical perspectives on CSR). On maximal
forms of responsibility, some commentators would, however, go further to incorporate
corporate social responsibility in relation to global public goods that states cannot
comprehensively provide. See Inge Kaul, Rethinking Public Goods and Global
Public Goods, in REFLEXIVE GOVERNANCE FOR GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS, supra note 185, at
37.
203 Buhmann, supra note 185, at 38-76; Gadinis, supra note 185, at 1-57. On the need for
regulation, see Regina Kreide, The Obligations of Transnational Corporations in the Global
Context. Normative Grounds, Real Policy, and Legitimate Governance, 4 ETHICS & ECON. 125 (2006); Robert McCorquodale, Towards More Effective Legal Implementation of
Corporate Accountability for Violations of Human Rights, 103 PROC. ASIL ANN. MEETING
288-291 (2009); Mahmood Monshipouri et al., Multinational Corporations and the Ethics of
Global Responsibility: Problems and Possibilities, 25 HUM. RTS. Q. 965-989 (2003), but on
the limits of regulation, see Gregory A. Daneke, Regulation and the Sociopathic Firm, 10
ACAD. MGMT. REV. 15-20 (1985); and on behavioral impediments to selfregulation, see Charles R. Greer & H. Kirk Downey, Industrial Compliance with Social
Legislation: Investigations of Decision Rationales, 7 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 488-498 (1982).
204 See Pierre-Yves Néron & Wayne Norman, CITIZENSHIP, INC.: Do We Really Want
Businesses to Be Good Corporate Citizens?, 18 BUS. ETHICS Q. 2, 2-7 (2008); and
responses, see Donna J. Wood & Jeanne M. Logsdon, Business Citizenship as Metaphor and
Reality, 18 BUS. ETHICS Q. 51-94 (2008); Andrew Crane & Dirk Matten, Incorporating the
Corporation in Citizenship: A Response to Néron and Norman, 18 BUS. ETHICS Q. 27-33,
(2008).
205 Friedman, supra
note 131, as against David Windsor, Corporate Social
Responsibility: Three Key Approaches, 43 J. MGMT. STUD. 93-114 (2006); KEAY, supra note
72, at 173, 177-83.
206 This area is canvassed in relation to the importance of regulation and soft
law. See supra, note 181.
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by reference to the development of corporate codes of ethics that seem to
respond to and incorporate social demands, yet are self-regulating in nature.
Many commentators argue that corporate codes of ethics are not merely
based on internal values but recognize and incorporate external standards,
such as standards forged by international organizations.207 Corporate codes
of ethics are an embodiment of polycentric governance influences,
culminating in soft law instruments that regulate corporations
themselves.208 However, empirical research has persistently found
inconsistency in the corporate implementation of and adherence to such
codes, reflecting the dilemmas corporations face in their “bimoral”
dimensions and their uncertain positioning in relation to social spheres.209
The intractability in characterizing CSR and its impetus for change could
perpetuate decades of debate and discourse without entailing any structural
changes to the political economy or nature of regulatory capitalism, and
indeed corporate behavior.
The claim to institutional change, though observed, is slow.210 It is also
naïve to think that the polycentric governance space is a harmonious one.
The polycentric governance space is ridden with contests in ideology,
The International Labor Organization’s standards on workers’ rights are an example.
See Gunther Teubner, Corporate Codes in the Varieties of Capitalism: How Their
Enforcement Depends on the Differences Among Production Regimes, 24 IND. J. GLOB.
LEGAL STUD. 81-97 (2017); Gunther Teubner & Anna Beckers, Expanding
Constitutionalism, 20 IND. J. GLOB. LEGAL STUD. 523, 531 (2013); Jan Eijsbouts, Corporate
Codes as Private Co-Regulatory Instruments in Corporate Governance and Responsibility
and Their Enforcement, 24 IND. J. GLOB. LEGAL STUD. 181, 192 (2017); see also Teubner,
supra, at 90-91.
208 Ans Kolk & Rob van Tulder, Setting New Global Rules? TNCs and Codes of
Conduct, 14 TRANSNAT’L L. CORP. 1-27, (2005).
209 Commentators are concerned about the cosmetic nature of CSR codes, as they may
not be institutionalized, endorsed by leadership, or internalized by employees, see Andrew
Brien, Regulating Virtue: Formulating, Engendering and Enforcing Corporate Ethical
Codes, 15 BUS. & PROF. ETHICS J. 21-52 (1996), and may lack transparency, accountability,
and consistency in their application and enforcement. See Krista Bondy et al., Multinational
Corporation Codes of Conduct: Governance Tools for Corporate Social Responsibility?, 16
CORP. GOVERNANCE 294, 302-04 (2008); Scott Killingsworth, The Privatization of
Compliance, in TRANSFORMING COMPLIANCE: EMERGING PARADIGMS FOR BOARDS,
MANAGEMENT, COMPLIANCE, AND GOVERNMENT, May 2014, at 33-45; Patrick M. Erwin,
Corporate Codes of Conduct: The Effects of Code Content and Quality on Ethical
Performance, 99 J. BUS. ETHICS 535-548 (2011); Lutz Preuss, Codes of Conduct in
Organisational Context: From Cascade to Lattice-Work of Codes, 94 J. BUS. ETHICS 471487 (2010). Some commentators argue that such codes are ineffective because of the
enforcement deficit is key to the ineffectiveness of such codes, see Li-Wen Lin, Legal
Transplants Through Private Contracting: Codes of Vendor Conduct in Global Supply
Chains as an Example, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 711-744 (2009); but see ANNA BECKERS,
ENFORCING CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY CODES: ON GLOBAL SELF-REGULATION AND
NATIONAL PRIVATE LAW at chapter 4 (2015) (arguing such codes should be enforced in
private law to connect the public interest of accountability to the effectiveness of corporate
self-regulation).
210 See discussion infra.
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values, power, and methodology. Civil society organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and other socially-led groups do not have
consonant voices or common agendas with each other or with state-led
international organizations211 and corporate-led industry associations. They
also face conflicts of interests themselves.212 Business, as depicted above,
also influences the discourse strongly. There is a lack of clear authoritative
or coordinative order in this governance space, and the flourishing of
myriad forms of soft law has not always translated into roadmaps for
empirical implementation of changes to corporate behavior.
B. Mixed Achievements Observed in the U.K.
The emerging nature of transnational governance has produced
incremental institutional shifts. In the U.K., corporations are increasingly
attuned to social responsibility concerns, but these are predominantly
framed in terms of business risk in relation to reputation and
performance.213 Hence, policymakers introducing company law reforms in
2006 accepted that a director’s duty to secure the success of the company
for the benefit of shareholders as a whole includes a duty to take into
account of relevant stakeholder-facing and social responsibility matters.214
Investors are particularly called upon to consider “environment, social and
governance” (ESG) matters, aligning social expectations with their
interests.215 There is pronounced reliance on investor and market discipline
for corporations’ ESG profiles,216 but we cannot blithely assume that
investors act on behalf of enforcing social expectations or behave as social
gatekeepers.217 The focus on the marketized framing for CSR has the
potential to undermine the content of social demand in CSR. The
marketized framing also has the effect of confining CSR to voluntary and
211 Gregory C. Shaffer & Mark A. Pollack, Hard vs. Soft Law: Alternatives,
Complements, and Antagonists in International Governance, 94 MINN. L. REV. 706-798
(2010) (discussing how hard and soft law often used to avoid each other’s effects, especially
by states in negotiating transnational and international governance).
212 Fabrizio Cafaggi, The Many Features of Transnational Private Rule-Making:
Unexplored Relationships Between Custom, Jura Mercatorum and Gloval Private
Regulation, 36 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 875-938 (2010); Baur & Palazzo, supra note 171, at 579604.
213 See citations supra nn.196 & 197.
214 Companies Act 2006, c. 2, § 172.
215 UNEP FIN. INITIATIVE, FIDUCIARY RESPONSIBILITY: LEGAL AND PRACTICAL ASPECTS
OF INTEGRATING ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL AND GOVERNANCE ISSUES INTO INSTITUTIONAL
INVESTMENT, July 2009, at 20-22; Benjamin Richardson, Do the Fiduciary Duties of Pension
Funds Hinder Socially Responsible Investment?, 22 BANKING & FIN. L. REV. 145-200
(2007).
216 Such as UK Stewardship Code 2016, Principle 4.
217 See ROGER BARKER & IRIS H-Y CHIU, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND INVESTMENT
MANAGEMENT, 61-122 (2017) (citations omitted) (arguing that even socially responsible
investors may not take on such roles and activism).
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self-regulatory measures, as legalization may be regarded as inappropriate
interventions into the “market for virtue.”218
Policy-makers in the U.K. have been slow to consider regulatory
policy in CSR, relying on corporate self-regulation and investor leadership
to address corporate behavior. The agnosticism of regulators is arguably an
important reason for the slowness of institutional change. However, policymakers have become interested in the innovative “new governance”
methodologies in many soft law initiatives. When warranted, such
techniques seem to offer innovative and possible cost-reducing ways of
introducing corporate regulation.
New governance methodologies are based on multi-stakeholder
governance to change corporate behavior. 219 It is envisaged that the
regulated subject, i.e., the corporation, would be subject to regulatory
principles that incorporate more procedural flexibility and work with a
variety of governance actors including regulators, markets, and stakeholders
in securing compliance,220 potentially overcoming the short-comings of
traditional command-and-control regulation. In the U.K., this was accepted
by financial regulators (in line with international regulatory
developments)221 in the area of regulating risk management by banks.
Further, we also saw this implemented in the Corporate Homicide and
Manslaughter Act 2007.
The implementation of such new governance techniques in financial
regulation has, however, resulted in spectacular regulatory failure as
revealed in the global financial crisis from 2007 to 2009. This is largely
because new governance techniques were not implemented in a truly multistakeholder fashion, and focused on investors and securities markets as
governance actors. These have failed to exercise meaningful discipline, 222
resulting in banks being devolved with self-regulation. Banks manipulated
the “flexible” regulatory standards to their advantage and were relatively

VOGEL, supra note 197, at 1-15, 46-74 (2005).
See CHRISTINE PARKER, THE OPEN CORPORATION 1-30 (2002); and Christine Parker,
Meta-Regulation: Legal Accountability for Corporate Social Responsibility?, in THE NEW
CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY: CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE LAW 207
(Doreen McBarnet et al. eds., 2007) (arguing for a form of corporate conscience that would
be shaped and reinforced by procedural forms of regulation that attempt to change culture
and behavior).
220 The involvement of stakeholders in ensuring corporate compliance is discussed in
Gunningham, Environment Law, Regulation and Governance: Shifting Architectures, supra
note 116, at 179-212; Gunningham, The New Collaborative Environmental Governance: The
Localization of Regulation, supra note 116, at 145-166.
221 The Basel II Capital Accord of 2006; and discussed in Robert F. Weber, New
Governance, Financial Regulation, and Challenges to Legitimacy: The Example of the
Internal Models Approach to Capital Adequacy Regulation, 62 ADMIN. L. REV. 783-867
(2010).
222 See CHIU, supra note 144, at 3-41.
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unchecked.223
Lackluster implementation of new governance techniques in the U.K.
can also be seen in the Corporate Homicide and Manslaughter Act 2007.
The Act progressed through a long period of gestation since policy reform
recommended by the Law Commission in 1996224 after a number of largescale accidents between 1986 and 1989 that caused significant numbers of
deaths and injuries.225 Amidst political challenges to the policy change, the
Law Commission’s report was not taken up until 2000 after the New
Labour government came to power.
The Act was ultimately passed in 2007 to introduce a corporate
manslaughter offense for public and private corporate bodies that cause
death due to a gross breach of a duty of care to the victims, attributed to the
way the organization is managed or organized.226 The reform overcame the
limitations in case law, which premised corporate liability upon an
attribution doctrine that certain individuals’ minds and wills could be
attributed to the corporation.227 The new regulatory technique seems able to
interrogate the inside of the corporation in terms of poor management or
organization that results in harmful, externally-facing conduct.228 This
reform arguably connects a corporation’s management to the prevention of
social harm, introducing a form of disruption to the insular and
economically-driven model of the corporation and its governance. 229
Nevertheless, the adoption of new governance techniques in the Act
has not introduced profound changes to corporate behavior. First, the
corporation remains free to determine its internal management and systems,
and the regulatory regime does not involve multi-stakeholder input or a
social dimension to influence corporate behavior on an ex-ante basis.
223 Cristie Ford, New Governance, Compliance, and Principles-Based Securities
Regulation, 45 AM. BUS. L.J. 1-60 (2008).
224 LAW COMMISSION, LEGISLATING THE CRIMINAL CODE: INVOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER
(ITEM 11 OF THE SIXTH PROGRAMME OF LAW REFORM: CRIMINAL LAW), 1996, HC 171, at 6785 (UK).
225 Id. at 4-6.
226 Corporate Manslaughter and Homicide Act 2007, c. 19, §§ 1-2.
227 R. v. P & O European Ferries (Dover) Ltd [1991] 93 Cr. App. R. 72 (Eng.); Transco
PLC v. Her Majesty’s Advocate [2005] S.L.T. 211 (Scot.); see C.M.V. Clarkson, Kicking
Corporate Bodies and Damning Their Souls, 59 MOD. L. REV. 557-630 (1996).
228 Alice Belcher, Corporate Killing as a Corporate Governance Issue, 10 CORP.
GOVERNANCE 47-54 (2002); Iris H-Y Chiu & Anna Donovan, A New Milestone in Corporate
Regulation: Procedural Legalisation, Standards of Transnational Corporate Behavior and
Lessons from Financial Regulation and Anti-Bribery Regulation, 17 J. CORP. L. STUD. 427467 (2017). Although one of the limitations is that individuals in the organization are not
indicted under the Act which applies only to corporations. Critique in Frank B. Wright,
Criminal Liability of Directors and Senior Managers for Deaths at Work, CRIM. L. REV.,
Dec. 2007, at 949.
229 McBarnet, supra note 177, at 1-63 Cynthia A. Williams, Corporate Social
Responsibility and Corporate Governance, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE LAW
AND GOVERNANCE 634 (Jeffrey N. Gordon & Wolf-Georg Ringe eds., 2018).
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Second, the corporation is only called to account for its internal
management and systems before the court when indicted for the occurrence
of corporate homicide or manslaughter. The judicial interrogation of
internal management and systems is ex-post in nature and has focused on
precise pinpointing of senior management negligence.230 This narrow
approach allows large organizations with diffuse responsibilities to more
easily escape from liability under this regime as senior management may
not be implicated with precise acts by employees.231
The achievements in regulatory policy in addressing the social
dimensions of corporate behavior have been relatively incremental before
the onset of the global financial crisis 2007-9. The crisis and its aftermath,
which we turn to discuss, have provided new opportunities for challenges to
the stability of regulatory capitalism, culminating in the recent surge in the
legalization of CSR issues discussed in Section III.
C. Regulatory Capitalism Challenged by Global Financial Crisis and its
Aftermath
The global financial crisis 2007–2009 saw the near failure of a number
of U.S., U.K., and European banks that had taken excessive risks. Many
were exposed to liquidity risks resulting from imprudent management,232 or
solvency risks from having complex (and ultimately toxic) securitized
assets on their balance sheets.233 The marketized financial economy
promotes herding in good times and excessive withdrawals in bad times, 234
exacerbating stresses already faced by financial firms.235 As financialization
230
R. v. Cotswold Geotechnical Holdings Ltd [2011] EWCA Crim. 1337 (Eng.), (on
pinpointing the lack of safety guidelines such as for the depth of pits, causing an engineer to
fall to his death in a collapsed pit.
231 This is seen in the prosecution against an NHS Trust for the death caused by its two
anesthetists, whose negligence was not upheld. The court insisted that on the prosecution
make their making a case upon precise pinpointing of the level of management and
procedures that had failed, and refused to accept that employment of an inadequately
qualified person was to be regarded as a failure of management. The prosecution collapsed,
see R. v. Cornish (Errol) [2016] EWHC 779 (QB) (Eng.).
232 Such as over-reliance on short-term market funding in the case of Northern Rock in
the U.K.
233 HOWARD DAVIES, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: WHO IS TO BLAME? at chapter 9 (2010);
Gillian Tett, FOOL’S GOLD: HOW UNRESTRAINED GREED CORRUPTED A DREAM, SHATTERED
GLOBAL MARKETS AND UNLEASHED A CATASTROPHE 3-26 (2009); ADAIR TURNER, FIN.
SERVS. AUTH., THE TURNER REVIEW: A REGULATORY RESPONSE TO THE GLOBAL BANKING
CRISIS 21-22 (2009), http://www.ecgi.org/tcgd/2009/FSA_Turner_Report_on_Financial_
Crisis_2009.pdf.
234
Emilios Avgouleas, The Global Financial Crisis, Behavioral Finance and Financial
Regulation: In Search of a New Orthodoxy, 9 J. CORP. L. STUD. 23, 60 (2009).
235 See Hershey H. Friedman & Linda W. Friedman, The Global Financial Crisis of
2008: What Went Wrong?, in LESSONS FROM THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: CAUSES,
CONSEQUENCES, AND OUR ECONOMIC FUTURE 31 (Robert Kolb ed., 2010); James K.
Galbraith, The Roots of the Crisis and How to Bring it to a Close, in LESSONS FROM THE
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brought about a state of private sector dominance in meeting the financial
needs of states, business, and households,236 many states found themselves
in a position of having to bail out significant financial institutions to prevent
the collapse of domestic financial systems.237 The crisis led to real
economic damage, including home foreclosures and job losses, and
adversely affected the fiscal strength of governments, resulting in
widespread austerity measures in the EU and U.K., and a loss of welfare.238
Social confidence in market capitalism in the U.K. has been severely
disturbed,239 as reflected in (a) articulations of the ideological crisis of faith
in the U.K.’s capitalist model and (b) political disruptions in the U.K.
echoed across many other European countries.
The ideological crisis of faith in market capitalism has been expressed
in intellectual calls to challenge the current model of market capitalism, in
order to adjust towards an economic model more cognizant of the social
needs for justice and stability.240 This is not necessarily “leftist” talk: these
voices reflect a culmination of underlying concerns that have built up for
years about the U.K. economy with respect to issues such as widening
inequality between the economic elite and ordinary citizenry, 241 the
stagnation of wages compared to profits made from financial capital,242 and
FINANCIAL CRISIS: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, AND OUR ECONOMIC FUTURE, supra, at 37.
236 States rely on financial markets for borrowing, as do businesses and households. See
Gerald A. Epstein, Introduction: Financialization and the World Economy, in
FINANCIALISATION AND THE WORLD ECONOMY 3 (Gerard A. Epstein ed., 2005).
237 See Rosa María Lastra, Systemic Risk, SIFIs and Financial Stability, 6 CAP. MARKETS
L.J. 197, 199 (2011); see also Iain G. MacNeil & Justin O’Brien, Introduction: The Future
of Financial Regulation, in THE FUTURE OF FINANCIAL REGULATION 1, 2 (Iain G. MacNeil &
Justin O’Brien eds., 2010).
238 See Randall Germain, Financial Order and World Politics: Crisis, Change and
Continuity, 85 INT’L. AFF. 669, 672-74 (2009); Sue Mew, Contentious Politics: Financial
Crisis, Political-Economic Conflict, and Collective Struggles—A Commentary, 39 SOC.
JUST. 99, 100-01 (2013).
239 See John W. Cioffi, After the Fall: Regulatory Lessons from the Global Financial
Crisis, in HANDBOOK ON THE POLITICS OF REGULATION 642, 656-59 (David Levi-Faur ed.,
2011).
240 See STIGLITZ, supra note 28, at 196-209; Luiz Carlos Bresser-Pereira, The Global
Financial Crisis and a New Capitalism? 32-36 (Levy Economics Institute of Bard College,
Working Paper No. 592, 2010); Kolja Möller, Struggles for Law: Global Social Rights as an
Alternative to Financial Market Capitalism, in THE FINANCIAL CRISIS IN CONSTITUTIONAL
PERSPECTIVE: THE DARK SIDE OF FUNCTIONAL DIFFERENTIATION 305, 326-31 (Poul F. Kjaer
et al. eds., 2011); Ikerd, supra note 132, at 17-22; Iqbal et al., supra note 160, at 76-84. An
analogous intellectual trend, stakeholder capitalism, is also back in vogue, see R. Edward
Freeman et al., supra note 159, at 311-13.
241
Such as highly remunerated corporate executives and those profiting from
intermediating financial assets.
242 Ken-Hou Lin & Donald Tomaskovic-Devey, Financialization and U.S. Income
Inequality, 1970–2008, 118 AM. J. SOC. 1284, 1291-95 (2013); Eckhard Hein, FinanceDominated Capitalism and Redistribution of Income: A Kaleckian Perspective 31-32 (Levy
Economics Institute of Bard College, Working Paper No. 746, 2013); Basak Kus,

126

An Institutional Theory of Corporate Regulation
39:85 (2019)

the marginalization of stakeholders from business and policy.243 Indeed, the
“Occupy” movement worldwide was a reflection of social discontent that
arose to challenge the legitimacy of the capitalist model of market
fundamentalism that perpetuated social inequalities and divisions.244 This
ideological crisis has not become revolutionary with worldwide crackdown
of the Occupy movement.245 But policy-makers cognizant of the failings of
financial markets have sought to appease the public with international
resolve to regulate banks and financial institutions much more robustly than
before. 246 The determination in the U.S. to bring the Dodd-Frank Act 2010
into force, and the comprehensive program of institutional and regulatory
reform in the EU247 and U.K.248 have found social resonance. These
measures compel regulators to take proactive roles,249 as well as robust ex
Financialisation and Income Inequality in OECD Nations: 1995-2007, 43 ECON. & SOC.
REV. 477, 492-93 (2012); Gerard Duménil & Dominique Lévy, Financialization, NeoLiberalism and Income Inequality in the USA, in FINANCIALIZATION AT WORK, supra note
109, at 225-29.
243 E.g., INST. FOR PUB. POLICY RESEARCH, COMM’N ON ECON. JUSTICE, supra note 149, at
29-39; see also Mulgan, supra note 158, at 32-51.
244 ANDENAS & CHIU, supra note 109, at 3-15.
245 ‘Occupy Wall Street: 5 years later’ (CNN 16 Sep 2016) at https://edition.cnn.com/
2016/09/16/us/occupy-wall-street-protest-movements/index.html.
246 For an in-depth discussion of the EU, U.K. and international political perspectives,
see THE REGULATORY AFTERMATH OF THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS (Eilis Ferran et al. eds.,
2012).
247 The regulatory reform program is based on protecting financial stability as a social
good of newfound importance. Measures include: controlling financial institution risk-taking
at the micro and macro levels; bank crisis and resolution measures; increased market
transparency and reporting for regulatory surveillance, not just market discipline; greater
consumer protection; and intervening into the organizational governance and management of
financial institutions, including remuneration controls. These are supported by institutional
reform at the EU with agencies tasked with greater rule-making and supervisory powers, and
in the U.K. with clear division of responsibilities between the Prudential Regulation and
Financial Conduct Authorities and enhanced supervisory and enforcement arsenal. See
ANDENAS & CHIU, supra note 109; THE FUTURE OF FINANCIAL REGULATION, supra note 237;
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AFTER THE FINANCIAL CRISIS (P.M. Vasudev & Susan Watson
eds., 2011).
248 The U.K. transposed most of the EU reforms but added structural reforms to end the
“too-big-to-fail” problem. See ANDENAS & CHIU, supra note 109, at 295-331, and citations
therein, for a discussion of the Vickers Report, which preceded the government White Paper
and legislation. Further, the U.K. conducted a “social”-level inquiry in the form of the four
volumes of reports under the House of Commons and House of Lords Committees to
“[C]hang[e] banking for good.” See PARLIAMENTARY COMM’N ON BANKING STANDARDS,
CHANGING BANKING FOR GOOD (2013), https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt201314/
jtselect/jtpcbs/27/27.pdf. These inquiries played a significant part in the U.K.’s development
and introduction of the senior managers regime, which created a near strict-liability
regulatory framework for senior bank officers. See Iris H-Y Chiu, Regulatory Duties for
Directors in the Financial Services Sector and Directors’ Duties in Company Law:
Bifurcation and Interfaces, 6 J. BUS. L. 465, 474-81 (2016).
249 See BANK OF ENG., PRUDENTIAL REGULATION AUTH., THE PRUDENTIAL REGULATION
AUTHORITY’S APPROACH TO BANKING SUPERVISION 33-37 (2013), https://www.
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post roles,250 far more than ever before in supervising banks and financial
institutions, changing the regulatory paradigms significantly.251 This shift
has not dethroned the private financial sector from continuing to be
dominant in mediating worldwide financial needs for states, businesses and
households,252 but a social truce seems to have been attained by the force of
regulation asserting a new balance of power and legitimacy in the
financialized market economy.253 Further, large fines imposed upon
financial institutions for misconduct,254 a visible form of legal and social
penance, have humbled many banks. The social “magic” of regulation, in
terms of its perceived strength and legitimacy,255 cannot be ignored and
bankofengland.co.uk/-/media/boe/files/prudential-regulation/approach/banking-approach2013.pdf?la=en&hash=EE3CF43F507394DA596088664EAAAC5C6128F4F6 (discussing
judgement-based supervision).
250 Credible supervision and enforcement. One important aspect of supervision is stresstesting that puts banks through hypothetical models of stress scenarios in order to evaluate
resilience, see IRIS CHIU & JOANNA WILSON, BANKING LAW AND REGULATION, CHAPTER 9.F
(Oxford: Oxford University Press 2019).
251 The financial regulatory paradigm has shifted away from market fundamentalism with
the advent of macro-prudential regulation, see Iris H-Y Chiu, Macro-Prudential
Supervision: Critically Examining the Developments in the UK, EU and Internationally, 6 L.
& FIN. MKT. REV. 184 (2012), toward supervisory measures such as stress-testing, see CHIU
& WILSON, supra note 250, and accompanying text; an explosion of transparency returns,
see Iris H-Y Chiu, Corporate Reporting and the Accountability of Banks and Financial
Institutions, in THE LAW ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN BANKS 196, 199-215 (Iris H-Y
Chiu et al. eds., 2015); and extension of regulatory reform to areas hitherto unregulated or
lightly regulated, such as alternative investment funds, see ANDENAS & CHIU, supra note
109, at 140-90, and aspects of shadow banking, see RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON SHADOW
BANKING: LEGAL AND REGULATORY ASPECTS, chapters 3-13 provide discussion on different
aspects (Iris H-Y Chiu & Iain MacNeil eds., 2017).
252 See Christopher Arup, The Global Financial Crisis: Learning from Regulatory and
Governance Studies, 32 L. & POL’Y 363, 365-72 (2010); Timothy Canova, Financial Market
Failure as a Crisis in the Rule of Law: From Market Fundamentalism to a New Keynesian
Regulatory Model, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y. REV. 369, 388-93 (2010).
253 ANDENAS & CHIU, supra note 244.
254 The financial penalties meted out to banks for historical misconduct such as misselling and manipulation of the London Inter-Bank Offered Rate have been tremendous in
the U.S. as well as U.K. See Hannes Köster & Matthias Pelster, Financial Penalties and
Bank Performance, 79 J. BANKING & FIN. 57, 59 (2017), (detailing 671 penalties imposed
following the financial crisis). Köster and Pelster also find, however, that bank performance
improves thereafter as investors perceive behavioral problems to be closed upon regulatory
punishment. See id. at 62-70.
255 See Augusto de la Torre & Alain Ize, Regulatory Reform: Integrating Paradigms, 13
INT’L. FIN. 109, 110-12 (2010). Regulation offers appeal in providing a “better” solution
when self or light regulation has failed. Rosner and Markowitz discuss how voluntary
initiatives undertaken by firms never went far enough in the US to promote occupational
health and safety and were ultimately superseded by regulation. See Rosner & Markowitz,
supra note 16, at 29-34. In cases where the social responsibility concerns are severe, such as
where commercial activities are carried out in conflict areas experiencing severe human
rights breaches, self-regulation by firms may be regarded as insufficient, as there is a lack of
public accountability and the level of social protection required may exceed a firm’s
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plays a part in restoring social confidence. The re-regulatory high in the
aftermath of the global financial crisis 2007-2009 is an important driver for
the increased legalization of CSR to change corporate behavior,256 as
corporate regulation remains an important socio-political tool.257 This is a
trend not limited to,258 although pronounced in, the EU259 and U.K.260 At an
international level, a similar appetite for the legalization of CSR can also be
detected. 261 International initiatives are launched against corporate
bribery262 and tax evasion,263 while non-governmental activists such as in
governance capacity. For example, De Beers developed a system for tracing the source of
their diamonds in order to ensure that they were not implicated by conflict diamonds (the
Kimberley Process). However, in the face of mounting international pressure and reports of
severe human rights breaches regarding the conflict areas in Angola and Sierra Leone, the
U.S. ultimately passed the Clean Diamonds Trade Act. The Act outlaws trade in diamonds
not certified according to internationally-agreed standards set out in the Kimberley Process.
See Andrew Bone, Conflict Diamonds: The De Beers Group and the Kimberley Process, in
BUSINESS AND SECURITY: PUBLIC-PRIVATE SECTOR RELATIONSHIPS IN A NEW SECURITY
ENVIRONMENT 129, 129-35 (Alyson J.K. Bailes & Isabel 128 Frommelt eds., 2004),
https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/files/books/SIPRI04BaiFro/SIPRI04BaiFro11.pdf;
see also Ralf Boscheck, Strategy, Markets and Governance, in STRATEGIES, MARKETS AND
GOVERNANCE: EXPLORING COMMERCIAL AND REGULATORY AGENDAS, supra note 16, at 5-6.
256 Engobo Emeseh et al., Corporations, CSR and Self Regulation: What Lessons from
the Global Financial Crisis?, 11 GERMAN L.J. 230, 253-59 (2010); Larry Catá Backer, From
Moral Obligation to International Law: Disclosure Systems, Markets and the Regulation of
Multinational Corporations, 39 GEO. J. INT’L. L. 591, 601-08 (2008); Corinne Gendron et
al., Résponsibilité Social et Regulation de l’Entreprise Mondialisée [Social Responsibility
and the Regulation of the Global Firm], 59 REL. INDUSTRIELLES 73-100 (2004).
257 See Gunningham, supra note 15 and accompanying text; PHILIP RAWLINGS ET AL.,
QUEEN MARY U. OF LONDON, CTR. FOR COM. L. STUD., REGULATION OF FINANCIAL SERVICES:
AIMS AND METHODS 24-29 (2014), http://www.ccls.qmul.ac.uk/media/ccls/docs/research/
020-Report.pdf.
258 For example, the U.S. has also enacted regulatory measures related to corporate social
responsibility, such as in relation to conflict minerals. Listed companies are to report on
whether they use certain minerals originating from the Democratic Republic of Congo or
other conflict-ridden country and the extent of due diligence and monitoring they carry out
to ascertain the source of their minerals, see SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, FINAL RULE: CONFLICT
MINERALS (2012), https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2012/34-67716.pdf. The EU counterpart
is discussed in Section III, infra.
259 The EU’s initiatives for legalization of CSR are discussed in Section III, infra.
260 See discussion infra Section III.
261 See LAW AND LEGALIZATION IN TRANSNATIONAL RELATIONS (Christian Brütsch &
Dirk Lehmkuhl eds., 2007). Brütsch and Lehmkuhl’s volume shows how legalization is
pursued at a transnational level to deal with common global problems in relation to
economic activity, such as financial crime and corporate financial reporting.
262 See e.g., Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in Int’l. Bus.
Transactions, Dec. 17, 1997, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 105-43, OECD/LEGAL/0293 (1998),
http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/ConvCombatBribery_ENG.pdf;
PREVENTING
CORPORATE CORRUPTION (Stefano Manacorda et al. eds., 2014).
263 See Org. for Econ. Cooperation & Dev. Council, Standard for Automatic Exchange of
Fin. Acct. Info. in Tax Matters, Jul. 15, 2014, C(2014)81/FINAL; id. at 10 (detailing that the
convention is modeled on the United States’ Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act, see 26
U.S.C.A §§ 1471–1474 (West) (Current through P.L. 115-281)); see also Iris H-Y Chiu,
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human rights have pushed these issues to a level of legalization.264
In the U.K., the continuing motivation towards legalization of CSR is
also attributable to the sharpened political need to respond to social
demand. The persistence of critical CSR265 is not a futile effort, as such
voices can stimulate paradigm changes in more destabilizing times.
Political sensitivity is sharpened towards social demand as the U.K.
continues to experience political disruption that has followed from the
global financial crisis. Instability in the consolidation of political power
amongst major parties in the U.K. has intruded upon business-government
relations, now in a more turbulent phase.
The New Labour government was ousted from power in the 2010
election following political mistakes made by the incumbent government
defending the economic status quo.266 With no party gaining a majority, an
From Multilateral to Unilateral Lines of Attack: The Sustainability of Offshore Tax Havens
and Financial Centres in the International Legal Order, 31 CONN. J. INT’L. L. 163, 172-79
(2016) (discussing the legal endorsement in some EU legislation of the OECD’s Model Tax
Convention, see OECD, Model Tax Convention on Income & on Capital, Jul. 14, 2014,
OECD/LEGAL/0407).
264 See U.N. HUM. RTS. COUNCIL, OFF. OF THE HIGH COMM’R, GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR
BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS, U.N. Doc. HR/Pub/11/04 (2011), https://www.ohchr.org/
documents/publications/GuidingprinciplesBusinesshr_eN.pdf; see also Larry Catá Backer,
The Guiding Principles of Business and Human Rights at a Crossroads: The State, the
Enterprise, and the Spectre of a Treaty to Bind Them All 44-49 (Coalition for Peace &
Ethics, Working Paper No. 7/1, 2014).
265 “Critical CSR” refers to academic and intellectual commentary that casts doubt on the
sufficiency of business-oriented or managerialized forms of CSR, and which raises critical
questions about connecting to corporations’ moral agency, real behavioral change, and
corporate culture. See e.g., Martin Fougère & Nikodemus Solitander, Against Corporate
Responsibility: Critical Reflections on Thinking, Practice, Content
and Consequences, 16 CORP. SOC. RESP. & ENVTL. MGMT. 217-227 (2009); Mollie PainterMorland, Rethinking Responsible Agency in Corporations: Perspectives from Deleuze and
Guattari, 101 J. BUS. ETHICS 83-95 (2011). Other commentators also point out that CSR can
be used to resist deeper social embedment of issues within the corporate structure, such as
stakeholder voice and involvement, see Gregory Jackson & Androniki Apostolakou,
Corporate Social Responsibility in Western Europe: An Institutional Mirror or Substitute?,
94 J. BUS. ETHICS 371, 387-90 (2010); but see Dirk Matten & Jeremy Moon, “Implicit” and
“Explicit” CSR: A Conceptual Framework for a Comparative Understanding of Corporate
Social Responsibility, 33 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 404-424, (2008) (adopting a more neutral
explanation for “explicit” versus “implicit” CSR using the lens of institutional reasons).
Further critical CSR could refer to business’ attempts to situate the discourse outside of
political spheres, thereby disempowering constituents and carrying out a form of neocolonization of the social discourse, see Jean-Pascal Gond, Reconsidering the Critical
Corporate Social Responsibility Perspective Through French Pragmatic Sociology:
Subverting Corporate Do-Gooding for the Common Good?, in THE CORPORATION, supra
note 123, at 360, 361-68; Steve Tombs, The Functions and Dysfunctions of Corporate Social
Responsibility, in THE CORPORATION, supra note 123, at 351-56; Baars, supra note 170, at
427-29. The “social citizenship” literature is arguably also critical as it emphasizes the need
to re-embed CSR discourse in the political relations between corporations, government and
society, see supra note 173.
266 Justin Pritchard, United Kingdom: The Politics of Government Survival, in FRAMING
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unprecedented coalition government was formed in the wake of the election
between the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats, which oversaw most of
the immediate post-crisis reforms and a period of severe austerity measures.
Social sentiment has remained unstable as greater polarization between the
political right and left grew,267 and far-right elements have garnered a
louder voice in political representation.268 The subsequent Conservativemajority governments269 have been weak and besieged by divisions in
social demand and opinions. The U.K. is experiencing a period of political
instability as highlighted in the highly divided Brexit referendum in 2016
and its continuing ramifications. Social discontent leading to political
disruption is also played out in the U.K.’s European neighbors. Such
political disruption is a response to the social fallout from austerity
measures,270 and some of which reflect a social cry for a paradigm shift and
change in policy.271
In this landscape, holders of political power (potentially transient in
these destabilizing times) have turned to regulation272 to address many
aspects of social discontent, especially vis-a-vis business. Such sociallyfacing regulation of business could placate voters, but they inevitably cause
a shift in business-government relations. Could the current wave of
legalization in CSR matters signal a fundamental institutional shift in the
tenets of regulatory capitalism, bridging the economically-driven and
market-focused corporation with its ethical and social dimensions? Has the
new legalization ultimately “hardened” the soft law of socially-driven
initiatives? We analyze the key reforms to critically appraise their
achievements and limitations. We suggest marginal shifts have occurred but
THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC DOWNTURN 99-119

(Paul ‘t Hart & Karen Tindall eds., 2009).
Such as the election of extreme left Jeremy Corbyn as Labour party leader, while
nationalist elements in the Conservative Party became bolder and were instrumental in
aligning with far-right political parties supporting the U.K.’s “Brexit” from EU membership.
The Conservative government ultimately offered a referendum in May 2016, which resulted
in the shocking, narrow majority supporting Brexit. The Liberal Democrats, recognized as a
centrist party, were trounced in the 2015 elections, losing over 30 seats in Parliament.
268 Characterized by the rise of the U.K. Independence Party led for a time by
charismatic Nigel Farage.
269 The Cameron government in 2015 and the May government formed in late 2016 after
the Brexit Referendum.
270 Such as social unrest and protests in Portugal, Greece and Spain, as austerity
measures adversely affected social welfare.
271 The French election in 2016 that saw a completely new party and leader Emmanuel
Macron defeat well-established left and right parties; and the rise of far-right politics in
Hungary and Poland, and also reflected in the gains made by far right political parties in the
German and Austrian elections in 2017. The Spanish Catalan separatist movement, although
quashed in mid-2017, also highlighted elements of political volatility in Spain.
272 Analyzed for e.g. in relation to the EU regulatory machinery as a harmonizing and
also politically stabilizing force, see Tully Fletcher, The European Union: From Impotence
to Opportunity?, in FRAMING THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC DOWNTURN, supra note 266, at 181–
200.
267
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new governance techniques employed in regulatory reforms leave
flexibility for ambivalent implementation. We account for the
underwhelming achievements but show how their limitations have been
dependent on the characteristics of the U.K.’s regulatory capitalism.
Fundamentally, regulatory capitalism is defined by the capitalist model in
which it is implemented.
Section III highlights the precise locations of institutional weaknesses
in order to provoke thinking for a change and suggests that regulatory
leadership can still play a crucial role in institutional change.
III. POST-CRISIS LEGALIZATION OF CSR
The corporate regulation reforms discussed in this Section could mark
a significant institutional shift, as various socially-facing aspects of
corporate behavior seem no longer to be left in the realm of soft law and
self-regulation, but have found a place in regulatory law. This, however,
does not mean that regulatory law embodies the substantive norms of
conduct, or implementation and enforcement that reflect the nature of social
demand. Crucially, new governance techniques have again been brought in
to effect such reforms. On the one hand, new governance techniques
embody a new ethos in corporations’ governance relationships with
stakeholders and not just the regulator/state. The employment of such
techniques could mark a shift towards changing the nature of corporate
regulation, allowing multi-stakeholderism and more social infusion into
corporate regulation. On the other hand, new governance techniques can
also empower internal self-regulation by corporations, and are susceptible
to devolution to corporates without due monitoring and accountability, as
has occurred in the pre-crisis years. We observe that new governance
techniques have been employed in two key ways across a number of
different regulatory reforms.
One technique extends corporate transparency to socially-facing issues
and seems to invigorate securities markets as well as broader society in new
roles of governance. We discuss the examples of the EU Non-financial
disclosure Directive 2014 and the U.K.’s Modern Slavery Act 2015. The
other technique employs the new governance approach of interrogating the
inside of a corporation to enhance responsibility for preventing misconduct.
These are in relation to conflict minerals due diligence (EU Conflict
Minerals Regulation 2017), bribery (Bribery Act 2010), tax evasion
(Criminal Finances Act 2017), and the general enhancement of stakeholder
voice in corporations (the U.K.’s Business Energy and Industrial Strategy
(BEIS) Department’s reforms).
The achievements and limitations of recent corporate regulation
reforms will be fleshed out by our analysis of the advancements (or
otherwise) made by the employment of new governance techniques. New
governance has the potential to challenge the economic insularity of
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corporate governance and objectives, and compel a form of socialization of
the corporation. However, the very flexibility and malleability of new
governance techniques can be molded to limit their challenge to the tenets
of regulatory capitalism. We argue that “strong” forms of implementation
of certain corporate regulation reforms could be adopted that bring about
more profound paradigm shifts corporate regulation in the U.K., but these
are ultimately not achieved. Instead, the implementation in the U.K.
continues to be shaped by the tenets of regulatory capitalism.
A. Strong versus Weak Forms of New Governance Implementation
Strong forms of implementation of the recent corporate regulation
reforms can signal decisive shifts away from the tenets of regulatory
capitalism. Such implementation could promote the ethos of new
governance techniques in terms of infusing corporate objectives and culture
with social and ethical underpinnings, and promoting greater engagement
between corporations with stakeholders in various degrees of formalized
multi-stakeholder approaches in securing corporate compliance.273 These
shifts would represent the change from the market fundamentalist
paradigms of corporate behavior, as actors in governance could be nonmarket in nature, and social values may be elevated and not marginalized
by market values. We regard one or more of the following as representing a
marked shift in corporate behavior: re-orienting corporate objectives
towards commitment to address the CSR problems, re-orienting internal
management and structures towards new ethics for supporting social
objectives, re-positioning corporate accountability towards a wide scope of
the polycentric sphere, and the adoption of new, collaborative or pluralistic
273 Multi-stakeholder initiatives can come in a variety of forms and hence impacting on
their effectiveness, as participation scope, meaning and intensity of participation, quality of
deliberativeness, procedural governance in the multi-stakeholder structure and ultimately,
consequentiality can differ vastly among initiatives. These problems are pointed out by
Karin Backstränd, Multi-Stakeholder Partnerships for Sustainable Development: Rethinking
Legitimacy, Accountability and Effectiveness, 16 EUR. ENV’T 290-306 (2006); Luc Fransen
& Ans Kolk, Global Rule-Setting for Business: A Critical Analysis of Multi-Stakeholder
Standards, 14 ORG. 667-684 (2007); Greetje Schouten et al., On the Deliberative Capacity
of Private Multi-Stakeholder Governance: The Roundtables on Responsible Soy and
Sustainable Palm Oil, 83 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 42-50 (2012); O’Rourke, supra note 177, at 129; but the highlighting of these issues can be a start towards their improvement. Particular
issues in relation to certain major multi-stakeholder initiatives are discussed, in relation to
the Ethical Trading Initiative, see Susanne Schaller, The Democratic Legitimacy of Private
Governance, INEF REPORT 91/2007, Oct. 2007, at 5-45; in relation to the Forest Stewardship
Council, see Axel Marx & Dieter Cuypers, Forest Certification as a Global Environmental
Governance Tool: What is the Macro-Effectiveness of the Forest Stewardship Council?, 4
REG. & GOVERNANCE 408-434 (2010); in relation to the Marine Stewardship Council, see
Lars H. Galbrundsen, The Emergence and Effectiveness of the Marine Stewardship Council,
33 MARINE POL’Y 654-660, (2009). More mature multi-stakeholder initiatives that have
achieved some successes in input and output legitimacy in different degrees, is discussed in
Vallejo & Hauselmann, supra note 190, at 3-26.
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techniques of governance by the corporation.
On the contrary, weak forms of implementation would likely result in
little difference from the tenets of regulatory capitalism. This could mean a
continued subscription to the importance of incentives-based behavior and
market discipline, and limited or non-adoption of multi-stakeholderism.
Further, new governance techniques that interrogate internal management
structures, governance or procedures can be devolved to corporations and
reduced to proceduralization. Corporations can superficially adopt
procedures or manipulate them for instrumental purposes, culminating in a
form of “organized hypocrisy”274 that does not touch corporate culture.275 It
has been observed that the deliberate promotion of multi-stakeholder
governance in environmental governance has been unique and successful, a
trend not replicated in other areas of CSR. 276 Corporations devolved to
interpret new governance reforms may manipulate regulatory freedoms in a
calculative manner that does not satisfy social expectations,277 undermining
the ethos of new governance itself. At worst, corporations can even subvert
the original cause to change corporate behavior as they can become more
politically involved in order to influence policy.278
B. Examples
We first discuss the employment of new governance techniques in
interrogating internal management and procedures at corporations to
combat bribery and tax evasion. Next, we discuss the use of the same
techniques, albeit in a more limited way, in addressing supply chain
governance by corporations. Third, we turn to reforms based on corporate
disclosure of CSR issues. Finally, we discuss the U.K.’s reforms to improve
stakeholder engagement with companies.
1. Enhancing Internal Interrogation into Corporations and Changing
Corporate Culture?
We first examine the Bribery Act 2010 and Criminal Finances Act
274 Dangers are also canvassed in Parker, supra note 219, at 207-37; Kimberly Krawiec,
Cosmetic Compliance and the Failure of Negotiated Governance, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 487544 (2003); Alwyn Lim & Kiyoteru Tsutsui, Globalization and Commitment in Corporate
Social Responsibility: Cross-National Analyses of Institutional and Political-Economy
Effects, 77 AM. SOC. REV. 69-98 (2012) (on “organized hypocrisy” and ceremonial
commitment).
275 Tombs, supra note 265, at 347-59.
276 Arya & Salk, supra note 177, at 211-234.
277
Discussed in Section II.
278 Gary Fooks et al., The Limits of Corporate Social Responsibility: Techniques of
Neutralization, Stakeholder Management and Political CSR, 112 J. BUS. ETHICS 283-299
(2013); Ben Baumberg Geiger & Valentina Cuzzocrea, Corporate Social Responsibility and
Conflicts of Interest in the Alcohol and Gambling Industries: A Post-Political Discourse?,
68 BRITISH J. SOC. 254-272 (2017).
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2017 to assess the U.K.’s legislative efforts intervening into the internal
organization of corporations in order to change corporate behavior “from
within.” Under both pieces of legislation, corporations are obliged to
institute reasonable or adequate procedures in order to prevent bribery or
tax evasion. This form of ex ante phrasing is different from ex post
enforcement against acts of bribery and tax evasion. The obligation to
prevent emphasizes ongoing efforts and is aimed to change “the way things
are done” in the corporation via the introduction of a form of procedural
regulation.
The Bribery Act 2010 introduces criminal liability for a corporation
that fails to prevent bribery by any person associated with it in order to
retain business or gain an advantage for the corporation.279 The corporation
can only avoid liability if it has in place adequate procedures280 designed to
prevent such conduct. Anti-bribery regulation delineates corporations’
responsibility to prevent bribery even if they operate in a complex web of
external institutional and cultural factors that drive demand-side pressures
for corruption.281 The Criminal Finances Act 2017 introduces for
corporations an offense for failure to prevent tax evasion facilitated by a
person associated with the corporation, whether such tax evasion is in
relation to a liability to pay U.K. or foreign tax.282 The corporation can only
avoid liability if it has put in place prevention procedures that are
reasonable to be instituted. It is arguably a bold step for both Acts to
impose criminal liability on corporations for “failure to prevent,” signaling
the need for corporations to proactively look into their internal
organizations, procedures, and incentives in order to avoid liability.
In terms of substantive norms, anti-bribery norms have been enhanced
in the Bribery Act while anti-tax evasion norms have been incrementally
developed in other pieces of legislation.283 The Bribery Act has adopted an
Bribery Act 2010, c. 23, § 7 (UK).
MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, THE BRIBERY ACT 2010: GUIDANCE 15-20 (2010),
https://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/legislation/bribery-act-2010-guidance.pdf (provides
six broadly framed principles in relation to internal organization, governance and
management).
281 Firms can find demand side pressures difficult to handle if they are reliant on corrupt
host country governments e.g. for exporting rights, licenses, public infrastructure, or just the
overwhelming cultural or institutional factors in host countries, see S. Douglas Beets,
Understanding the Demand-Side Issues of International Corruption, 57 J. BUS. ETHICS 6581 (2005); Yanjing Chen et al., Factors Influencing the Incidence of Bribery Payouts by
Firms: A Cross-Country Analysis, 77 J. BUS. ETHICS 231-244 (2008); Kelly D. Martin et al.,
Deciding to Bribe: A Cross-Level Analysis of Firm and Home Country Influences on Bribery
Activity, 50 ACAD. MGMT. J. 1401-1422 (2007); Simon Gächter & Jonathan F. Schulz,
Intrinsic Honesty and the Prevalence of Rule Violations Across Societies, 531 NATURE 496499 (2016).
282 Criminal Finances Act 2017, c. 22, § 45–46 (UK).
283 The Finance Act 2013 introducing an anti-abuse rule and the EU Tax Avoidance
Directive that has been passed in July 2016 but has yet to be implemented in most EU
countries, see Council Directive 2016/1164, 2016 O.J. (L 193) Arts 4-9, esp. Art 6 (EU).
279
280
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expansive definition of bribery,284 avoiding the route taken by the U.S.
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act whose exceptions to the definition of bribery
reflect the capture of business interests.285 The Act has arguably achieved
an unequivocal pronouncement on the social unacceptability of bribery286
after a protracted policy process challenged by business resistance.287 Under
the Criminal Finances Act, tax evasion is defined as “cheating the public
revenue” or “knowingly engaged in a fraudulent scheme to evade tax” 288
and in relation to foreign taxes, relates to committing a tax evasion offence
or breach of duty under foreign law.289 The illegal tax behavior captured
relates to well-established norms of tax evasion behavior such as deceptive
under-declaration or falsification of information so that tax liability is
assessed incorrectly, but will also include tax avoidance behavior that is
established as “abusive.” As Wolff points out,290 there is relatively minimal
tax evasion by corporations as such, especially by multinational
corporations whose financial transparency is heavily regulated, leaving
little room for tax evasion behavior.291 The increasing social outcry against
corporate tax behavior relates to tax avoidance292 or aggressive forms of it,
Christopher J. Newman & Michael Macaulay, Placebos or Panaceas: Anglo-New
Zealand Experiences of Legislative Approaches to Combatting Bribery, 77 J. CRIM. L. 482496 (2013).
285 Jack G. Kaikati et al., The Price of International Business Morality: Twenty Years
Under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 26 J. BUS. ETHICS 213-222 (2000).
286 Laura S. Underkuffler, Defining Corruption: Implications for Action, in CORRUPTION,
GLOBAL SECURITY, AND WORLD ORDER 27-46 (Robert I. Rotberg ed., 2009) (i.e. achieving a
moral pronouncement). See also Mark S. Schwartz, “Corporate Efforts to Tackle
Corruption: An Impossible Task?” The Contribution of Thomas Dunfee, 88 J. BUS. ETHICS
823-832 (2009).
287 The U.K. has since 1999 acquired the obligation to transpose into law the ratification
of the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International
Business Transactions 1999. The Law Commission proposed to codify and modernise the
criminal law against bribery in 1998 following independent Committee recommendations,
see LAW COMM’N, LEGISLATING THE CRIMINAL CODE: CORRUPTION 118-122 (1998),
https://s3-eu-west-2.amazonaws.com/lawcom-prod-storage-11jsxou24uy7q/uploads/
2015/03/lc248_Legislating_the_Criminal_Code_Corruption.pdf, but there was no legislative
resolve towards the end of the Major government. Indeed, the ultimate enactment of the
Bribery Act 2010 reflects protracted and oft-criticized progress. See LAW COMM’N,
REFORMING BRIBERY at 5-14 (2008), https://s3-eu-west-2.amazonaws.com/lawcom-prodstorage-11jsxou24uy7q/uploads/2015/04/lc313.pdf. Discussed in Cecily Rose, The UK
Bribery Act 2010 and Accompanying Guidance: Belated Implementation of the OECD AntiBribery Convention, 61 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 485-499 (2012).
288 Criminal Finances Act 2017, c. 22, § 45 (UK).
289 Id. at § 46.
290 Lutz-Christian Wolff, Offshore Holdings for Global Investments of Multinational
Enterprises: Just
Evil?, 6 J. BUS. L. 445-471 (2015).
291 Joel Slemrod, Cheating Ourselves: The Economics of Tax Evasion, 21 J. ECON.
PERSP. 25-48 (2007).
292 See difference between avoidance and evasion explained in Montgomery Agnell, Tax
Evasion and Tax Avoidance, 38 COLUM. L. REV. 80-97 (1938). Aggressive MNC tax
284
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i.e., legal structures and schemes that may appear to be complex and
contrived, in order to minimize a corporation’s tax burdens.
Commentators have discussed how globalization and easy access to
low tax jurisdictions have greatly facilitated tax avoidance schemes – such
as the use of transfer pricing schemes within the same group of companies
293
or the use of offshore companies incorporated in tax havens to hold
corporate assets or licenses so that revenues are regarded to be earned
offshore and subject to minimal tax. 294 One of the most oft-cited examples
is the “double Irish Dutch sandwich” scheme used by Google to avoid
paying corporate tax in the U.S.295 Although the ethicality of paying tax is
not an absolute one,296 and one can take the view that tax laws are rulebased in nature,297 not representing fundamental norms or values such as
the protection of human rights or anti-corruption,298 the social outcry
against aggressive corporate tax avoidance, especially by globally
successful companies, is not unfounded. Zucman299 argues that aggressive
corporate tax avoidance has to date deprived most treasuries of 20% of their
corporate tax receipts, which form a third of most developed jurisdictions’
revenues. Even if the net effect is a 6% loss or so in overall tax receipts by
governments, this can impact public services, the deterioration of which is a
major source of social discontent. 300 Further, the loss of tax receipts could
avoidance discussed in Mihir A. Desai & Dhammika Dharmapala, Corporate Tax Avoidance
and High Powered Incentives, 79 J. FIN. ECON. 145-179 (2006); Carlo Garbarino, Aggressive
Tax Strategies and Corporate Tax Governance: An Institutional Approach, 8 EUR. COMPANY
& FIN. L. REV. 277-304 (2011); Gerrit Lietz, Tax Avoidance vs. Tax Aggressiveness: A
Unifying Conceptual Approach, (Working Paper, 2013), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2363828;
at chapter 2; A COMPARATIVE LOOK AT REGULATION OF CORPORATE TAX AVOIDANCE 1-24
(Karen B. Brown ed., 2012).
293 Don R. Hansen et al., Moral Ethics v. Tax Ethics: The Case of Transfer Pricing
Among Multinational Corporations, 9 J. BUS. ETHICS 679-686 (1992).
294 Steven A. Bank, The Globalization of Corporate Tax Law Reform, 40 PEPP. L. REV.
1307-1328 (2013); Wolff, supra note 290, at 445-471.
295 Wolff, supra note 290, at 445-471 (for discussion of the Google “double Irish Dutch
sandwich” scheme).
296 As tax rules can be made for bad or corrupt governments, can be oppressive, and may
bear no relation to the state’s role in provision of public services, see Robert W. McGee,
Three Views on the Ethics of Tax Evasion, 67 J. BUS. ETHICS 15-35 (2006); Slemrod, supra
note 291, at 25-48. Further, the ethicality of tax rules is also influenced by social culture, see
Robert W. McGee et al., A Comparative Study on Perceived Ethics of Tax Evasion: Hong
Kong vs the United States, 77 J. BUS. ETHICS 147-158 (2008) (features a survey of different
attitudes of ethicality in different countries). Further, political and social policy can affect
the perception of the ethicality of tax, and heavy or “sacrificial” burdens can quickly become
unjustified as people consider their moral duty to minimize their tax bill, see Steven A.
Bank, When did Tax Avoidance Become Respectable?, 71 TAX L. REV. 123-177 (2017).
297 Agnell, supra note 292, at 80-97; Wolff, supra note 290, at 445-471.
298 Opined in Wolff, supra note 290, at 445-471.
299 Gabriel Zucman, Taxing Across Borders: Tracking Personal Wealth and Corporate
Profits, 28 J. ECON. PERSP. 121-148 (2014).
300 Karen B. Brown, Comparative Regulation of Corporate Tax Avoidance: An
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mean that governments have to borrow more and spread the cost of
borrowing onto ordinary citizens, with the perception of such burdens
worsening in times of austerity. Although some have argued that
corporations, especially multinational ones, do not benefit much from state
provision of services or welfare and hence should not be asked to pay taxes
to fund state expenditure,301 this argument only reflects the insularity of the
economically-driven, globalized corporation that has no sense of citizenship
or common burden-sharing with its communities.302 Many commentators
see the need for corporations to be responsible in the ethicalities of their tax
behaviors, especially in light of their resourcefulness compared to ordinary
individuals.303
Tax behavior has come under substantive reform since 2013. Until the
passage of the Finance Act 2013, there was no “general anti-avoidance
rule”304 in the U.K. In 2013, tax law has been reformed to allow Her
Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC) to challenge “tax abuse”
arrangements.305 Where the HMRC is of the view that tax abuse
arrangements are in place, it needs to establish their nature by referring to a
panel whose advisory opinion is recognized in court.306 Abusive tax
behavior is based on a “double reasonableness” test that no reasonable
person would regard the arrangement as a reasonable course of action,
except to facilitate tax avoidance.307 The tax abuse regime applies to
specific taxes including corporation tax,308 and HMRC publishes regularly
Overview, in A COMPARATIVE LOOK AT REGULATION OF CORPORATE TAX AVOIDANCE 1-24
(Karen B. Brown ed., 2012); Hans Gribnau, Corporate Social Responsibility and Tax
Planning: Not by Rules Alone, 24 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 225-250 (2015).
301 Robert W. McGee, Some Thoughts on the Ethics of Parking Profits Offshore, 15 J.
ACCT., ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 165-174 (2014).
302 Hans JLM Gribnau & Ave Geidi-Jallai, Good Tax Governance: A Matter of Moral
Responsibility and Transparency, 1 NORDIC TAX J. 70-88 (2017). See also, Assaf Likhovski,
Training in Citizenship: Tax Compliance and Modernity, 32 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 665-700
(2007) (arguing that tax compliance is very much seen as part of good citizenship even for
individuals).
303 Slemrod, supra note 291; Brown, supra note 300, at 25-48.
304 Sandra Eden, United Kingdom, in A COMPARATIVE LOOK AT REGULATION OF
CORPORATE TAX AVOIDANCE, supra note 300, at 1. There are however specific tax
avoidance prohibitions in different legislative schemes.
305 For the General Anti-Abuse Rule, see Finance Act 2013, c. 29, §§ 206-15; [and
guidance from the HMRC, General Anti-abuse Rule Guidance (2018) at
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_dat
a/file/695255/gaar_parts_a_b_c_2018.pdf].
306 Finance Act 2013, c. 29, § 211. The somewhat confused nature of this process is
discussed in Judith Freedman, Creating New UK Institutions for Tax Governance and Policy
Making: Progress or Confusion?, 4 BRITISH TAX REV. 373-381 (2013).
307 Finance Act 2013, c. 29, § 207(2).
308 See HM REVENUE & CUSTOMS, GENERAL ANTI–ABUSE RULE (GAAR) GUIDANCE,
PARTS PP 10-34 (2018), https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/
uploads/attachment_data/file/605502/gaar-part-d-2017.pdf; HMRC Tax Avoidance Schemes
Currently in the Spotlight, https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/tax-avoidance-
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specific schemes under the “spotlight” that it would challenge as tax abuse.
These tend to be highly specific instances of unacceptable avoidance of tax
or claiming of relief. Hence, establishing that any tax avoidance scheme is
abusive or evasionist requires the exhaustion of due process and tends to
result in findings of a highly specific nature. Although a major step towards
a general anti-avoidance rule, some commentators argue that the U.K.’s
approach falls slightly short.309 However, the EU Anti-Avoidance Directive
2016, which has yet to be fully implemented by Member States, clearly
combats many instances of corporate tax avoidance and provides a general
anti-avoidance rule. The Directive looks set to develop substantive norms in
unacceptable tax behavior more widely in an unprecedented manner.310 Full
implementation in the U.K. is however uncertain given Brexit’s
imminence.311 In sum, there is a movement towards reforming tax behavior
norms but the full extent of these achievements remains to be seen. It is
noted that the U.K. has also introduced soft measures to moderate
corporations’ behavior,312 flanking the enforcement regime for abuse.
Although key achievements in norm advancement have been attained
in anti-bribery and anti-tax evasion, changes in corporate culture need to be
achieved by both robust enforcement and ex ante corporate internalization.
As enforcement is largely ex post and specific in nature, the ex ante role of
an obligation to prevent is important to instill the need for corporate
behavioral change. We critically query whether the new governance
techniques that impose on firms the “responsibility to prevent” would result
schemes-currently-in-the-spotlight.
309 Policy-makers may view the anti-abuse regime as equivalent to a general antiavoidance rule, especially in light of Art 6, Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive which the U.K.
has yet to fully implement. However, a number of commentators note the relatively narrower
nature of the anti-abuse regime and are skeptical as to its equivalence to a general antiavoidance rule. See Andrés Báez Moreno, A Pan-European GAAR? Some (Un)Expected
Consequences of the Proposed EU Tax Avoidance Directive Combined with the Dzodzi Line
of Cases, 143 BRITISH TAX REV. (2016); Anzhela Cédelle, The EU Anti-Tax Avoidance
Directive: A UK Perspective, 490 BRITISH TAX REV. (2016).
310 Art 6.
311 Anzhela Cédelle, ‘The EU Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive: A UK Perspective’ (2016)
British Tax Review 490. But the article notes that the U.K. supported the Directive
ultimately as implementation by the entire EU would ensure that there is no competitive
disadvantage.
312 The HMRC has introduced an obligation for tax professionals to make disclosure of
tax avoidance schemes in order to obtain ‘clearance’ for their use, or otherwise. There are
relatively steep continuing penalties for failure to disclose, and scheme transparency has
improved. Without a general anti-avoidance rule, the Revenue may have limited room in
disallowing schemes of creative compliance, but transparency regarding innovation in
schemes could provide intelligence for policy design to combat undesirable tax behavior.
Further specific sectors have been targeted where aggressive tax avoidance has been carried
out; for example, HMRC has bound the U.K. banking sector to a code of ethics to moderate
aggressive tax avoidance behavior. ‘U.K. tax authorities warn banks against aggressive
avoidance’, Financial Times (London, 20 Oct 2017) at https://www.ft.com/content/
bcf2082e-b418-11e7-a398-73d59db9e399.
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in mere devolution to corporations to institute internal procedures that are
opaque to stakeholder and public accountability. This could undermine the
ethos and potential of new governance techniques, rendering the obligation
to “prevent” merely rhetoric, as the only meaningful source of pressure for
behavioral change would be ex post enforcement, which can be more
sporadic in nature.
First, we observe that the obligation to institute procedures under both
Acts would be in accordance with broad guidelines issued by the relevant
government departments. The Ministry of Justice has issued procedural
guidance: six broad principles to supplement the Bribery Act.313 A similar
approach of Ministerial guidance is adopted in relation to the Criminal
Finances Act. As such guidances outline broad principles, it may be argued
that corporations can use these as bases for designing tailor-made changes
to corporate operations or procedures, reflecting changes in corporate
culture and objectives. However, procedural or organizational reforms
penetrate at different levels and need not show fundamental change. The
resolve to change could reflect the corporation’s incentives to manage the
commercial impact and cost-effectiveness of compliance, or could reflect a
more normative embrace of social and public interest expectations. The
premise for change affects the design of procedures including reforming
leadership commitment, key business and operations processes, risk
management, and internal control. 314 Procedural changes can also be less
penetrative and more superficial, if designed merely to minimize legal risk
while avoiding significant changes to the way business is carried out.
Procedural changes can be task-oriented such as multiplying documented
channels,315 and one could remain skeptical as to real engagement with
313 Ministry of Justice, The Bribery Act 2010 Guidance at https://www.justice.gov.
uk/downloads/legislation/bribery-act-2010-guidance.pdf. The Australian position is to
require corporate procedures to adhere to an Australian process standard but this is also
rather widely worded, see Marta Muñoz de Morales, ‘Corporate Responsibility and
Compliance Programs in Australia’ in Stefano Manacorda et al. at ch20.
314 Angela Gorta, Research: A Tool for Building Corruption Resistance in Peter Larmour
and Nick Wolanin, CORRUPTION AND ANTI-CORRUPTION (Canberra: ANU Press 2013) at ch3;
Catherine Boardman and Vicki Klum, ‘Building Organisational Integrity in Peter Larmour
and Nick Wolanin, CORRUPTION AND ANTI-CORRUPTION (Canberra: ANU Press 2013) at ch.
5; David Hess, Catalyzing Corporate Commitment to Combating Corruption 88 JOURNAL OF
BUSINESS ETHICS 781 (2009).
315 Discussed in terms of internal guidance, reporting and discipline, training and
monitoring, and audit Massimo Mantovani, The Private Sector Role in the Fight Against
Corruption, Stefano Giavazzi, The ABC Model: The General Framework for an AntiBribery Compliance Program, The ABC Program: An Anti-Bribery Compliance Program
Recommended to Corporations Operating in a Multinational Environment, Adán Nieto
Martín and Marta Muñoz de Morales, Compliance Programmes and Criminal Law
Responses, VT Fan, An Analysis of Institutional Guidance and Case Law in the USA and
Marta Muñoz de Morales, Corporate Responsibility and Compliance Programs in Canada
in Stefano Manacorda et al, PREVENTING CORPORATE CORRUPTION (Springer 2014) at chs 3,
7, 8, 17, 18 and 21 respectively. The predominance of contributions in this volume focusing
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ethics, values,316 or organizational culture.317 Worse, it is queried if broadlyframed guidances would be able to combat creative compliance318 where
governance structures can be used to further illicit behavior while appearing
compliant. It is queried whether corporations can now legitimately
disengage corporate tax planning (or avoidance) from the specific problem
of evasion, and direct prevention procedures only narrowly to prevent tax
evasion. In this case, corporate tax planning can be validly and separately
carried on as a business-based and not as a compliance-based activity.
The Acts seem to have devolved to corporations to determine their
internal organization and reform of procedures, as corporations are only
required to introduce procedures where “reasonable” and remain the judges
of “reasonable” on an ex ante basis (although they have the burden to prove
that their determination was correct). Although the Acts employ new
governance techniques, the essential new governance ethos of enrolling
multi-stakeholder input and scrutiny is not implemented. 319 Leaving
corporations to implement their new compliance may render such postcrisis new governance techniques susceptible to the pre-crisis problems
discussed in Section II. LeBaron and Rühmkorf320 in an empirical study of
the Bribery Act 2010’s implementation found that many corporations have
visibly changed their internal procedures as well as the terms and manners
in which they conduct external relationships. These findings show that the
potential criminal liability that can entail from the Act has compelled an
extent of disruptive change from the “inside.” However, as this study did
not engage interviews or qualitative findings of that nature, it does not shed
light on whether procedural changes in written policies have deeply
penetrated corporate culture and ethics.
The U.K.’s Serious Fraud Office’s (SFO) enforcement of the Bribery
on procedural aspects also shows the largely managerialist or procedural manner of
corporate implementation of responsibility for preventing bribery.
316 Francesco Centonze, Public–Private Partnerships and Agency Problems: The Use of
Incentives in Strategies to Combat Corruption in Stefano Manacorda et al, PREVENTING
CORPORATE CORRUPTION (Springer 2014) at ch4.
317 Johann Graf-Lambsdorff, The Organization of Anti-Corruption: Getting Incentives
Right in Robert I Rotberg (ed), CORRUPTION, GLOBAL SECURITY, AND WORLD ORDER (NY:
Brookings Institution Press 2009); Jeff Everett, Dean Neu and Abu Shiraz Rahaman, The
Global Fight against Corruption: A Foucaultian, Virtues-Ethics Framing 65 JOURNAL OF
BUSINESS ETHICS 1 (2006).
318 Doreen McBarnet, After Enron Will ‘Whiter Than White Collar Crime’ Still Wash?,
46 THE BRITISH JOURNAL OF CRIMINOLOGY 1091 (2006).
319 Dimitri Vlassis, An Anticorruption Ethics and Compliance Program for Business: A
Practical Guide in Stefano Manacorda et al (eds), PREVENTING CORPORATE CORRUPTION at
ch12 (Springer 2014) (opining that corporations can look at standards or guidance produced
by independent third parties in order to connect corporate compliance with externally-facing
awareness, such as UNCAC’s standards.).
320 Genevieve LeBaron and Andreas Rühmkorf, Steering CSR Through Home State
Regulation: A Comparison of the Impact of the UK Bribery Act and Modern Slavery Act on
Global Supply Chain Governance, 8 GLOBAL POLICY 15 (2017).

141

Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business

39:85 (2019)

Act against Rolls Royce PLC in 2017 also sheds light on the extent to
which new governance regulatory techniques have really changed the
nature of corporate regulation. In order to avoid prosecution for bribery
carried out in China, Indonesia, and a number of other countries, Rolls
Royce agreed to appoint Lord Gold to monitor its internal procedural
reform to prevent bribery in the future. Such monitoring and review is
reported periodically to the SFO.321 We argue that the deferred prosecution
agreement shows a preference for devolution to corporations to institute
appropriate procedures, subject to a privatized form of monitoring by an
expert. There seems no attempt made at employing more inclusive forms of
multi-stakeholder governance to monitor changes at Rolls Royce.
Privatized implementation of corporate compliance can result in “legal
endogeneity,”322
the
self-legitimating
effect
of
corporations’
implementation of their own procedures and systems, resulting in de facto
self-regulation. Under such an approach, the methods corporations use to
deal with their ethical and compliance dilemmas remain opaque. In the
wider context of global competition and temptations from tax havens or the
difficult contexts of doing business where demand-side pressures for
corruption abound in foreign jurisdictions,323 ethical dilemmas abound324
and there is social interest in ensuring that corporate decisions do not
compromise social objectives.325 The new governance approach in the
Bribery Act as enforced by the SFO has framed the governance space as
revolving around the regulator and regulated, leaving little space for public
and stakeholder scrutiny. We critically question why multi-stakeholder
321
Deferred Prosecution Agreement with Rolls Royce, SFO, (Jan 17, 2017) https://www.
sfo.gov.uk/cases/rolls-royce-plc/.
322 Seven dead in Potters Bar train crash, BBCNews, (May 10, 2002) http://news.bbc.co.
uk/1/hi/england/1979677.stm.
323 Firms that are mobile, less reliant on host country government privileges or regulation
and have stable and established sales/market share are likely more resistant to demand-side
pressures, see Yanjing Chen, Mahmut Yaşar and Roderick M. Rejesus, Factors Influencing
the Incidence of Bribery Payouts by Firms: A Cross-Country Analysis, 77 JOURNAL OF
BUSINESS ETHICS 231 (2008).
324 The ‘bimoral’ tensions in corporate corruption can be distilled in AW Cragg,
Business, Globalization, and the Logic and Ethics of Corruption, 53 INTERNATIONAL
JOURNAL 643 (1998).
325 Indeed corporations complying with one aspect of social responsibility or liability
could be ‘irresponsible’ in other areas and there are no means to critically hold such
behavior to account under law or by society. ‘Responsibility’ can be atomistic and
meaningless when taking into account of holistic behavior, see Susan Ariel Aaronson,
“Minding Our Business”: What the United States Government Has Done and Can Do to
Ensure That U.S. Multinationals Act Responsibly in Foreign Markets,59 JOURNAL OF
BUSINESS ETHICS 175 (2005); Vanessa M. Strike, Jijun Gao and Pratima Bansal, Being Good
While Being Bad: Social Responsibility and the International Diversification of US Firms,
37 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS STUDIES 850 (2006); Ronen Shamir, Between SelfRegulation and the Alien Tort Claims Act: On the Contested Concept of Corporate Social
Responsibility 38 LAW AND SOCIETY REVIEW 635 (2004).

142

An Institutional Theory of Corporate Regulation
39:85 (2019)

governance is not attempted. For example, Transparency International has
developed a checklist that systematically directs companies to establish
policies and management processes that would meet the broadly worded
procedural requirements in the Bribery Act and MOJ Guidance. 326 Such a
player could usefully act as part of an independent monitoring group for
deferred prosecution arrangements.327 Multi-stakeholder governance may
be resisted by business on the basis of commercial sensitivity, but
obligations of confidentiality and other safeguards can be imposed.328
It may, however, be argued that multi-stakeholder governance is not
the only means of securing corporate behavioral change. There is a strong
movement in the U.K. towards securing corporate culture and behavior
change in the banking sector after the global financial crisis 2007-9,329 and
326 Transparency International’s work in this area is chiefly referred to, see generally
https://www.transparency.org/impact/.
327 We acknowledge that multi-stakeholder governance in ‘enforcement’ is the most rare
form of involvement for stakeholders even in the landscape of the variety of multistakeholder initiatives. Input and discussion is far more common while the more sensitive
areas of review and monitoring are rarer, than except for established certification-type multistakeholder initiatives such as the Forest Stewardship, Marine Stewardship Councils and
Ethical or Fair Trading initiatives. See Luc Fransen and Ans Kolk, Global Rule-Setting for
Business: A Critical Analysis of Multi-Stakeholder Standards, 14 ORGANISATION 667-684
(2007).
328 Although confidentiality in multistakeholder governance is criticized by the Open
Democracy group, see Harry Gleckman, Multi-stakeholder Governance (Jan. 19, 2016)
https://www.opendemocracy.net/harris-gleckman/multi-stakeholder-governance-corporatepush-for-new-global-governance. (explaining that there needs to be a balance between the
sensitivities of policy formation and the needs for public accountability.).
329 In the UK, cultural change was a strong social demand reflected in the
parliamentarians’ 2013 report, House of Lords and House of Commons, Changing Banking
for Good (2013) Vols I and II at http://www.parliament.uk/documents/bankingcommission/banking-final-report-volume-i.pdf and https://www.parliament.uk/documents/
banking-commission/banking-final-report-vol-ii.pdf which culminated in the introduction of
the ‘senior managers regime’ for the banking and financial sector. See PRA and FCA,
Strengthening Accountability in Banking: A New Regulatory Framework (July 2014); PRA,
Strengthening individual accountability in banking and insurance – responses to CP14/14
and CP26/14 (Mar. 23, 2015); FCA, Approach to Non-Executive Directors in Banking and
Solvency II Firms & Application of the Presumption of Responsibility to Senior Managers
in Banking Firms’ (Feb. 23, 2015); PRA, Strengthening Individual Accountability in
Banking and Insurance: Amendments and Optimisations – PS12/17 (May 12, 2017). This
law reform allows regulators to map senior responsibilities in all financial institutions, hold
senior management to their prescribed responsibilities and a Code of Conduct (based on
principles of integrity, care, control and due accountability) and render them personally
liable for falling below standards. Senior managers and financial firms are also responsible
for certifying and holding a significant scope of employees (performing certain prescribed
functions below senior management) to a Code of Conduct. A senior person who has
responsibility over an area in which a regulatory contravention has occurred may be
personally liable in regulatory enforcement if the regulator proves that the senior person did
not take such steps as a person in the senior manager’s position could reasonably be
expected to take to avoid the contravention occurring, S66A(5) and 66B(5) of the Financial
Services and Markets Act 2000 amended by the Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act
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these efforts are very much aimed at empowering regulators against the
regulated, not co-opting a wider scope of governance capacity. Regulatory
enforcement and scrutiny can prevent legal endogeneity. However, the
opacity in the regulator-regulated relationship can make regulatory efficacy
an inscrutable matter, including obscuring any dangerous elements of
regulatory capture or sympathy330 for the industry. For example, Wells331
has criticized the Serious Fraud Office in its forbearance from enforcement
where it felt constrained by fears that sanctions would damage the firm’s
viability.332 Further, the unique approach in financial regulation can
partially be explained by the technical (and quantitative) nature of
regulatory obligations333 imposed, which stakeholders may find hard to
scrutinise. We argue that where social objectives underpin corporate
regulation such as in anti-bribery, multi-stakeholder governance,334 such as
enrolling a panel of third-party bodies for engagement, feedback or even
inspections, should be considered, as such can powerfully influence
corporate consciousness and culture.335
2013 and subsequently by the Bank of England and Financial Services Act 2016. Second, if
the regulator is of the view that a senior manager has contravened a conduct rule,
enforcement may be taken in respect of the senior manager that can culminate in personal
fines and/or disqualification. Discussion of enforcement can be found in Iris H-Y Chiu,
Regulatory Duties for Directors in the Financial Services Sector and Directors’ Duties in
Company Law- Bifurcation and Interfaces, JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW 465 (2016).
https://www.sweetandmaxwell.co.uk/catalogue/productdetails.aspx?productid=30791434
Further, regulatory interventions have been made to prescribe corporate governance and
internal control organisation at most financial institutions in order to overhaul their risk and
control cultures. Basel Committee, Guidelines: Corporate Governance Principles for Banks
(July 2015); EBA and ESMA, Guidelines on Internal Governance under Directive
2013/36/EU (Sept. 26, 2017) which applies to banks and investment firms as mirror
corporate governance provisions are found in the CRD IV and MiFID 2014. PRA Rulebook,
Compliance, Internal Audit, General Organisational Requirements; FCA Handbook, SYSC
3, 4, 6 and 7. See discussion in Iris H-Y Chiu, REGULATING (FROM) THE INSIDE: THE LEGAL
FRAMEWORK FOR INTERNAL CONTROL AT BANKS AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS (Oxford: Hart
2015). The salience of culture to the regulatory agenda is affirmed in Andrew Bailey,
Culture in financial services – a regulator’s perspective (Speech at Cityweek 2016
Conference, May 9, 2016) http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/
2016/901.aspx.
330 See e.g., Daniel C. Hardy, Regulatory Capture in Banking (IMF Working Paper 2006)
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=892925.
331 Celia Wells, Who’s Afraid of the Bribery Act 2010? JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW 420
(2012) on the lenient enforcement against Innospec and BAE Systems plc.
332 Such as the enforcement against Innospec discussed above.
333 Such as microprudential regulation which is of a highly technical nature, see
generally Simon Gleeson, INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF BANKING: CAPITAL AND RISK
REQUIREMENTS (Oxford: OUP 2012).
334 Discussed earlier on in Section II as part of the rise of transnational polycentric
private governance.
335 We see increasingly corporate responsiveness to shape ethical cultures in response to
social and relational demands, as the concept of corporate culture moves away from being
performance-focused see John Kotter and James Heskett, CORPORATE CULTURE AND
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2. Addressing Supply Chain Governance in Legislation
Globalization and international trade have liberalized opportunities for
the worldwide sourcing, production, and distribution of goods and services,
but has also brought about opportunities for questionable means of
economic exploitation of resources and labor. 336 Global sourcing can lead
to fueling regional conflicts over control of resources like oil and minerals,
and exploitation of human beings in search of economic opportunities,337
such as human trafficking and abject labor conditions.338 Whether or not
corporations are directly complicit in armed gangs’ evil exploits, they have
been able to take advantage of cost advantages by outsourcing and
procuring on the basis of their global buying power.339 The abuses in such
exploitation have been brought to light by the determined efforts of civil
and non-governmental organizations, highlighting the pernicious effects of
corporate indifference to the sufferings and negative externalities in their
supply chains.
U.K. and EU legislation have now started to address different issues in
the supply chain, after decades of voluntary and soft law initiatives in the
transnational polycentric sphere. These are in relation to the importation of
conflict minerals,340 human trafficking and modern slavery341 (U.K.) and
PERFORMANCE (NY: Free Press rep, 2011, from 1991); Kim S. Cameron and Robert E.
Quinn, DIAGNOSING AND CHANGING ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE: BASED ON THE COMPETING
VALUES FRAMEWORK (Chicester: John Wiley & Sons 2011); or efficiency-driven, see
Donald C. Langevoort, Opening the Black Box of “Corporate Culture in Law and
Economics”, 162 JOURNAL OF INSTITUTIONAL AND THEORETICAL ECONOMICS (2006); Eric
van den Steen, On the Origin of Shared Belief (and Corporate Culture) 41 RAND JOURNAL
OF ECONOMICS, 617, 617–648 (2010); Rafael Rob and Peter Zemsky, Social Capital,
Corporate Culture, and Incentive Intensity, 33 RAND J. OF ECONOMICS 243 (2002) (to being
more socially/relationally-focused). See Marvin T. Brown, Corporate Integrity (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press 2012) at chs 1, 2, 3 and 7; Peter Rea, Alan Kolp, Wendy Ritz
and Michelle D. Steward, Corporate Ethics Can’t Be Reduced to Compliance, HARV. BUS.
REV. (April 29, 2016); Christopher McLaverty and Annie McKee, What You Can Do to
Improve Ethics at Your Company, HARV. BUS. REV. (Dec. 29, 2016); Rosa Chun, What
Aristotle Can Teach Firms About CSR, HARV. BUS. REV. (Sept. 12, 2016).
336 Kate Manzo, Modern Slavery, Global Capitalism & Deproletarianisation in West
Africa, 32 REVIEW OF AFRICAN POLITICAL ECONOMY 521 (2005); Kevin Bales, DISPOSABLE
PEOPLE: NEW SLAVERY IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY (California: Berkeley University Press,
1999).
337 Chandran Nair, The Developed World Is Missing the Point About Modern Slavery,
Time.com (June 20 ,2016) http://time.com/4374377/slavery-developed-developing-worldindex-slave-labor/; Kevin Bales, Expendable People: Slavery in the Age of Globalization, 53
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 461 (2000).
338
Galit A Sarfarty, Shining Light on Global Supply Chains, 56 HARVARD
INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL 419 (2015).
339 Jennifer Bair, The Corporation and the Global Value Chain, THE CORPORATION
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2017).
340 The EU Conflict Minerals Regulation 2017.
341 Modern Slavery Act 2015.
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more generally, the protection of human rights.342
New governance techniques are employed in regulatory reforms, but
they largely devolve supply chain governance to corporations themselves.
To different extents in the Conflict Minerals Regulation 2017, the U.K.
Modern Slavery Act 2015, and the non-financial disclosure of human rights
impact under the EU Non-Financial Disclosure Directive 2014,
corporations are expected to manage their supply chains based on their
implementations of “due diligence.” Other than the Conflict Minerals
Regulation, which imposes direct due diligence obligations, the regulatory
obligations in the Modern Slavery Act and EU Non-Financial Disclosure
Directive are disclosure-based, requiring companies to disclose procedural
aspects of supply chain governance.
First, it is noted that regulation has avoided articulating particular
substantive norms, such as liability for sourcing conflict minerals or
liability for using trafficked labor or modern slaves in the supply chain.
This is because the regulatory reforms avoid introducing “outcomes” to be
attained in terms of the social changes that are desired. Introducing bans for
conflict minerals or substantive norms of such a nature may result in an
indiscriminate blow to legitimate economic activity in developing regions;
therefore, the introduction of blanket prohibitions should be avoided for
unintended consequences.343 Under the Modern Slavery Act, it is a criminal
offense for anyone to hold or require the performance of slave or
compulsory labor,344 or to carry out or be complicit in human trafficking.345
Unless a corporation is engaged in the practice of holding employees to
egregious slave-like conditions, such as the abusive and illegal employment
practices at large U.K. sports retailer Sports Direct which became the
subject of a Parliament Inquiry,346 the criminal offense is unlikely to attach
to a multinational corporation on the basis of practices occurring in its
342 UN Guiding Principles for Business and Human Rights (2011) which is to be
implemented by countries in terms of state responsibility for protecting human rights and
corporate responsibility for preventing and remedying relevant abuses. The EU Nonfinancial Disclosure Directive 2014 dealing with the company’s footprint in these matters,
and only indirectly to its supply chain as a result of the policies it pursues.
343 Jeff Schwartz, The Conflict Minerals Experiment, 6 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 129 (2016);
Katarzyna Kryczka, Sarah Beckers and Tineke Lambooy, The Importance of Due Diligence
Practices for the Future of Business Practices in Fragile States, 9 EUROPEAN COMPANY LAW
125 (2012).
344 The nature of such compulsion is widely defined to take into account the individual’s
circumstances so that not only threats of physical violence would count S1, Modern Slavery
Act 2015.
345
Sections 2-4, Modern Slavery Act 2015.
346 House of Commons Business Innovation and Skills Committee, Employment
Practices at Sports Direct (July 2016) https://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/
cm201617/cmselect/cmbis/219/219.pdf?utm_source=219&utm_medium=module&utm_cam
paign=modulereports highlighting breaches of minimum wage regulation, employment law,
and abusive practices.
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supply chain. There is little prospect of attaching criminal liability to
corporations for their supply chain practices, or the availability of tort class
actions by victims of modern slavery in supply chains against the foreign
multinational.347 It may be argued that corporations maintain different
levels of leveraging power over their supply chains348 and an excessively
high level of responsibility may be impracticable, and may indeed damage
commercial relations and international trade. It seems that soft law and
transnational governance has achieved far more in terms of introducing
outcomes-based norms, such as the Ethical Trading Initiative.349 For
example, the Responsible Business Alliance’s code of conduct for the
electronics and toys industry sets out extensive norms in terms of achieving
humane working and employment conditions within the supply chain.350
Compared to norm advancement in anti-bribery and tax evasion, it is
questioned why similar norms to prevent the outcomes of suffering for
individuals, or at least a form of joint or contributory liability for supply
chain misconduct are not instituted. Such norm changes would have
profound implications, especially in terms of imposing enterprise liability
for multinational corporations and changing how they would manage legal
risk.351
In terms of the strength in regulating procedures within the firm, the
Conflict Minerals Regulation352 regime seems most demanding in
compliance. Detailed due diligence obligations are imposed on importers of
tin, tungsten, tantalum and gold, and they also need to obtain third-party
There is no doctrine of enterprise liability in the UK see generally Adams v. Cape
Industries plc 1990] Ch 433; Prest v. Petrodel Resources Ltd [2013] UKSC 34 especially
Lord Sumption’s judgement with whom two lawlords agree.
348 Jennifer Bair, The Corporation and the Global Value Chain, THE CORPORATION
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2017) (explaining how some corporations may be
in a better position to do this than others); see also Erika R. George and Scarlett R. Smith, In
Good Company: How Corporate Social Responsibility Can Protect Rights and Aid Efforts to
End Child Sex Trafficking and Modern Slavery, 46 INT. L. AND POLITICS 55 (2013). But see
Wen-Lin Li, Legal Transplants through Private Contracting: Codes of Vendor Conduct in
Global Supply Chains as an Example, 57 AM. J. OF COMP. L. 711 (2009) for more nuanced
and critical discussion on the motivations and effectiveness of such ‘legal transplantation’ of
codes across supply chains.
349 A multi-stakeholder initiative setting out substantive outcomes-based norms such as
humane labour conditions and fair employment practices, see https://www.ethicaltrade.org/,
although its achievements have been incremental. See also Susanne Schaller, The
Democratic Legitimacy of Private Governance : An Analysis of the Ethical Trading
Initiative http://edoc.vifapol.de/opus/volltexte/2011/3476/pdf/report91.pdf (2007).
350 The
Electronic Industry Citizenship Coalition Code of Conduct at
http://www.responsiblebusiness.org/media/docs/EICCCodeofConduct5_1_English.pdf.
351 See infra Section IV.
352 Regulation (EU) 2017/821 of the European Parliament and of the Council of May 17,
2017 laying down supply chain due diligence obligations for Union importers of tin,
tantalum and tungsten, their ores, and gold originating from conflict-affected and high-risk
areas.
347
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certification of such compliance. Such due diligence and certification must
be publicly disclosed on a yearly basis.353 The nature of the obligations is
highly procedural and prescribed, although the procedures conform to the
internationally agreed OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible
Supply Chain of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas
2009. However, these obligations are imposed on a narrow group of direct
importers of the minerals into the EU.354 If EU corporations produce output
with these minerals which are sourced at some stage outside of the EU, they
are not obliged to comply with the Regulation’s requirements.355
Presumably, they may need to report the human rights impact of their
activity and their relevant due diligence under the Non-financial Reporting
Directive.
The mandatory due diligence obligations under the Conflict Minerals
Regulation, third-party auditing, and public disclosure go further than the
disclosure-based and devolved implementation under the Modern Slavery
Act and the EU Non-financial Disclosure Directive relating to human rights
in the supply chain, to be discussed below. It is questioned why the
discrepancy in approach. Nevertheless, in the absence of substantive norms
that change corporate objectives or conduct, can the fulfilment of due
diligence improve corporations’ ethical considerations of being good
citizens in difficult, conflict-ridden, and fragile jurisdictions? It is
questioned why a more precise substantive norm to require sourcing from
conflict-free smelters cannot be legalized.356 Would such a norm not have
greater impact upon the ordering of economic relations in fragile
jurisdictions? The due diligence obligations in terms of tracing sources and
undertaking risk management and mitigation are still devolved to
corporations as a form of contractual management within its supply
chain.357 In analyzing the American counterpart to the Conflict Minerals
Regulation,358 commentators observe the practices of weak and cosmetic
Art. 3-7.
Art. 3-7, see Elif Härkönen, Conflict Minerals in the Corporate Supply Chain,
forthcoming, 29 European Bus. L. Rev. 691- 727(2018) (discussing the scope of coverage of
the EU Regulation as affecting about 150,000-200,000 businesses although 880,000
businesses or so that use conflict minerals at some stage would not be covered.).
355 This is unlike the case in the US which requires corporations that use conflict
minerals in a key part of its production to disclose its sourcing diligence, see Dodd-Frank
Act 2010 and Conflict Minerals Rule, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240–49. See also SEC Factsheet,
https://www.sec.gov/opa/Article/2012-2012-163htm---related-materials.html.
356 Jeff Schwartz, The Conflict Minerals Experiment, 6 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 129 (2016).
357 That said, the EU is developing subsidiary legislation to recognize formally third
party due diligence schemes. This could go some way in instituting multi-stakeholder
governance in this area which can promote business-society engagement and accountability
and could in time bring about stronger substantive norms.
358 Which imposes a disclosure obligation on corporations of their steps in due diligence
if conflict minerals from covered countries are used in the production of an essential
functionality of their products.
353
354
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due diligence procedures and a general corporate indifference to their
sourcing and impact on fragile jurisdictions.359 In the absence of stronger
substantive norms of outcomes or conduct, corporations’ socially-facing
motivations may conflict with their calculative and bimoral tensions.360
These underlie the main hazards in devolving to corporations management
of the socially-facing issues in the commercial context of their supply-chain
relations.
There is scope, however, for the third-party certification mechanism to
work as a form of gate-keeping under the Conflict Minerals Regulation.
The third-party certification has the potential to hold corporations
accountable for their due diligence so that superficial compliance is
avoided. Such certification can count towards highlighting the efforts taken
by corporations to avoid sourcing for conflict minerals, thereby adding
implicit pressure for behavioral change.361 There are existing players in the
industry for such certification services, such as the Conflict-free Smelter
Programme, which can be expected to gain more formal recognition in
engaging with mineral importers. It is important that certification should
not merely be technical in nature and should take into account of the social
justice footprint of conflict regions and the minerals trade. As the regulation
comes into force in 2021, the developments under this regulation should be
watched for the impact on real social outcomes and how business-society
relations co-evolve.
In respect to the regulatory obligation of disclosure under the Modern
Slavery Act and EU Non-Financial Disclosure Directive relating to human
rights in supply chains, corporations are subject to a principally devolved
and non-standardized implementation of due diligence.
Under the Modern Slavery Act, section 54 requires certain commercial
organizations362 to make annual mandatory disclosures of a “slavery and
human trafficking statement” (“the Statement”) in order to provide
transparency on the steps that the corporation has taken to ensure that its

The US disclosure regime has been empirically found to be rather ineffectual,
producing reports that are not very informative and that do not show deep engagement with
the ethicality of preventing conflict mineral sourcing. Many companies avoid cost by
superficially polling suppliers and are content to be rather indifferent in their ignorance of
ultimate supply sources, see Christiana Ochoa & Patrick J. Keenan, Regulating Information
Flows, Regulating Conflict: An Analysis of United States Conflict Minerals Legislation, 3
GOETTINGEN J. OF INT.L L. 129 (2011); Jeff Schwartz, The Conflict Minerals Experiment, 6
HARV. BUS. L. REV. 129 (2016).
360 Katarzyna Kryczka, Sarah Beckers and Tineke Lambooy, The Importance of Due
Diligence Practices for the Future of Business Practices in Fragile States, 9 EUROPEAN
COMPANY L. 125 (2012).
361 However, it may be argued that consumer pressure too must be consistent or else the
message to corporations may be muted.
362 Having a turnover over £36 million net of taxes, as prescribed by section 2, The
Modern Slavery Act 2015 (Transparency in Supply Chains) Regulations 2015.
359
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business and supply chain are free from slavery and human trafficking.363
The Statement is to be made publicly available on the corporation’s
website. It is unlikely that section 54 would be interpreted as imposing a
positive obligation of due diligence. Corporations’ disclosure obligations
are to account for their own satisfaction that they have prevented the
occurrence of modern slavery in their supply chains. Further, the mandatory
statement avoids being too prescriptive as it refers to a non-exhaustive list
of matters for reporting and companies do not have to include all of them.
364

The Home Office’s practical guidance for compliance with reporting
under the act emphasizes that the Statement should encapsulate the steps
taken by the company to prevent slavery and human trafficking in its
business and supply chain, and that it should be in plain English, succinct,
and readily accessible. As procedural steps in the above list are optional and
not mandatory, it is unlikely that the Act imposes procedural obligations.
Corporations are in fact devolved to implement appropriate procedures for
their own satisfaction of compliance.
The EU Non-Financial Disclosure Directive 2014 requires large
undertakings that are public-interest entities (exceeding on their balance
sheet dates the criterion of the average number of 500 employees during the
financial year) to include in the management report a non-financial
statement, where such information forms part of company policies to the
extent necessary for an understanding of the undertaking’s development,
performance, position and impact of its activity, relating to, as a
minimum, environmental, social and employee matters, respect for
human rights, anti-corruption, and bribery matters. Many of the matters
in the list relate to the corporation’s own practices, but it is arguable that in
relation to human rights, the corporation’s role in its supply chain is
implicated.
The non-financial statement should include the list of matters below,
many of which are procedural in nature:
(a) a brief description of the group’s business model;
(b) a description of the policies pursued by the group in relation to
[the social responsibility] matters [mentioned above], including
due diligence processes implemented;
(c) the outcome of those policies;
(d) the principal risks related to those matters linked to the group’s
Modern Slavery Act 2015, § 54.
The Ministry’s Practical Guidance has clarified the list above as being not
compulsory, see Home Office, Transparency in Supply Chains etc: A practical guide (2015)
at
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/471996/
Transparency_in_Supply_Chains_etc__A_practical_guide__final_.pdf.
363
364
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operations including, where relevant and proportionate, its
business relationships, products or services which are likely to
cause adverse impacts in those areas, and how the group
manages those risks;
(e) non-financial key performance indicators relevant to the
particular business.365

This is transposed in the U.K., which now requires the directors’
Strategic Report, i.e. the narrative report produced by the Board, to include
a non-financial information statement that contains the above
information.366 It is arguable that the list above, which is mandatory and not
optional, introduces an indirect form of procedural obligation for
corporations in relation to instituting effective due diligence procedures and
measuring social performance.367 This could be a stronger form of supply
chain governance, compelling real changes in corporations’ relationships
with their suppliers, and brings the regulatory regime closer to the
prescriptive one under the Conflict Minerals Regulation. However, we see
no clear tendency towards treating the mandatory non-financial statement
as a form of indirect procedural regulation. This is because the Commission
Communication and the U.K. transposition frame the non-financial
statement firmly within the familiar tenets of regulatory capitalism, relying
on investors’ heightened consciousness368 for ESG (environmental, social
and governance) issues to result in market discipline, a point we return to
shortly.
The regulatory techniques above focus on preliminary endeavors such
as overcoming information asymmetry, and emphasizes a predominantly
contractual form of management that is private to corporations and their
suppliers. Such regulatory endeavors pale somewhat against initiatives in
the transnational governance sphere, which has developed multistakeholder standards and methodology for due diligence, such as thirdparty auditing or certification. Some examples are SHIFT-Mazars assurance
Art. 19a.
Section 414CA, inserted into the Companies Act 2006 via the via the Companies,
Partnerships and Groups (Accounts and Non-Financial Reporting) Regulations 2016 (S.I.
2016/1245).
367 Iris H-Y Chiu, Unpacking the Reforms in Europe and UK Relating to Mandatory
Disclosure in Corporate Social Responsibility: Instituting a Hybrid Governance Model to
Change Corporate Behavior?, 5 EUROPEAN COMPANY L. 193 (2017).
368 Such heightened consciousness can be as a result of policy-makers’ nudging towards
optimal and socially useful shareholder behavior, in ‘shareholder stewardship’ as in the UK,
see Iris H-Y Chiu, Turning Institutional Investors into “Stewards”- Exploring the Meaning
and Objectives in “Stewardship” (2013) 66 Current Legal Problems 443-481; or financiallydriven motivations such as the pursuit of investment performance, see Alexander Boersch,
Doing Good by Investing Well? Pension Funds and Socially Responsible Investment: Results
of an Expert Survey (January 2010) Allianz Global Investors International Pension Paper No
1/2010 http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1607730.
365
366
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standard for human rights management369 and the SA8000 certification
standard for fair treatment of workers in workplaces.370 Such voluntary
initiatives seem to have provided clearer and more precise articulation of
standards in supply chain governance, such as in the Clean Clothes Model
Code of Conduct.371 Regulation has clearly avoided hardening substantive
norms of social justice, and implements a regime to devolve to corporations
the implementation of appropriate processes. Chuang also points out
possible retardation in the development of social justice norms more
generally in relation to labor practices and wage justice.372 Other than the
OECD guidance for due diligence that has been hardened in the Conflict
Minerals Regulation, no soft law initiative has attained a harder form of
recognition. Legalization may even bring about an arguably regressive
position as corporations are chiefly devolved with supply chain governance
and subject to weak forms of discipline.
Indeed, the Practical Guidance from the Home Office for the Modern
Slavery Act clearly states that mandatory disclosure is not tantamount to a
warranty by the corporation that such crimes do not occur. This in effect
sums up the limitations of the disclosure regulation - in the absence of
norms that deal with conduct or connects more clearly with outcomes, such
regulatory endeavors bear, at best, a weak connection to the issues of social
justice sought to be addressed. Disclosure-regulation is means-based
without definite pursuits of outcomes in relation to social goals such as the
protection of human rights.373 It is highly questionable if procedural
compliance proxies for the attainment of satisfactory corporate behavior.
Procedural obligations such as due diligence would go as far as
369 SHIFT-Mazars, UNGP Reporting Framework Assurance Guidance and UNGP
Reporting Framework Assurance Guidance Indicators, https://www.ungpreporting.org/wpcontent/uploads/UNGPRF_AssuranceGuidance.pdf and https://www.ungpreporting.org/wpcontent/uploads/UNGPRF_AssuranceGuidance_Indicators.pdf.
370 See Social Accountability International http://www.sa-intl.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=
Page.ViewPage&PageID=1689.
371 Which
has been introduced since 1998, see Clean Clothes Campaign
https://cleanclothes.org/resources/publications/clean-clothes-campaign-model-code-ofconduct/view.
372 Although this framing establishes a moral basis for clear decrying against modern
slavery, it may sideline issues such as labour rights and migrant justice, see Janie A Chuang,
Exploitation Creep and the Unmaking of Human Trafficking Law, 108 AMER. J. OF INT. L.
609 (2014). See also Johannes Koettl, Human Trafficking, Modern Day Slavery and
Economic Exploitation World Bank Discussion Paper 49802 (May 2009)
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/208471468174880847/pdf/498020NWP0SP0d10
Box341969B01PUBLIC1.pdf. (highlighting the thin line of difference between nonconsensual and consensual forms of exploitation where the exploited party has little choice)
373 Ozlem Arikan, Julianne Reinecke, Crawford Spence and Kevin Morrell, Signposts or
Weathervanes? The Curious Case of Corporate Social Responsibility and Conflict Minerals,
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3032498 (2015) (pointing out that legalisation of CSR reforms do
not address the underlying contested issues of the nature and scope of corporate
responsibility).
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improving informational awareness and possibly shapes an organizational
response. 374 However, how corporations deal with the informational
awareness or its impact is devolved to them. It is then up to their perception
of incentives that may motivate any significant conduct change. Both the
Modern Slavery Act and disclosure regime under the EU Directive involve
significant devolved implementation by corporations, primarily accountable
to the markets, and without a mandatory third-party certification or
assurance. 375 Devolved implementation fails to address any bimoral
conflicts, opposing incentives and corporate culture that persist in
corporations. Devolved implementation could even provide a regressive
form of behavior, legitimating corporate-centered implementation to the
exclusion of multi-stakeholder governance.
A brief survey376 conducted of a small sample of Modern Slavery
Statements in the first year of compliance shows that corporations disclose
the existence of their internal codes of ethics or conduct and assert that they
implement due diligence and other procedures developed by themselves in
order to comply with the disclosure requirements under the Act. The
corporations surveyed co-opt no multi-stakeholder guidance or partnership
in fighting modern slavery. Disclosure obligations seem to exert little
impact upon corporate procedures and behavior, as observed by a couple of
commentators.377
Although the EU Non-Financial Directive also facilitates devolved
implementation, there seems to be more efforts to nudge companies into
adopting multi-stakeholder developed procedures for due diligence and
managing the supply chain. The European Commission has developed nonbinding guidelines for supply chain due diligence for three sectors: oil and
gas, information technology and communications, and recruitment
agencies, a product of multi-stakeholder governance.378 A comprehensive
empirical study of the production of narrative reporting in the strategic
reports by U.K. listed companies finds generally good quality disclosure,
with the exception of human rights reporting.379 Such a finding highlights
374 Stephen Kim Park, Targeted Social Transparency as Global Corporate Strategy, 35
NW. J. OF INT. L. AND BUS. 87 (2014).
375 Shuangge Wen, The Cogs and Wheels of Reflexive Law ± Business Disclosure under
the Modern Slavery Act 43 J. OF L. AND SOCIETY 327 (2016).
376 Iris H-Y Chiu, Unpacking the Reforms in Europe and UK Relating to Mandatory
Disclosure in Corporate Social Responsibility: Instituting a Hybrid Governance Model to
Change Corporate Behavior?, 5 EUROPEAN COMPANY L. 193 (2017).
377 Genevieve LeBaron and Andreas Rühmkorf, Steering CSR Through Home State
Regulation: A Comparison of the Impact of the UK Bribery Act and Modern Slavery Act on
Global Supply Chain Governance, 8 GLOBAL POLICY 15 (2017).
378 Together
Against Trafficking in Human Beings, https://ec.europa.eu/antitrafficking/publications/european-commission-sector-guides-implementing-un-guidingprinciples-business-and-human_en.
379 Irene-Marie Esser, Iain MacNeil and Katarzyna Chalaczkiewicz-Ladna, Engaging
Stakeholders in Corporate Decision-Making through Strategic Reporting: An Empirical
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corporations’ continued struggles within their supply chain. A model of
governance centered on mandatory disclosure does not necessarily connect
with concrete steps forward for strategic or behavioral change, but it
remains to be seen if the nudge efforts led by the Commission may bear
fruit.380 This is, however, an incremental process, and guidelines for multistakeholder governance have only been developed for three sectors.
In sum, the new governance technique of interrogating corporate due
diligence and other procedures is arguably weak, as it essentially devolves
to the corporation managing its socially-facing goals within a commercial
contractual context. This devolution tends to obscure the bimoral dilemmas
corporations face, which is not made accountable through rather skeletal
disclosure obligations. Further, the disclosure obligations are purposed
towards letting markets and stakeholders judge the matter, so corporations’
accountability may be framed more narrowly and privately rather than
being shaped by public interest orientations.
In relation to the Modern Slavery Statement, although it is of a
primarily social orientation and not purposed as securities market
disclosure, civil society scrutiny may be limited. This is because the
Statement is required to be concise, and the devolved implementation to
corporations of their procedures may render such implementation
essentially inscrutable by stakeholders. Civil society also has no standing
for enforcement, as the Home Office is primarily responsible for
enforcement. We are skeptical as to the potency of regulatory enforcement
as the Home Office is tasked with more pressing social and crime
enforcement responsibilities. It is possible that such enforcement could be
carried out as part of a criminal enforcement action against a company for
engaging in modern slavery, but we do not see the Home Office as an
ongoing supervisor of companies’ procedural systems and governance, or
perhaps as a watchman for corporate behavioral change.
In relation to the EU Directive, we are skeptical that investors’
governance would become a force for corporate behavioral change towards
meeting social demands and expectations. We now turn to the limitations of
CSR transparency that has been framed within the paradigms of securities
market disclosure.
3. Corporate Transparency in relation to Social Responsibility Matters
Corporate transparency in CSR matters has always been regarded as a
key means to advance corporate engagement with social responsibility. The
Study of FTSE 100 Companies https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
3049203 (2017).
380 The EU’s recommended multi-stakeholder frameworks are arguably not a strong
version of nudge, which is often implemented as ‘default unless opt out’. There is room to
consider if such stronger ‘nudge’ is needed, such as to presume adequate disclosure made
upon the basis of adoption of those frameworks. See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN AND
RICHARD THALER, Nudge (Penguin, 2009).
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processes of preparing for disclosure could make companies more selfaware and responsive to social demand and reputational needs.381 Such
disclosure is also essential for overcoming information asymmetries with
stakeholders, civil society, and securities markets.382 Voluntary reporting in
CSR has been on the rise as companies perceive reputational benefits and
the need to be responsive to investors who care about ESG.383 With the
growth of the market for voluntary reporting, is there a need for mandatory
disclosure? The EU Non-Financial Disclosure Directive is situated in an
ambivalent place - it seems to introduce mandatory disclosure in order to
improve the accountability of corporate social responsibility relevant to
non-investor stakeholders, such as consumers. 384 On that basis, mandatory
disclosure may be explained as necessary in order to overcome the selfselecting biases of companies, and to represent a shift away from investorcentric disclosure. This distinguishes the EU Directive’s mandatory nonfinancial information statement from other shareholder-centric financial and
non-financial reporting, which has been introduced in the U.K. since
2006.385
381 Stephen Kim Park, Targeted Social Transparency as Global Corporate Strategy, 35
NW. J. OF INT. L. AND BUS. 87 (2014).
382 John Parkinson, Disclosure and Corporate Social and Environmental Performance:
Competitiveness and Enterprise in a Broader Social Frame, 3 J. CORP. L. STUD. 3 (2003);
Christiana Ochoa & Patrick J. Keenan, Regulating Information Flows, Regulating Conflict:
An Analysis of United States Conflict Minerals Legislation, 3 GOETTINGEN J. OF INT. L. 129
(2011); Björn Fasterling, Development of Norms Through Compliance Disclosure, 106 J. OF
BUS. ETHICS 73 (2012) (doubting that compelling disclosure causes companies to change
from within.
383 See Iris H-Y Chiu, Standardization in Corporate Social Responsibility Reporting and
a Universalist Concept of CSR?: A Path Paved with Good Intentions, 22 FL. J. OF INT. L. 361
(2011).
384 Preamble 3 to the EU Non-financial Disclosure Directive 2014.
385 The UK has since 2006 required the directors’ business review, a narrative report, to
contain information on how environment and stakeholder issues relate to business
performance i.e., the superseded section 417 of the UK Companies Act that deals with
directors’ business reviews- containing social responsibility matters framed as being useful
for investors to understand the risks and performance of the company. The former section
417, Companies Act 2006 has since been superseded by section414A, the Strategic Report,
discussed in Iris H-Y Chiu, Reviving Shareholder Stewardship: Critically Examining the
Impact of Corporate Transparency Reforms in the UK, 38 DEL. J. OF CORP. L. 983 (2014).
The EU has to date extensively harmonised corporate reporting requirements including
financial and narrative reporting, see Directive 2013/34/EU of the European Parliament and
of the Council of 26 June 2013 on the annual financial statements, consolidated financial
statements and related reports of certain types of undertakings, amending Directive
2006/43/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directives
78/660/EEC and 83/349/EEC. The narrative reporting requirements relate to qualitatively
explaining business performance and risks, see Arts 19-20, Directive 2013/34/EU above.
Narrative reporting in the EU and UK has, until the transformational reform introduced in
the EU Non-financial Disclosure Directive 2014, been focused on shareholder-centric needs
in relation to evaluating financial performance and viability. See Iris H-Y Chiu, The
Paradigms for Mandatory Non-Financial Disclosure: A Conceptual Analysis- Parts 1 and
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The EU Directive has, on face, introduced mandatory disclosure of a
range of social responsibility matters viz “[an] undertaking’s development,
performance, position and impact of its activity, relating to, as a
minimum, environmental, social and employee matters, respect for
human rights, anti-corruption and bribery matters.” This prescribed list
can be perceived as a way of making the disclosure standardized and
comparable. Commentators have, however, observed that no definite ends
are articulated with respect to mandatory social disclosure386 (i.e. there is no
explicit elevation of stakeholders in terms of corporate accountability to
them, nor is there articulation of particular social goals that corporate
transparency is to facilitate). Without a clear alternative basis upon which
mandatory disclosure is to be implemented, such mandatory disclosure has
to be placed upon its default position, i.e. serving investor-centric purposes
in securities markets.
The U.K. transposition of the EU Directive subsumes the non-financial
statement within the existing paradigms of corporate transparency and
securities regulation. This approach limits the extent to which the
mandatory disclosure reforms are fundamentally different in nature from
the tradition of investor-centric securities regulation. Section 414CA of the
Companies Act 2006 situates the non-financial statement within the
directors’ Strategic Report, a narrative report that is centered upon
explaining financial performance and business risks to investors.387 This is
not inconsistent with the Directive’s requirement that the non-financial
statement be included in the management report,388 perhaps highlighting the
Directive’s ambivalent nature regarding the orientation of the statement.
The Financial Reporting Council in the U.K. has further clarified that the
non-financial statement, like the rest of the Strategic Report, should be
guided by the standard of materiality,389 which frames the nature of
disclosure according to what may be material to a reasonable investor.
Although this is again not inconsistent with the Commission
Communication that provides guidelines for implementation,390 the
2,’ 27 COMPANY LAWYER 259; 291 (2006). On the shareholder-centric focus of the section
417 directors’ report, see Ian Havercroft and Arad Reisberg, Directors’ Duties Under the
UK Companies Act 2006 and the Impact of the Company’s Operations on the Environment
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1274567 (2010); Andrew Keay, Section
172(1) of the Companies Act 2006: An Interpretation and Assessment, 28 COMPANY
LAWYER 106 (2007).
386 Stephen Kim Park, Targeted Social Transparency as Global Corporate Strategy, 35
NW. J. OF INT. L. AND BUS. 87 (2014); Barnali Choudhury, Social Disclosure, 13 BERK. BUS.
L. J. 183 (2015).
387
The nature of the Strategic Report is discussed in Iris H-Y Chiu, Reviving
Shareholder Stewardship: Critically Examining the Impact of Corporate Transparency
Reforms in the UK, 38 DEL. J. OF CORP. L. 983 (2014).
388 Art. 19a.
389 Financial Reporting Council, Guidance on the Strategic Report (July 2018)
390 Section 3.1, Communication from the Commission — Guidelines on non-financial
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Communication explicitly confirms the stakeholder-orientation of the
statement.391 One may, however, treat the Communication as having
ambivalent premises, endorsing shareholder centricity on the one hand by
referring to standards of materiality, balance and fairness from the
perspective of investors’ interest, while also referring to corporate
responsibility conventions and the importance of stakeholders to the
statement.392 The approach taken by the U.K. in implementing the
disclosure obligation more clearly limits the social orientation of the
matters to be reported, and reframes their salience to be investor and
market-centric.
Disclosure regulation is often described as “sunlight,” being the “best
disinfectant” for behavior that may otherwise be hidden and shielded.
However, it is also a regulatory tool of minimum intrusion as it merely
compels information to be released so that the market can decide and effect
necessary economic discipline.393 There is even some investor interest in
the financial implications of a corporation’s compliance with the Modern
Slavery Act.394 In relation to socially responsible behavior, the mandatory
disclosure tool suffers from several limitations. One is that mandatory
disclosure is addressed to securities markets and investors, and reliance is
therefore placed on investors to introduce discipline for change in corporate
behavior. Investors are highly diverse, and even if some groups may
monitor such disclosure and assess their relevance to their investment
decisions,395 other groups may be indifferent.396 This results in mixed
reporting (methodology for reporting non-financial information) (2017) http://eurlex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52017XC0705(01).
391
Section 3.5, Communication from the Commission — Guidelines on non-financial
reporting (methodology for reporting non-financial information) (2017) http://eurlex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52017XC0705(01).
392 Id. Further, Impact Assessment for this reform was assessed largely in terms of
benefits to investors, see Martin Petrin, Regulatory Analysis in Corporate Law, 79 MOD. L.
REV. 537 (2016).
393 Alan C. Page and R.B. Ferguson, INVESTOR PROTECTION, at 59-77 (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press 1992).
394 Paul D. Cousins et al., The Shareholder Wealth Effects of Modern Slavery Reporting
Requirements (2017) https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2995175.
395 Such as investors that are ‘socially responsible funds’ mandated to factor in social
performance, see, Roger M. Barker and Iris H-Y Chiu, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND
INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT, ch. 2.F (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 2017) and citations therein.
It can be argued that many institutional investors have signed up to the UNPRI principles for
investment that include monitoring ‘environmental, social and governance’ (ESG) matters
and hence they would integrate these in their investment monitoring and decisions,
Generation Foundation, UNEP and UNPRI, Fiduciary Duty for the 21st Century: Statement
on Investor Obligations and Duties (June 2016) at https://www.unpri.org/download_
report/19422. Or that investors may be motivated to monitor ESG matters because they
believe in the link to business case, although see supra 196 (Marc Orlitzky, Links Between
Corporate Social Responsibility and Corporate Financial Performance: Theoretical and
Empirical Determinants, in Corporate Social Responsibility Volume 2 41 (José Allouche
ed., 2006); Laura Poddi & Sergio Vergalli, Does Corporate Social Responsibility Affect the
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signals and may be overall ineffective in terms of sending a market message
to corporations. Second, it is not certain what “market discipline” is
intended to be motivated by mandatory disclosure of this nature. This is
because investors only play a very limited role in challenging companies in
matters relating to social responsibility.397 If “market discipline” comes in
the form of “exit,” this form of economic discipline merely drives corporate
behavior in relation to managing their social responsibility profile for the
business case.398 Empirical research has found that social responsibility
reports focused on the business case tends towards being narrow and
individualistic, so the investor-centric orientation endorsed in law may not
be consonant with meeting social expectations.399
We should not assume that a financially-driven and marketized
framework for discipline and enforcement would clearly reshape incentives
and behavioral tendencies on the part of corporations towards socially
optimal objectives. Further, the reframing of the importance of CSR issues
as financially-driven may encourage only an instrumental perception of
their importance. 400 Incentive-based, instrumental behavior can trump
normative premises401 and the legalization in the EU Directive could
produce the counter-intuitive effect of undermining the social-ness of the
CSR norms that corporations should reckon with. However, the opposite
can also be true. The infusion of the salience of CSR norms into investment
marketplaces incrementally introduces re-orientation of market perceptions
with social ones,402 producing an integrative effect which is holistic and can
Performance
of
Firms? (FEEM
Working Paper No. 52.2009,
2009),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1444333) shows empirical research on such a link is inconclusive.
396
Alan Lewis and Carmen Juravle, Morals, Markets and Sustainable Investments: A
Qualitative Study of ‘Champions,’ 93 J. OF BU. ETHICS 483 (2010), discussing their findings
among qualitative surveys carried out on ‘champions’ for ESG investing in the mainstream
sector.
397 See Roger M. Barker and Iris H-Y Chiu, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND INVESTMENT
MANAGEMENT, ch. 2-3 (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 2017).
398 Martin Fougère and Nikodemus Solitander, Against Corporate Responsibility:
Critical Reflections on Thinking, Practice, Content and Consequences, 16 CORPORATE
SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND ENVIRON. MGMT., 217 (2009).
399 Stefan Tengblad and Claes Ohlsson, The Framing of Corporate Social Responsibility
and the Globalization of National Business Systems: A Longitudinal Case Study, 93 J.L OF
BUS. ETHICS 653 (2010).
400 See Iris H-Y Chiu, The Paradigms for Mandatory Non-Financial Disclosure: A
Conceptual Analysis- Parts 1- 2, 259 COMPANY LAWYER 291 (2006).
401 Jiwei Ci, Justice, Freedom, and the Moral Bounds of Capitalism, 25 SOCIAL THEORY
AND PRACTICE 409 (1999.
402 See Karl Polyani, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION (Beacon Press, 2nd ed, 2002, original
1944); Gareth Dale, KARL POLANYI: THE LIMITS OF THE MARKET (Polity Press, 2010); Carlo
Trigilia, ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY (Oxford: Blackwell 2002) at chapter 1, discussing Polyani’s
social embeddedness of markets, see Fred Block and Margaret F. Sommers, Beyond the
Economistic Fallacy: The Holistic Social Science of Karl Polanyi, VISION AND METHOD IN
HISTORICAL SOCIOLOGY (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1984). But note critique
that the vague concept of embeddedness provides no guidance for calculations needed for
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overcome the myopic and calculative culture of modern institutional
investment. This, however, requires more significant institutional change,
which Strine403 doubts would happen due to the entrenched patterns of
corporate law and the nature of modern institutional investment.404 The
U.K. transposition of the ambivalent premises in the EU Directive has
avoided paradigm change, although some see the usefulness of generally
overcoming information asymmetries for the purposes of informing civil
society or stakeholder activism.405
4. U.K. Reforms towards Stakeholder Inclusiveness in Corporate
Governance
The complaint so far of a lack of paradigm change is based on
observations of the corporate-centric and market-centric premises and
implementation of recent corporate regulation reforms, signaling no
significant shift from the tenets of regulatory capitalism. There is, however,
emerging corporate law reform in the U.K. that holds promise for more
fundamental change, as the government is preparing to implement more
formalized stakeholder engagement with corporations. This reform holds
promise as it places the polycentric governance space around corporations
on firmer footing, and marks a shift away from the a-socialized corporation
that pursues shareholder primacy and wealth maximization in a myopic
manner. If polycentric governance for corporations can be implemented
“strongly,” this has potential to overcome some of the critique raised earlier
in relation to the recent reforms. Polycentric governance can become a
dominant framework in corporate governance that mitigates the weaknesses
in firm-centric implementation or market-centric disclosure pointed out in
relation to the reforms discussed above.
Reforms towards stakeholder inclusiveness are one of the first
initiatives led by the May government after it came to power in July 2016 to
reform corporate governance. The Department of Business, Energy and
Industrial Strategy has embarked on legislative and soft law reforms that
purport to recalibrate stakeholders’ relations with the corporate sector in

economic behavior, see Kurtuluş Gemici, Karl Polanyi and the Antinomies of Embeddedness
6 SOCIAL ECON. REV. 5 (2008).
403 Leo Strine Jr., Human Freedom and Two Friedmen: Musings on the Implications of
Globalization
for
the
Effective
Regulation
of
Corporate
Behavior
at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1024506 (2007).
404 See, Roger Barker and Iris H-Y Chiu, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND INVESTMENT
MANAGEMENT, ch. 1-3 (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2017).
405 Nadia B. Ahmad, Meta-Regulation for Environmental Monitoring and Corporate
Sustainability Reporting, CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT:
EXPLORING THE NEXUS OF PRIVATE AND PUBLIC INTERESTS (Oxford: Routledge 2015) ; Cynthia
A. Williams, Engage, Embed, and Embellish: Theory versus Practice in the Corporate
Social Responsibility Movement. 31 J. CORP. L. 1 (2005).
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stakeholder favor.406 It may, however, be criticized that most reforms are in
soft law407 and the legislative initiatives only enhance shareholders’ roles.
The cynical view is that the reforms resist institutional change by giving
stakeholders illusory and non-consequential “improvements.” In the
alternative, we may view the confused premises of these reforms as
representing a genuine struggle towards institutional change.
First, employees are the only group of stakeholders given more voice
in strategic decision-making at companies. This is to be achieved in one of
three ways: nominating a non-executive director dedicated to employee
issues, nominating an employee-director, or setting up an employee
advisory council to feed input to the Board. The Financial Reporting
Council proposes changes to the U.K. Corporate Governance Code that
require Boards to demonstrate engagement with stakeholders, and in
particular to consider the above options in engaging with employees as
“normally” expected arrangements.408 Code standards are nevertheless
subject to “comply-or-explain” by listed companies.409 It can be argued that
the use of market-focused soft law to enhance employees’ stakeholder
rights within corporate governance falls short of moving away from the asocialization of corporations cocooned in the shareholder primacy model.
The Code is market-focused and is a means for shareholders to hold
companies’ corporate governance to account. Shareholders could agree to
companies deviating from these measures if they accept companies’
explanations.410
Next, directors are to report on how they have engaged with
stakeholder-focused considerations in narrative reporting.411 The disclosure
requirements are, however, constrained by the nature of the directors’ duty
406 Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, Corporate Governance
Reform: The Government’s Response (August 2017) https://www.gov.uk/government/
uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/640631/corporate-governance-reformgovernment-response.pdf
407 As part of the Corporate Governance Code or as industry guidelines, not in company
law as such.
408 FRC, Proposed Revisions to UK Corporate Governance Code (Dec. 2017)
https://www.frc.org.uk/getattachment/bff48ee6-4fce-4593-9768-77914dbf0b86/ProposedRevisions-to-the-UK-Corporate-Governance-Code-Appendix-A-Dec-2017.pdf.
409 Which means that companies should comply with the standards or else explain
deviations and shareholders would have the opportunity to evaluate their satisfaction or
otherwise with such explanations.
410 It has been argued that shareholders tend to hold companies to ‘compliance’ as
compliance represents a shorthand for best practices and shareholders may be too indifferent
to evaluate companies’ explanations in detail. See Marc Moore, Whispering Sweet Nothings:
The Limitations of Informal Conformance in UK Corporate Governance, 9 J. OF CORP. L.
STUDIES 77 (2009).
411 FRC, Proposed Revisions to UK Corporate Governance Code (Dec. 2017)
https://www.frc.org.uk/getattachment/bff48ee6-4fce-4593-9768-77914dbf0b86/ProposedRevisions-to-the-UK-Corporate-Governance-Code-Appendix-A-Dec-2017.pdf. This is now
enacted in § 414CZA, Companies Act 2006.
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in section 172 of the Companies Act,412 which hold directors to account to
shareholders for how they “promote the long-term success of the
company.” This directors’ report is primarily intended for shareholders’
evaluation. It remains uncertain how the continued maintenance of the
shareholder primacy focus in such stakeholder-related reporting would
advance corporate consciousness of stakeholder inclusiveness. There would
also be development of stakeholder engagement best practices in the form
of soft law led by professional and industry associations.413 It is uncertain to
what extent these would include stakeholder input. One of the associations
involved in developing this soft law is the Investment Association
representing investors. Can such leadership advance stakeholder
engagement with companies on stakeholders’ terms?
Finally, companies are to disclose the pay ratios of their U.K.
employees.414 This seems, on face, to meet the social demand for
scrutinizing the gulf of inequalities in reward that have developed in the
U.K.’s corporate sector. However, such disclosure is primarily targeted at
shareholders who would scrutinize this as a part of their role in approving
directors’ remuneration packages. Stakeholders seem disengaged from this
issue,415 which ought to be of social orientation and importance.
As soft law, not legalization, has been employed as the premise for
stakeholders to be “relationized” within corporate governance, the
continued dominance of the shareholder primacy framework can undermine
real advancement of stakeholders’ and CSR causes. However, the
institutional stature of soft law cannot be totally underestimated. Although
based in soft law, it can be argued that employee stakeholdership must be
realized, and it is only the form of such realization that is left to companies’
See §172, Companies Act 2006 explicitly provides that directors’ duties are to
promote the long-term success of the company for the benefit of the members as a whole.
This has come to be coined as ‘enlightened shareholder value’, a long-termist and more
inclusive perspective for corporate performance, but revolving around shareholders. But
most commentators are of the view that the focus on ‘shareholder value’ will unlikely
introduce any revolutionary move in directors’ conduct towards stakeholders; see e.g., Paul
Davies, Enlightened Shareholder Value and the New Responsibilities of Directors, (2005)
http://law.unimelb.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0014/1710014/94-Enlightened_
Shareholder_Value_and_the_New_Responsibilities_of_Directors1.pdf; see also Richard
Williams, Enlightened Shareholder Value in UK Company Law, 35 UNSW L. J. 360 (2012);
Andrew Keay, Section 172(1) of the Companies Act 2006: an Interpretation and Assessment,
28 COMPANY LAWYER 106 (2007); Elaine Lynch, Section 172: A Ground-Breaking Reform
of Director’s Duties, or the Emperor’s New Clothes?, COMPANY LAWYER 196 (2012).
413 Institute of Chartered Secretaries and Administrators: The Governance Institute and
the Investment Association.
414
Companies Act 2006 ¶ 19A.
415 Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, Corporate Governance
Reform: The Government’s Response (Aug.2017) https://www.gov.uk/government/
uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/640631/corporate-governance-reformgovernment-response.pdf, showing investor scepticism for the usefulness of such reporting,
and the lack of stakeholder engagement in responding to this measure.
412
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discretion. Further it can be argued that the collaborative model for
developing other stakeholder engagement mechanisms accepts a
polycentric principle for developing governance. This makes it less easy to
exclude civil society and other stakeholder groups that are not specifically
named in the reform document. Even if the confused and contesting
premises between shareholder-centric and stakeholder theories of the
corporation are not reconciled overtly416 in these reforms, these
developments mark a not insignificant shift from the tenets of regulatory
capitalism. Space is formally opened up for stakeholders and civil society to
exert pressure and efforts to ‘re-socialize’ the corporation, and the state has
finally taken on a more coordinating role to facilitate this potential.
Nevertheless, the implementation of stakeholder engagement reforms runs
the risk of being merely proceduralized. Commentators have highlighted
how stakeholder engagement can be carried out in superficial and limited
ways and do not fundamentally affect business strategy or corporate
culture.417 It remains uncertain if implementation of such reforms would be
devolved largely to the corporation. Further, the domination of investorcentric input into the development of best practices for stakeholder
engagement can affect the social utility of these engagement mechanisms.
The above survey of recent corporate regulation reforms paints a
mixed picture of what has been achieved in legalizing various aspects of
CSR. We observe some but not tremendous achievements in advancing
social norms in relation to corporate objectives or conduct. We observe a
significant employment of new governance techniques in compelling
corporations to institute procedures to address CSR matters, but procedural
regulation is largely devolved to corporations and do not involve the new
governance ethos of multi-stakeholder governance. Supply chain
governance in particular, in its devolved nature, is framed within a
commercial contractual context, and is likely to be dominated by
commercial and market forces. Finally, we are skeptical that corporate
transparency empowers multi-stakeholder governance and brings about
significant impact upon corporate ethical consciousness because such
transparency is either limited or directed at securities markets whose
economic discipline, if it exists, is not necessarily aligned with social
expectations.
Discussed in Ozlem Arikan, Julianne Reinecke, Crawford Spence and Kevin Morrell,
Signposts or Weathervanes? The Curious Case of Corporate Social Responsibility and
Conflict Minerals (2015) https://ssrn.com/abstract=3032498.
417 Jean-Pascal Gond, Reconsidering the Critical Corporate Social Responsibility
Perspective through French Pragmatic Sociology: Subverting Corporate Do-Gooding for
the Common Good’, THE CORPORATION, ch. 23 (Cambridge: CUP 2017) (opining that
stakeholder dialogue is usually ‘unilateral communications’ from the corporation); Krista
Bondy, Jeremy Moon and Dirk Matten, An Institution of Corporate Social Responsibility
(CSR) in Multi-National Corporations (MNCs): Form and Implications, 111 J. OF BUS.
ETHICS 281 (2012).
416
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The table below indicates achievements in each regulatory reform that
may portend of an institutional shift, mapped against limitations that show
adherence to the institutional tenets of regulatory capitalism.
Indicators of
Institutional Change
Conflict Minerals
Regulation

1.

Bribery Act 2010

1.

Criminal Finances
Act 2017

1.

2.

2.

BEIS Corporate
Governance
Reforms 201718

1.

Prescriptive
procedures
Compulsory thirdparty monitoring
and potential for
development of
formally
recognized multistakeholder
governance
Articulation of the
obligation to
prevent bribery

Articulation of the
obligation to
prevent tax
evasion
Supported by
impending
overhaul of tax
behavioral norms
Coordination of
stakeholder
engagement in
companies
especially with
employees

1.

Indicators of
Institutional
Adherence
No overt
articulation of
social objectives

1.

Devolution to
corporations to
design systems and
procedures
2. Lacks reference to
coordinating multistakeholder
governance
1. Devolution to
corporations to
design systems and
procedures
2. Lacks reference to
coordinating multistakeholder
governance
1. Directors’ report on
stakeholder
engagement framed
towards investors’
interests
2. Use of soft law in
coordinating
stakeholder
engagement, not
giving a position in
corporate law
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3.

EU Non-financial
Disclosure
Directive 2014
transposed in
U.K. Companies
Act

1.

2.

Modern Slavery Act
2015

1.

Implied
requirement for
institution of
corporate
procedures and
systems for wide
range of CSR
issues
Nudge towards
multi-stakeholder
governance for
procedural
implementation
(EU)
Mandatory
disclosure framed
towards sociallyfacing law
enforcement, not
securities markets

1.

2.

1.

2.

3.

Potential devolution
to corporations to
design engagement
mechanisms
Maintenance of
investor-centric
premise for
mandatory
disclosure
No legal footing for
coordination with
multi-stakeholder
governance

Lacks articulation
of obligation to
prevent human
trafficking/modern
slavery
Devolution to
corporations to
design systems and
procedures
Lacks reference to
coordinating multistakeholder
governance

In the next Section, we account for why regulatory reforms in
legalizing aspects of CSR are underwhelming and the implications of
addressing the precise locations of weakness.
IV. WHY LEGALIZATION OF CSR IS UNDERWHELMING AND
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
Calleiss and Renner argue that418 soft law hardens when its function
arrives at a state of “stabilization of normative expectations.” We may
blithely expect the legalization of aspects of CSR to reflect “mature”
418 Gralf-Peter Calliess & Moritz Renner, From Soft Law to Hard Code: The
Juridification of Global Governance, 22 RATIO JURIS 260 (2007).
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moments of recognition for certain aspects of CSR as public goods; the
“stabilization” of certain socially-facing norms of conduct for corporations;
and for corporate accountability to be provided in innovative ways,
including the engagement of multi-stakeholder governance.419 Although the
flexibility of soft law is often positively regarded, Short argues that “falling
back” on self or soft regulation is often a manifestation of a regulatory
“void” – the lack of resolve to address problems.420 Commentators support
the formalization of public policy in CSR, such as into regulation, as one or
more of the following benefits can be attained:
(a) leadership in setting public interest objectives;421
(b) the orchestration of governance capacity on the part of both public
and private actors by assigning regulatory responsibilities,
coordinating a systematic and coherent framework supported by
regulatory intervention to moderate imbalances in power and
influence;422
(c) support for the implementation of changes by private actors. These
include corporations and third party organisations that may
propose governance frameworks for corporations. Such support
allows regulators to co-opt private sector parties into coregulation;423 and
(d) the provision or coordination of enforcement capacity in different
419 Reinhard Steurer, The Role of Governments in Corporate Social Responsibility:
Characterising Public Policies on CSR in Europe, 43 POLICY SCI. 49 (2010); Jette Knudsen,
Bringing the State Back in? US and UK Government Regulation of Corporate Social
Responsibility (CSR) in International Business (2014) http://ssrn.com/abstract=2541002;
Natasha Tusikov, Transnational Non-State Regulatory Regimes, REGULATORY THEORY
(Canberra: ANU Press 2017). A comparative study on different extents of CSR publicisation
and legalisation can be found in Laura Albareda, Josep M. Lozano and Tamyko Ysa, Public
Policies on Corporate Social Responsibility: The Role of Governments in Europe, 74 J. OF
BUS. ETHICS 391 (2007).
420 Jodi Short, Self-Regulation in the Regulatory Void: “Blue Moon” or “Bad Moon”?,
649 THE ANNALS OF THE AM. ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCI. 22 (2013); Atle
Blomgren, Is the CSR Craze Good for Society? The Welfare Economic Approach to
Corporate Social Responsibility, 69 REV. OF SOCIAL ECON. 495 (2011) (arguing that rarely
would public goods be best provided by private providers).
421 Colin Scott, The Regulatory State and Beyond’, REGULATORY THEORY, ch. 16
(Canberra:ANU Press 2017); Benedict Sheehy, Private and Public Corporate Regulatory
Systems: Does CSR Provide a Systemic Alternative to Public Law, 17 UC DAVIS BUS. L. J. 1
(2016); Robert MacQuordale, Towards More Effective Legal Implementation of Corporate
Accountability for Violations of Human Rights, 103 PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANNUAL MEETING
(AMER. SOCIETY OF INT. L.) 288 (2009).
422 Kenneth W. Abbott; Duncan Snidal, Strengthening International Regulation through
Transmittal New
Governance: Overcoming the Orchestration Deficit, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 501 (2009).
423 Colin Scott, Beyond Taxonomies of Private Authority in Transnational Regulation, 13
GERMAN L.J. 1329 (2012); Neil Gunningham, Regulation: From Traditional to Cooperative,
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF WHITE COLLAR CRIME (Oxford: OUP 2016); Fabrizio Cafaggi, New
Foundations of Transnational Private Regulation, 38 J. OF L. AND SOCIETY 20 (2011).
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and multi-faceted ways in order to secure corporate compliance
and behavioral change.424
However, if we measure the achievements of the corporate regulation
reforms discussed in Section III against the expectations stipulated above,
the achievements seem underwhelming.
First, the Table in Section III shows that the articulation of substantive
obligations is limited, and has only been more clearly achieved in antibribery and anti-tax evasion. In the absence of clearer and stronger
normative premises, task-based and procedural requirements may produce
compliance of an underwhelming quality, as corporations can revert to their
own centricity and market-facing priorities in order to determine their
implementation. It remains questionable if there is clear engagement with
ethics, social expectations, and corporate culture.
The lack of genuine social advancement in some CSR areas may be
attributed to the still-contested nature of these issues in the polycentric
transnational sphere.425 The “hardening” or “legalization” of substantive
norms is limited in two ways. One is that substantive norms that are
legalized reflect already-achieved consensus in international governmental
organizations, advancing nothing much that is novel. The due diligence
obligations in conflict minerals and anti-bribery as well as the fight against
tax evasion using offshore havens have all been developed extensively over
decades under the OECD.426 In particular, it may also be noteworthy that
norm advancement in anti-bribery and tax evasion were achieved due to
economic interests at play. A number of commentators discuss how U.S.
business economic interests were key to the U.S. government’s adopting the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 1977 and its sustained championing for
international convergence, which was finally achieved in the late 1990s at
the OECD.427 Further, it has also been suggested that anti-tax evasion
Yishai Blank; Issi Rosen-Zvi, The Persistence of the Public/Private Divide in
Environmental Regulation, 15 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 199 (2014); Kevin T. Jackson, The
Normative Logic of Global Economic Governance: In Pursuit of Non-Instrumental
Justification for the Rule of Law and Human Rights, 22 MINN. J. INT’L L. 71 (2013);
425 See supra Section II.
426 OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from
Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas established since 2011; the OECD Convention on
Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions since
1997, and in relation to tax evasion and avoidance, the OCED has since 1993 began work on
mooting a Model Tax Convention for multilateral adoption, and since 1998 began work on
combatting harmful tax competition from tax havens see e.g., Harmful Tax Competition
(1998) http://www.oecd.org/tax/transparency/44430243.pdf. It continues to address tax
reporting and tax avoidance schemes such as transfer pricing and base erosion.
427 Beverley Earle, The United States’ Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and the OECD
Anti-Bribery Recommendation: When Moral Suasion Won’t Work, Try the Money Argument,
14 PENN STATE INT. L. REV. 207 (1996); Kenneth W. Abbott, Rule-making in the WTOLessons from Bribery and Corruption, 4 J. OF INT. ECON. L. 275 (2001); Elizabeth K. Spahn,
Implementing Global Anti-Bribery Norms: From The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act to the
OECD Anti-Bribery Convention to the
424
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norms have been advanced in the U.K. after the global financial crisis
largely due to the government’s interests in shoring up its fiscal weaknesses
after bailing out large banks in the crisis.428 The alignment of economic
interests and political strength are key to policy choice changes and norm
advancement, and such are still relatively lacking in relation to supply chain
responsibility, as the implications for multinational corporations would be
an undesirable convergence in enterprise liability and an expansion of their
legal risks. 429 Hence, in relation to corporations’ responsibility to prevent
human rights violations or manage supply chain misconduct, norms are
much more contested in terms of the scope of corporate responsibility in a
network of commercial relations.
We also see the lack of advancement in regulatory commitment to
norms of social justice as being due to the lack of multi-stakeholder
governance or a Habermasian430 discourse in the polycentric space
regarding the future of our capitalism model431 and institutions. Although
U.N. Convention Against Corruption, 23 INDIANA INT. AND COMP. L. REV. 1 (2013)
(commenting that the variety of norms both economic and social supporting anti-bribery and
corruption. But the dominance of economic interests preceded the development of more
social and developmental objectives. See locus classicus, SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN,
Corruption: A Study In Political Economy (Academic Press 1997) which focuses on the
incentives for and distortions caused by corruption and argues that anti-corruption strategies
must deal with those in order to achieve efficiency for both the public and private sectors.
428 Iris H-Y Chiu, From Multilateral to Unilateral Lines of Attack: The Sustainability of
Offshore Tax Havens and Financial Centres in the International Legal Order, 31
CONNECTICUT J. OF INT. L. 177 (2016).
429 MNCs have been able to structure risky activities in subsidiaries in order to protect
parent companies from liability. In the UK this is helped by the persistent refusal of UK
courts to allow enterprise liability by applying the ‘lifting of the corporate veil’, see Adams v
Cape Industries plc [1990] Ch 433; Prest v Petrodel Resources Ltd [2013] UKSC 34
especially Lord Sumption’s judgement with whom two lawlords agree. If certain
transnational norms such as protection of human rights or responsibility for supply chain
practices become legalised, MNCs’ legal risk is likely amplified and current practices of risk
management would cease to be effective.
430 See generally JÜRGEN HABERMAS, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a
Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1996) (arguing
that theories of law and democracy are built upon a theory of discourse, communication and
deliberation in the manner espoused in earlier works); JÜRGEN HABERMAS, Communication
and the Evolution of Society (Beacon Press, 1979) (developing a theory of communication in
society that is premised on language, seeking the technical qualities of language that can
achieve universal conditions for understanding); JÜRGEN HABERMAS, Moral Consciousness
And Communicative Action (MIT Press, 1990) (espouses the discourse theory of ethics
where ethical values in shared social understandings are developed by communication in the
manner espoused in earlier works); JÜRGEN HABERMAS, The Theory of Communicative
Action, Vol. 2: Lifeworld and System: A Critique of Functionalist Reason (Boston: Beacon
Press, 1985) (sketching out a social system whereby social order and integration is
maintained by shared understandings and values developed through communication,
developed from his earlier work above).
431 Concerns with the problems of a liberal market economy model of capitalism have
been articulated even before the global financial crisis 2007-9 in ADAIR TURNER, Just
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we see new governance techniques employed to an unprecedented extent in
terms of interrogating the inside organization and procedures of
corporations, much of regulatory implementation results in devolution to
the corporation or scrutiny by securities markets. Corporations would
manage their supply chain governance as an extension to their contractual
governance, and it is queried if the continued dominance of the commercial
context would bring any fundamental change to the corporations’ incentivebased behavior. There is still too much deference to the corporation and its
self-regulating capacity, and misplaced reliance on capital markets to
develop an aligned “market for virtue.” The continued failure of regulatory
incorporation of the new governance ethos of polycentricism could be a key
impediment to institutional shift. Except for the mandatory requirement of
third-party auditing under the Conflict Minerals Regulation, there is no
implicit nudge towards co-opting multi-stakeholder governance in other
regulatory reforms discussed.
The lack of advancement in promoting the ethos of multi-stakeholder
governance can be fundamentally attributed to the incompatibility of such
governance with the capitalist institution of the U.K.’s liberal market
economy. This capitalist model eschews the notion of regulators taking a
lead in coordinating polycentric governance. Orchestrating such
coordination may be seen to be intervening with the freedoms of
constituents who should be allowed to express their discipline in the open
“market for virtue.” Although the “market for virtue” as a liberal notion is
open to all who supply and demand, the market commercializes virtue, the
very problem that CSR protagonists wish to address. Moreover, the market
for virtue is not a level playing field. Voices derived from capital, i.e.,
investors’ voices, are accorded with more legitimacy in the current
paradigm of regulatory capitalism, and civil society voices can be
marginalized, enjoying no real freedom of exercising discipline. It may be
necessary for states and regulators to coordinate stakeholder and civil
society involvement more explicitly432 in order to (a) signal the public
interest orientation of CSR issues (and not merely their commercial or
market relevance) and (b) compensate for stakeholders’ and civil society’s
relatively disadvantaged positions in exercising governance.433 Pluralistic
and inclusive frameworks can be key to fostering discourses that may give

Capitalism (Pan., 2002) advocating that capitalism needs to develop a ‘human face’ and be
more socially cognisant for it to survive and thrive.
432 Neil Gunningham, The New Collaborative Environmental Governance: The
Localization of Regulation, 36 J. OF L.A ND SOC’Y 145 (2009)..
433 These groups do not have institutional status within law or politics to influence policy
and business behavior as such, and their capabilities can be better enhanced. In this respect
the European Commission’s development of sectoral human rights due diligence guidelines
with multi-stakeholder input is commendable but only starts a slow process of ‘nudge’ for
corporate adoption.

168

An Institutional Theory of Corporate Regulation
39:85 (2019)

rise to substantive changes in values, norms or goals.434
Legalization has also avoided hardening or recognizing civil society
initiatives that attempt to connect social dimensions with corporate
procedures, affirming the primacy of the corporation in deciding its
implementation. This has the tendency to allow corporations to default to
their incentive-based behavior in designing their implementation. As
discussed above, despite the achievements in transnational governance435 in
relation to substantive standards of conduct, auditing, or certification
initiatives, the regulatory reforms discussed above have avoided
recognizing these developments. The avoidance of elevating or giving
recognition to social initiatives may again be attributed to the U.K.’s
preference for market fundamentalism, allowing corporations to choose
among the plethora of initiatives out there, as if the transnational
governance space is a market for implementation designs. One
commentator opines that more advancement in CSR causes can possibly be
achieved if regulators are involved in facilitating the coordination and
convergence of multiple initiatives and standards.436
In the U.K., the stakeholder-focused reforms in soft law that are afoot
in corporate governance hold some promise for introducing a formal multistakeholder governance space surrounding corporations. This reform may
be important for future advancement of CSR causes. Employees are to be
formally organized in order to input voice into corporate governance, and
research has shown that they are able to advance labor justice and human
rights issues.437 Other stakeholder engagement mechanisms are to be
developed in soft law, and such mechanisms can also form the basis for
developing multi-stakeholder governance over CSR issues. However, there
are a few caveats in viewing such stakeholder inclusiveness reforms as
being equivalent to the coordination of polycentric/multi-stakeholder
governance in CSR issues. Stakeholder engagement mechanisms are likely
focused on each group’s interests and may not be focused on particular
CSR issues. Such engagement mechanisms may be seen as private
dialogues and communications, and do not revolve around public interest or
the provision of public goods. In the absence of the “public” coordinating
hand, the dynamics and coordination within such mechanisms would
merely be private interactions, and governance potential or capacity may
434 Björn Fasterling, Development of Norms Through Compliance Disclosure, 106 J. OF
BUS. ETHICS 73 (2012).
435 Such as the SHIFT-Mazars’ initiatives on business and human rights reporting and
assurance highlighted earlier. See Larry Catá Backer, The Guiding Principles of Business
and Human Rights at a Crossroads: The State, the Enterprise, and the Spectre of a Treaty to
Bind Them All, http://ssrn.com/abstract=2462844 (2014).
436 Jeff Schwartz, The Conflict Minerals Experiment, 6 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 129(2016).
437 Ruth V. Aguilera, Deborah E. Rupp, Cynthia A. Williams and Jyoti Ganapathi,
Putting the S Back in Corporate Social Responsibility: A Multilevel Theory of Social Change
in Organizations, 32 THE ACADEMY OF MGMT. REV. 836 (2007).
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not be activated or galvanized. Much more refinement and formalization of
stakeholder inclusiveness mechanisms, purposed towards specific CSR
issues, would need to be considered.
It may be argued that civil society groups should also improve their
transparency, social accountability, representativeness and legitimacy in
order to become truly credible actors in the multi-stakeholder governance
space. These issues are acknowledged by many,438 but the imperfections of
such groups can be worked upon. Civil society groups may be comparably
lacking in capacity, resources, and sophistication vis-a-vis corporations and
their industry associations.439 Indeed, states and regulators should engage
with civil society groups more and look into capacity-building in terms of
their research and informational strengths. Such imperfections cannot
amount to good reason for their marginalization.
Corporate regulation reforms in legalizing aspects of CSR seemed to
hold promise in changing the nature of corporate regulation. We
acknowledge the incremental achievements but remain underwhelmed. We
account for the limitations in recent regulatory reforms by highlighting their
institutional adherence. The institutional account of recent corporate
regulation reforms within the paradigm of regulatory capitalism explains
the limited achievements in the implementation of new governance and the
purported legalization of CSR. This institutional account nevertheless
pinpoints precise locations of impediments to institutional change, so as to
inspire resolve to face the heavier lifting ahead.
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